第一篇：Ted韓雪演講：積極的悲觀主義者(中文)

韓雪ted演講全程英文_演講主題----積極的悲觀主義者 大家下午好：

首先請?jiān)试S我我大家放一段音樂，我知道彈的很不好

因?yàn)槟鞘俏覐椀?，很抱歉這還不是本場最差。

我還要給大家看另外一個(gè)東西不要笑 這些話描述了一個(gè)完整的故事

如果你們真的想知道里面講的內(nèi)容 你們待會可以看下我的微博 這一幅畫是我去年畫的 我還有另外一幅作品比這個(gè)要好很多 但這一幅是我20年前畫的 你們一定想問 怎么越畫越差了？ 我猜你們的結(jié)論一定是 我越來越缺乏想象力了 那這是為什么呢 我想這是因?yàn)槲议L大了 長大了以后 我們開始變得害怕犯錯(cuò)了

我們要么不做，要做就做好的 所以總是嘗試著不去犯錯(cuò)誤 我們似乎將自己困在了一個(gè)保護(hù)過度的世界中 于是乎我們漸漸失去了想象力與創(chuàng)造力

怎么辦呢 對于我來說答案就是要做一個(gè)積極的悲觀主義者 讓我來解釋一下 做一個(gè)悲觀主義者意味著你放低對自己的要求 接受可能會失敗的事實(shí) 那么積極有意味著什么 其實(shí)很簡單 就是你拼盡全力 要去贏得游戲 把這兩個(gè)觀念放在一起似乎有一些矛盾 我也同意 但是我的認(rèn)為這就是世界本來的樣子 就是這樣 我們總能在生活中找到完全對立的事物

但是他們很好地共存在一起 那么如何做一個(gè)積極地悲觀主義者呢 我來分享一些我的經(jīng)歷吧 或許我還沒有老到可以大談自己的經(jīng)歷 但是這些故事對于我個(gè)人而言非常寶貴

第一個(gè)故事發(fā)生在2012年 我第一次成為了一名電視制片人 但是正如你們所知道的我是一名演員和歌手

制片人的角色我還是很不熟悉 所以請記住 我首先得是一個(gè)悲觀主義者 我要去設(shè)想最壞的結(jié)果 最壞或許就是沒有人愿意花錢去買它了吧 而我所有的花費(fèi)和時(shí)間都付諸東流

這項(xiàng)投資金額大概相當(dāng)于我這幾年演藝生涯賺到的錢的總和 電視市場是怎樣的呢

在國內(nèi)只有20%的電視劇能成功賣出去并在電視臺播放剩下的80%呢？ 過去制作團(tuán)隊(duì)只剩下了一堆錄像帶

現(xiàn)在情況更糟 我們只能剩下（硬盤里的）一堆數(shù)據(jù) 所以我不斷問自己 “你到底能不能接受這個(gè)最壞的結(jié)果” 我的答案是肯定的，至少我能試一下所以我們開始了拍攝 接下來 還記得嗎我要做的就是要保持積極心態(tài)

因?yàn)槲沂且粋€(gè)數(shù)字產(chǎn)品迷所以我還決定要在自己的電視中采用高科技 我專注在實(shí)現(xiàn)4k分辨率 我來解釋一下這是一個(gè)什么概念 通常我們在電影院屏幕上看到的電影分辨率是2k 而4k是2k的四倍分辨率 當(dāng)然這也意味著文件每幀都有50mb大小 如果你還有點(diǎn)迷糊的話 沒關(guān)系 你只需要記住這是在中國電視界的 一個(gè)巨大的挑戰(zhàn) 在我們之前只有很少一部分人嘗試過4k分辨率 他們做到了4k輸入但并不是輸出 因?yàn)樗鼘?shí)在是太難了 張藝謀導(dǎo)游在他的電影《歸來》中第一次使用了4k 當(dāng)我們結(jié)束了拍攝的工作并開始制作后期 噩夢才真的降臨在我們頭上

我仍然記得我們打算為北京電視節(jié)做一段5分鐘的試片 但是辛苦工作了一整天后

我們只輸出了50秒鐘 而且這個(gè)時(shí)候電腦癱瘓了 我快要急瘋了 我能夠做點(diǎn)什么嗎？一部30集的電視劇 我只輸出了50秒鐘的視頻 于是我去問我們的顧問 我們的技術(shù)顧問來自美國最大的數(shù)字影像公司red 他們告訴我們在美國他們使用的是ｈｐ基礎(chǔ)站 但是在中國我們并沒有ｈｐ基礎(chǔ)站

它實(shí)在是太貴了我們根本買不起 所以我們決定自己組裝自己的設(shè)備 我們嘗試了數(shù)十種組合的輸出模式 經(jīng)過了六個(gè)月之后我們成功了 我的《淑女之家》成為了首部 真正4k輸出的電視劇 而且我成功地把它賣給了電視臺并獲得了不錯(cuò)的收視率 這次的經(jīng)歷讓我學(xué)會了不要去害怕接受巨大的挑戰(zhàn) 你可以做好失敗的心理準(zhǔn)備但是靠毅力去征服它

下一個(gè)故事就發(fā)生在去年 我接受了貝爾的邀請 有人知道他嗎？ 你們可能會想我簡直瘋了 是的就是這個(gè)號稱站在食物鏈頂端的男人 他幾乎什么都吃 我也是 你們或許覺得我瘋了，是的在那兒之前 我?guī)缀鯖]做過體育鍛煉 我的體能也不太好 我害怕很多事情 我恐高 而且害怕昆蟲 我甚至連過山車都不敢做 但是我?guī)缀躐R上就接受了他的邀請 因?yàn)槲抑廊绻曳艞夁@次機(jī)會 我這一輩子都不會再得到它了 所以我決定去冒一次險(xiǎn) 在20天里面 我抓過老鼠 吃過昆蟲

但是（還好）我沒有喝過尿液 在前半段的旅程中我?guī)缀趺刻於荚诳奁?印象最深刻的是倒數(shù)第二天 我記得那一天我們要通過懸掛在懸崖兩邊 的繩子穿越一個(gè)峽谷 就是這張圖片 但是你們看不到寬度，很寬的 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的姿勢是將整個(gè)身體都懸掛在繩索上面

用一只腳的腳踝纏繞住繩子 然后用力將自己從一邊拉到另一邊去 輪到我的時(shí)候 貝爾對我說 你確定你要嘗試嗎

如果你想要退出這一項(xiàng)也是可以的因?yàn)槲抑滥銦o法保持身體的平衡 你不能使用你的左胳膊

在那項(xiàng)任務(wù)的兩天前我不幸地將自己的左手弄傷了 而且傷到了神經(jīng)系統(tǒng) 我的手指會不受控制地顫抖

我?guī)缀鯚o法使用我的左手 作為一名悲觀者，我不得不設(shè)想最壞的情況 這可是一個(gè)真人秀節(jié)目

真人秀可能會是非常危險(xiǎn)的 如果做不到百分百的完美

你可能會在網(wǎng)上受到網(wǎng)友的批評 我可能會再次跌倒然后傷到我右手 我問自己真的要嘗試嗎 我想至少我死不了 那就不管那么多了 接受挑戰(zhàn)

當(dāng)時(shí)當(dāng)我真的將我的身體掛在那根繩子上的時(shí)候

比我想象中的要難很多了 你們可以從照片中看到我的姿勢 我的團(tuán)隊(duì)成員跟我說 “你真是太丑了” 她說你看上去像一只死掉的毛毛蟲 我身體的一半在這一邊，另外一半在另一邊

這還不算最糟糕的 最糟糕的是我的手臂支撐不起我的上半身和腦袋 我抬不起頭去看終點(diǎn)在哪里 我該怎么辦？ 我知道我必須懷有積極的心態(tài) 我還知道

積極并不是說簡簡單單地說出一些話 你必須積極地作出點(diǎn)什么 那個(gè)時(shí)候我只能看到前面3米處的一塊石頭 我決定設(shè)定一個(gè)小小的目標(biāo) 專注子啊那塊石頭上 當(dāng)我心里面只想著那塊石頭的時(shí)候 神奇的事情發(fā)生了 我忘記了懸崖的高度 也忘記了要去保持平衡

我甚至忘記了終點(diǎn) 我只記得自己要專注 然后不斷拉自己 然后我開始朝前尋找一個(gè)又一個(gè)的目標(biāo) 然后任何小的物體都成為我前面閃閃發(fā)光的圖像 多次以后 我意識到我離終點(diǎn)已經(jīng)很近了

然后我終于成功抵達(dá) 從那以后我知道了失敗并不可怕 你只需要設(shè)立小小的目標(biāo)然后全身心投入

這些發(fā)生在我身上的故事塑造了我 成為一個(gè)積極的悲觀主義者 直到今天 我知道自己鋼琴彈得很差 畫也畫不好

也不是一個(gè)太棒的制作人 但是我喜歡成為一個(gè)積極的悲觀主義者 任何事情都不能阻擋我成為更好的人 謝謝大家

第二篇：(TED英文演講)韓雪：積極的悲觀主義者——觀后感

To be a positive pessimist.—— Feedback When we were young, we often dare to do whatever we can regardless of anything because we are innocent.As we became more mature after growth, we started being afraid of making mistakes.It’s common that we choose to be the best or nothing.Just like the lecturer Han Xue mentioned, we trapped ourselves in an overprotective world.Everything we are going to do or each situation we may face is unpredictable, but it shouldn’t be the reason for our escaping all hard periods.What if people always get rid of troubles? It seems like a signal meaning a loss of imagination and creativity.So, there must be some solutions that are needed.Han Xue shared her strategies about being a positive pessimist.She suggested that we receive lower expectations to ourselves and prepare to lose.Meanwhile, it doesn’t mean that you can always give in.Spare no efforts and go for it!There won’t be so much pity even if a failure happens.You might have a confusion about the “positive” and “pessimist”, how could a couple of opposite attitudes interweave together? However, we can find such paradoxes surrounding us.Generally speaking, we are expected to show our confidence while taking huge challenges, and conquer them with will power.Particularly, you needn’t be ashamed of losing only if you put your heart into it.A positive pessimist may not have something outstanding, but he(or she)must be better which is unstoppable.

第三篇：TED演講：了解中國的崛起(無中文)

Understanding the rise of China

了解中國的崛起

Martin Jacques TED演講：

在TED倫敦沙龍會上，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家馬丁·雅克Martin Jacques問：在西方我們對中國和它顯著的崛起現(xiàn)象有多少認(rèn)識？作為《當(dāng)中國統(tǒng)治世界》的作者，他解釋了西方國家常常對中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速增長力感到困惑的理由，他提出3個(gè)基礎(chǔ)觀點(diǎn)來幫助我們理解當(dāng)代的中國現(xiàn)實(shí)和中國未來的展望。

正文：

The world is changing with really remarkable speed.If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States.Goldman Sachs projected 2027.The post-crisis projection is 2020.That's just a decade away.China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects.First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world.Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country.Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world--which I think is what China will become--will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.Now, I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that as countries modernize, they also westernize.This is an illusion.It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology.It is not.It is also shaped equally by history and culture.China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West.It will remain in very fundamental respects very different.Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment, by and large, is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas.We can't.Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like, just as a beginning.The first is this: that China is not really a nation-state.Okay, it's called itself a nation-state for the last hundred years, but everyone who knows anything about China knows it's a lot older than this.This was what China looked like with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C.at the end of the warring-state period--the birth of modern China.And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China.Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2,000 years ago.And you can see already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China, which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now.Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China its sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation-state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization-state.I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on.These are all things that come from the period of the civilization-state.In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization-state, rather than as a nation-state.And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people.What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized.You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case.It's never been the case.So this is China, a civilization-state, rather than a nation-state.And what does it mean? Well, I think it has all sorts of profound implications.I'll give you two quick ones.The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization.You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown--the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire.It divided, and it's remained divided ever since.China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization-state, together.The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong.Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was.One country, two systems.And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them.“Window dressing.When China gets its hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case.” Thirteen years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997.We were wrong.Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation-state ways.Think of German unification, 1990.What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West.One nation, one system.That is the nation-state mentality.But you can't run a country like China, a civilization-state, on the basis of one civilization, one system.It doesn't work.So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong--as it will be to the question of Taiwan--was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Let me offer you another building block to try and understand China--maybe not sort of a comfortable one.The Chinese have a very, very different conception of race to most other countries.Do you know, of the 1.3 billion Chinese, over 90 percent of them think they belong to the same race, the Han? Now, this is completely different from the world's [other] most populous countries.India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil--all of them are multiracial.The Chinese don't feel like that.China is only multiracial really at the margins.So the question is, why? Well the reason, I think, essentially is, again, back to the civilization-state.A history of at least 2,000 years, a history of conquest, occupation, absorption, assimilation and so on, led to the process by which, over time, this notion of the Han emerged--of course, nurtured by a growing and very powerful sense of cultural identity.Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together.The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together.The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference.They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not.Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state.Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West.Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think--in these days at least--that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy.The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state.And the reason for this is because--well, there are two reasons, I think.And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy.And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special--it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization-state.This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged--I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on--for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged.It's had no serious rivals.So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history.The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state.Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all.The Chinese view the state as an intimate--not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family--not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family.This is the Chinese view of the state--very, very different to ours.It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West.And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past.Know that China believes in the market and the state.I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century, said, “The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe.” And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more or less the case ever since.But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state.The state is everywhere in China.I mean, it's leading firms--many of them are still publicly owned.Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage.Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state.And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas--as we are familiar with--with something like the one-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft.I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one.But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C.and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D.It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai.So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China.So there we have three building blocks for trying to understand the difference that is China--the civilization-state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.And yet we still insist, by and large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts.If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong--our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect--this is the reason.Unfortunately, I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality.It's kind of arrogant.It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure.And secondly, it's ignorant.We refuse to really address the issue of difference.You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian.And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures.But it's not.In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations.Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way.Whereas those cultures--virtually the rest of the world, in fact, which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West--have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies.And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia.East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc.--a third of the world's population lives there.Now the largest economic region in the world.And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia.Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present.Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning, the Goldman Sachs chart.What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world.We've seen this in terms of the G20 usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8.And there are two consequences of this.First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world.There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago--Copenhagen, climate change conference.Europe was not at the final negotiating table.When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago.And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with.And at last, I'm afraid--take Europe;America is slightly different--but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing.Some people--I've got an English friend in China, and he said, “The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion.” Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration.But there's another problem which goes along with this--that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world--and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future.I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in its confidence.Take the 19th century, for example.But this, alas, is no longer true.If you want to feel the future, if you want to taste the future, try China--there's old Confucius.This is a railway station the likes of which you've never seen before.It doesn't even look like a railway station.This is the new Guangzhou railway station for the high-speed trains.China already has a bigger network than any other country in the world and will soon have more than all the rest of the world put together.Or take this: now this is an idea, but it's an idea to be tried out shortly in a suburb of Beijing.Here you have a megabus, on the upper deck carries about 2,000 people.It travels on rails down a suburban road, and the cars travel underneath it.And it does speeds of up to about 100 miles an hour.Now this is the way things are going to move, because China has a very specific problem, which is different from Europe and different from the United States: China has huge numbers of people and no space.So this is a solution to a situation where China's going to have many, many, many cities over 20 million people.Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it.But I want to argue, above all, a big-picture positive for this world.For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population.That's what Europe and North America represented.The arrival of countries like China and India--between them 38 percent of the world's population--and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years.Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world.As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation, and we will have to learn about these civilizations.This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa.The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic.(Laughter)Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368.I think they're playing golf.Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.Welcome to the future.Thank you.(Applause)

第四篇：韓媒建議總統(tǒng)訪華用中文演講 稱此舉將感動(dòng)中國

韓媒建議總統(tǒng)訪華用中文演講 稱此舉將感動(dòng)中國

2013年05月23日04:03 環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào) 我有話說(1166人參與)

【環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)綜合報(bào)道】 22日首爾傳出的消息同樣復(fù)雜。韓聯(lián)社援引青瓦臺外交秘書的話說，如韓朝重啟對話，韓將從小事情上推動(dòng)韓朝恢復(fù)信任。韓國《中央日報(bào)》則援引韓國外長尹炳世的話說，朝鮮在賭博，“最終會輸?shù)蒙頍o分文”。

韓國媒體昨天關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)還包括總統(tǒng)樸槿惠籌劃于6月底訪華。韓國《中央日報(bào)》22日期待樸槿惠屆時(shí)能在北京用中文發(fā)表演講，哪怕不能全文使用中文，起碼可以用中文照著稿子念或只在核心部分用中文，并稱重要的不是發(fā)音是誠意，認(rèn)為此舉可以帶給中國很大的感動(dòng)?！俄n民族新聞》則說，樸槿惠訪華是韓國戒掉美韓同盟癮的契機(jī)。

“韓朝美中開始接觸，半島局勢或迎轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)”，韓聯(lián)社以此為題說，首爾將崔龍海訪華看做平壤主動(dòng)接觸中國的“好兆頭”，樸訪華時(shí)也必然與北京談朝鮮問題，此外，朝韓外長一直都參加的東盟地區(qū)論壇6月底也將在文萊舉行。若四方在今后一個(gè)月的連鎖接觸中達(dá)成共識，朝鮮與周邊對話將進(jìn)入準(zhǔn)備期。韓國《韓國日報(bào)》據(jù)此說，6月或許會成為左右朝鮮半島局勢的分水嶺。