第一篇：演講稿之尼克松

演講題目：理查德·尼克松

理查德·尼克松，出生于1913年9月。1946年，尼克松當(dāng)選美國(guó)眾議員，其政治觀點(diǎn)保守，素有反共斗士之稱，與參議員約瑟夫·雷芒德·麥卡錫齊名，是麥卡錫主義的擁護(hù)者和極力倡導(dǎo)者。他在1952年與1956年兩度與德懷特·D·艾森豪威爾搭檔參選并獲得勝利，在1953年到1961年間，擔(dān)任了兩屆副總統(tǒng)職務(wù)。1960年尼克松競(jìng)選總統(tǒng)，以微弱票差被約翰·肯尼迪擊敗，又在1962年競(jìng)選加利福尼亞州州長(zhǎng)時(shí)落敗而暫時(shí)離開國(guó)家權(quán)力中樞。1968年尼克松重返政壇，在當(dāng)年的美國(guó)大選中順利當(dāng)選為美國(guó)總統(tǒng)。1971年，發(fā)起了舉世聞名，影響美國(guó)刑事司法制度深遠(yuǎn)至今的“向毒品宣戰(zhàn)（英語(yǔ)：War on Drugs）”。

尼克松生性多疑，在美國(guó)政壇有“難以捉摸的迪克”（Tricky Dick）綽號(hào)。尼克松在1959年7月莫斯科舉行的美國(guó)國(guó)家展覽會(huì)（American National Exhibition）開幕式上，與時(shí)任蘇聯(lián)部長(zhǎng)會(huì)議主席的赫魯曉夫之間展開過一場(chǎng)關(guān)于東西方意識(shí)形態(tài)和核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的論戰(zhàn)，史稱“廚房辯論”。在任期內(nèi)，將美國(guó)軍隊(duì)撤出了越南，逐漸結(jié)束了那場(chǎng)使國(guó)家陷入危機(jī)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。透過乒乓球活動(dòng)嘗試與中華人民共和國(guó)建立外交關(guān)系，并支持其進(jìn)入聯(lián)合國(guó)，史稱“乒乓外交”，改善了中國(guó)大陸與美國(guó)的關(guān)系。尼克松于1972年2月訪問中國(guó)大陸，是美國(guó)總統(tǒng)第一次訪問一個(gè)與美國(guó)沒有正式外交關(guān)系的國(guó)家，對(duì)中國(guó)大陸的7天訪問被稱為“改變世界的一周”。當(dāng)時(shí)，尼克松率團(tuán)訪問了北京、杭州、上海三個(gè)城市，在北京與中共中央主席毛澤東會(huì)面，并在杭州西湖邊的園林中與中國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院總理周恩來(lái)草簽了轟動(dòng)世界的《中美聯(lián)合公報(bào)》。中華人民共和國(guó)與美國(guó)兩國(guó)關(guān)系正?；?，美中蘇三角外交的態(tài)勢(shì)開始形成，在很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間里成為決定國(guó)際形勢(shì)發(fā)展的重要因素之一。

他平生有兩大事跡而聞名全球。第一，尼克松訪華，這是當(dāng)時(shí)轟動(dòng)世界的舉動(dòng)，他這個(gè)人確實(shí)有遠(yuǎn)見卓識(shí)的本領(lǐng)。在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的人們會(huì)認(rèn)為美蘇的對(duì)立是意識(shí)形態(tài)的對(duì)立，而尼克松卻圖謀與社會(huì)主義中國(guó)建立正常的外交關(guān)系，這一舉動(dòng)石破天驚。一波驚起萬(wàn)層浪，也為我國(guó)改革開放補(bǔ)充了一個(gè)重要的外部條件。這一點(diǎn)，我們?cè)诟兄x鄧小平的同時(shí)，也要稱贊尼克松的聰明之舉。所以我們的歷史老師會(huì)一針見血的說(shuō)，國(guó)際關(guān)系的決定關(guān)系是國(guó)家利益。

另外我還想說(shuō)的是，尼克松訪華肯定有國(guó)家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的接待？那么接待尼克松是誰(shuí)呢？毛澤東。對(duì)于毛澤東的晚年問題，有諸多的非議。什么發(fā)動(dòng)大躍進(jìn)，人民公社化運(yùn)動(dòng)啊，還有最恨的是發(fā)動(dòng)了文化大革命，這個(gè)老家伙是晚節(jié)不保啊，恐怕是得了老年癡呆，但這只是我中學(xué)時(shí)的想法，如果大家還這樣想，說(shuō)明大家的思想還很年輕。事實(shí)上，毛澤東文革時(shí)期得罪了最不應(yīng)該得罪的群體：知識(shí)分子。我覺得要不是鄧小平的正確看待毛澤東同志的功與過這句話，恐怕毛澤東的袁世凱形象就要寫在歷史教科書上了。大家應(yīng)該相信教科書的力量，它能把黑變白，也能把白變黑。所以我希望大家對(duì)待某一事件，能有自己的意見和想法，千萬(wàn)不要隨波逐流。

那么話題重新回到尼克松，他的另一著名事件就是水門事件，相信大家都對(duì)水門事件有所了解，在這里就不多說(shuō)了。不過我是挺佩服那位把總統(tǒng)拉下馬的女性。這里可以看出美國(guó)的太多，比如美國(guó)人的性格，不屈的精神。但是大家反過來(lái)想，尼克松第二任總統(tǒng)新上任沒多久就被拉下來(lái)，他有那個(gè)勇氣下來(lái)，這是中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人所不能及的。在中國(guó)，好像有為他人遮羞的義務(wù)，所以中國(guó)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)斯諾登，但這正是中國(guó)的價(jià)值觀，沒有對(duì)錯(cuò)。謝謝

第二篇：尼克松總統(tǒng)英文演講稿

晚上好!親愛的同胞們：

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.今晚，我想與各位探討一個(gè)問題，這是所有美國(guó)人和全球無(wú)數(shù)人所深切關(guān)注的一個(gè)問題——越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy.The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.我認(rèn)為，在關(guān)于越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)一事上，大家的觀點(diǎn)出現(xiàn)了嚴(yán)重分歧的一個(gè)重要原因在于：很多美國(guó)民眾對(duì)我們的政府所宣揚(yáng)的政策已失去了信心。當(dāng)前情況下，除非美國(guó)人民真正認(rèn)清政策本質(zhì)，否則不能也不應(yīng)該被要求去支持涉及戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平等重大問題的政策。

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.所以，今晚，我想借此機(jī)會(huì)回答一些問題，一些縈繞在你們?cè)S多人腦海中的問題。

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years.Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action.The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule.Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow.After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him--and come out as the peacemaker.Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election.I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace.The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war.The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a

supporting a revolution.In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers.Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong.And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.They then murdered more

camps.We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year.During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said，“We want to see a stable Government there,” carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence.“ We believe strongly in

to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia.So we’re going to stay there.”

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude.A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest.This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace--in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.Ultimately, this would cost more lives.It would not bring peace.It would bring more war.For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces.I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts.I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision.We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force.And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side.We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals.They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements.I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum.That is why in addition to the

private avenue that might lead to a settlement.Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr.Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.None of these initiatives have to date produced results.In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break

’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years.Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.Let me read from that letter to you now:

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war.But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace.I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam.The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war.You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam.Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death.It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken

being released to the press.In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States.It is not the South Vietnamese Government.The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate--to negotiate seriously.I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth--the bad news as well as the good news--where the lives of our young men are involved.Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations.I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace--a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.It is in line with the major shift in U.S.foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine--a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.We Americans are a do-it-yourself people--we’re an impatient people.Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves.And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the

those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S.policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”

Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia.First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments.But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.The defense of freedom is everybody’s business--not just America’s business.And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam.In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March.Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’s orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies.Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home.By

Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength.As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office.Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.Let me now turn to our program for the future.We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S.combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness.As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I’m sure you will understand.As I’ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.One of these is

announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement.They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal.As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution.If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that

shelling of cities in South Vietnam.I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.This is not a threat.This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated

for Vietnamization, if necessary--a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.I have chosen this second course.It is not the easy way.It is the right way.It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves.Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home.But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges.Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right.I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen.Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.In San

“Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people.If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.I respect your idealism.I share your concern for peace.I want peace as much as you do.There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war.This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam.It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in

not have to write any of those letters.那么，現(xiàn)在，我想說(shuō)幾句話，如果可以的話，請(qǐng)?jiān)试S我對(duì)生活在這個(gè)國(guó)家，并且對(duì)這次戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)尤為關(guān)注的年輕人說(shuō)幾句，我也能夠理解他們?yōu)槭裁磿?huì)如此關(guān)注這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。我尊重你們的理想主義，我和你們一樣關(guān)心和平，我和你們一樣盼望和平。不僅如此，還有一些強(qiáng)烈的個(gè)人原因促使我想結(jié)束這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。這周我將簽署83封信件。這些信件將寄給為了祖國(guó)在越南失去生命的戰(zhàn)士們的母親、父親、妻子和他們所愛的人。讓我感到稍微滿意的是，這些信件僅僅只占我執(zhí)政第一周所要簽署信件的三分之一。

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.And I want to end the war for another reason.I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.I have chosen a plan for peace.I believe it will succeed.If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter.Or if it does succeed，’t matter.If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor.But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world.Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace.I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be

enemy is to negotiate at Paris.Let us be united for peace.Let us also be united against defeat.Because let us understand--North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.Only Americans can do that.Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world.He said: “This is the war to end wars.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics.And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which--to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated--the goal of a just and lasting peace.As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.Thank you and good night.

第三篇：尼克松答謝詞

1972年2月21日，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)尼克松應(yīng)周恩來(lái)總理的邀請(qǐng)?jiān)L問中國(guó)，當(dāng)晚，周總理在人民大會(huì)堂舉行了盛大宴會(huì)，歡迎尼克松總統(tǒng)一行?？偫砗涂偨y(tǒng)都發(fā)表了熱情洋溢的講會(huì)，回顧他們的講話，再看整整四十年之后中美關(guān)系互相提防的現(xiàn)狀，讓人不勝感慨。周恩來(lái)總理的歡迎詞如下：

總統(tǒng)先生,尼克松夫人,女士們,先生們,同志們,朋友們: 首先,我高興的代表毛澤東主席和中國(guó)政府向尼克松總統(tǒng)及夫人,以及其他的客人們

表示歡迎.同時(shí),我也想利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)代表中國(guó)人民向遠(yuǎn)在大洋彼岸的美國(guó)人民致以親切的問候.克松總統(tǒng)應(yīng)中國(guó)政府的邀請(qǐng)，前來(lái)我國(guó)訪問，使兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人有機(jī)會(huì)直接會(huì)晤,謀

求兩國(guó)關(guān)系正?；?并對(duì)共同關(guān)心的問題交換意見,這是符合中美兩國(guó)人民愿望的積極行

動(dòng),這在中美兩國(guó)關(guān)系史上是一個(gè)創(chuàng)舉.美國(guó)人民是偉大的人民,中國(guó)人民是偉大的人民.我們兩國(guó)人民一向是友好的.由于大

家都知道的原因,兩國(guó)人民之間往來(lái)中斷了二十多年.現(xiàn)在經(jīng)過中美雙方的共同努力，友

好往來(lái)的大門終于打開了.目前促使兩國(guó)關(guān)系正?；?爭(zhēng)取和緩緊張趨勢(shì)，已經(jīng)成為中美

兩國(guó)人民強(qiáng)烈的愿望，人民,只有人民,才是創(chuàng)造這個(gè)世界歷

史的動(dòng)力.我們相信,我們兩

國(guó)人民的這種共同愿望,總有一天要實(shí)現(xiàn)的.中美兩國(guó)的社會(huì)制度根本不同，在中美兩國(guó)政府之間存在極大分歧.但是這種分歧不應(yīng)

當(dāng)妨礙中美兩國(guó)在相互尊重主權(quán)和領(lǐng)土完整,互不侵犯,互不干涉內(nèi)政,平等互利和和平共 處五項(xiàng)原則的基礎(chǔ)上建立正常的國(guó)際關(guān)系，更不應(yīng)該導(dǎo)致戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng).中國(guó)政府早在1955年就公

開聲明,中國(guó)人民不想同美國(guó)人民打仗，中國(guó)政府愿意坐下來(lái)同美國(guó)政府談判，這是我們

一貫奉行的方針,我們注意到尼克松總統(tǒng)在來(lái)華前的講話中也說(shuō)到:“我們必須做的事情是 尋找某種辦法使我們可以有分歧而又不能成為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中的敵人.”我們希望通過雙方坦率的 交換意見，弄清彼此之間的分歧，努力尋找共同點(diǎn)，使我們兩國(guó)關(guān)系能夠有一個(gè)新的開

始.最后,我建議為尼克松總統(tǒng)和夫人的健康,為其他美國(guó)客人們的健康,為在座的所有朋

友和同志們的健康,為中美兩國(guó)之間的友誼,干杯！!

尼克松總統(tǒng)的答謝詞如下：

總理先生，中華人民共和國(guó)和美利堅(jiān)合眾國(guó)的我們十分尊貴的客人們：

我們能有機(jī)會(huì)在貴國(guó)做客期間歡迎你和今晚在座的諸位中國(guó)客人，感到十分榮幸。

我要代表尼克松夫人和同行的全體正式成員，對(duì)你們給予我們的無(wú)限盛情的款待，表示深切的感謝。

大家知道，按照我國(guó)的習(xí)慣，我們的新聞界人士有權(quán)代表他們自己講話，而政府中的人誰(shuí)也不能代表他們講話。但是我相信，今晚在座的全體美國(guó)新聞界人士都會(huì)授予我這一少有的特權(quán)來(lái)代表他們感謝你和貴國(guó)政府給予他們的種種禮遇。

你們已使全世界空前之多的人們得以讀到、看到、聽到這一歷史性訪問的情景。

昨天，我們同幾億電視觀眾一起，看到了名副其實(shí)的世界奇跡之一———中國(guó)的長(zhǎng)城。當(dāng)我在城墻上漫步時(shí)，我想到為了建筑這座城墻而付出的犧牲；我想到它所顯示的在悠久的歷史上始終保持獨(dú)立的中國(guó)人民的決心；我想到這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)，就是，長(zhǎng)城告訴我們，中國(guó)有偉大的歷史，建造這個(gè)世界奇跡的人民也有偉大的未來(lái)。

長(zhǎng)城已不再是一道把中國(guó)和世界其他地區(qū)隔開的城墻。但是，它使人們想起，世界上仍然存在著許多把各個(gè)國(guó)家和人民隔開的城墻。

長(zhǎng)城還使人們想起，在幾乎一代的歲月里，中華人民共和國(guó)和美國(guó)之間存在著一道城墻。

四天以來(lái)，我們已經(jīng)開始了拆除我們之間這座城墻的長(zhǎng)期過程；我們開始會(huì)談時(shí)就承認(rèn)我們之間有巨大的分歧，但是我們決心不讓這些分歧阻礙我們和平相處。

你們深信你們的制度，我們同樣深信我們的制度。我們?cè)谶@里聚會(huì)，并不是由于我們有共同的信仰，而是由于我們有共同的利益和共同的希望。我們每一方都有這樣的利益，就是維護(hù)我們的獨(dú)立和我們?nèi)嗣竦陌踩?；我們每一方都有這樣的希望，就是建立一種新的世界秩序。具有不同制度和不同價(jià)值標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的國(guó)家和人民可以在其中和平相處，互有分歧但互相尊重，讓歷史而不是讓戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)對(duì)他們的不同思想作出判斷?？偫硐壬阋炎⒁獾剿臀覀兊竭@里來(lái)的飛機(jī)名為“七六年精神號(hào)”。就在這個(gè)星期，我們美國(guó)慶祝了我們的國(guó)父喬治·華盛頓的生日，是他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)美國(guó)在我們的革命中取得了獨(dú)立，并擔(dān)任了我們的第一屆總統(tǒng)。

在他任期屆滿時(shí)，他用下面的話向他的同胞告別：“對(duì)一切國(guó)家恪守信用和正義。同所有的人和平與和睦相處?！本褪潜局@種精神——七六年精神，我請(qǐng)大家站起來(lái)和我一起舉杯，為毛主席，為周總理，為我們兩國(guó)人民，為我們的孩子們的希望，即我們這一代能給他們留下和平與和睦的遺產(chǎn)，干杯!

第四篇：辭職演講(尼克松

Resignation Speech

辭職演講（尼克松）

This is the 37th time I have spoken to you from this office where so many decisions have been made that shape the history of this nation.Each time I have done so to discuss with you some matters that I believe affected the national interest.And all the decisions I have made in my public life I have always tried to do what was best for the nation.Throughout the long and difficult period of Watergate, I have felt it was my duty to persevere, to make every possible effort to complete the term of office to which you elected me.In the past few days, however, it has become evident to me that I no longer have a strong enough political base in the Congress to justify continuing that effort.As long as there was such a base, I felt strongly that it was necessary to see the constitutional process through to its conclusion, that to do otherwise would be unfaithful to the spirit of that deliberately difficult process, and a dangerously destabilizing precedent for the future.But with the disappearance of that base, I now believe that the constitutional purpose has been served.And there is no longer a need for the process to be prolonged.I would have preferred to carry through to the finish whatever the personal agony it would have involved, and my family unanimously urged me to do so.But the interests of the nation must always come before any personal considerations.From the discussions I have had with Congressional and other leaders I have concluded that because of the Watergate matter I might not have the support of the Congress that I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties of this office in the way the interests of the nation will require.I have never been a quitter.To leave office before my term is completed is opposed to every instinct in my body.But as President I must put the interests of America first.America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad.To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow.Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.注釋：

注釋：

Watergate水門事件agonyn.苦惱，極大的痛苦

Unanimously全體一致地,無(wú)異議地

Quittern.輕易停止的人, 懦夫

Vindicationn.辯護(hù), 辯明, 擁護(hù)

中文對(duì)照

(晚上好！)這是我第37次在這里對(duì)你們講話。我曾在這里作過一些對(duì)我們這個(gè)國(guó)家有影響的決定。每次我都與你們討論一些有關(guān)影響國(guó)民利益之事。我所做出的這些決定，都

力圖為國(guó)家最高利益服務(wù)。

經(jīng)過漫長(zhǎng)而艱難的水門事件，我感覺到，我不得不辭職，盡力盡快結(jié)束我的總統(tǒng)工作。在過去幾年里，很明顯，我在國(guó)會(huì)已不再擁有強(qiáng)大的政治基礎(chǔ)。只要這種基礎(chǔ)還存在，我便會(huì)堅(jiān)決澄清這件事。但現(xiàn)在再做努力已非必要，這樣只會(huì)使程序更加艱難，也是對(duì)繼任者的刁難。

由于已經(jīng)失去政治基礎(chǔ)，我沒必要拖延這件事。

不管我個(gè)人的痛苦有多大，我也寧愿結(jié)束它，我家人也這樣黯然催促我。但是，國(guó)家利益總是要高于個(gè)人利益，通過我與國(guó)會(huì)及其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的商議，由于水門事件后，我已經(jīng)失去了國(guó)會(huì)的支持，我不得不做出這個(gè)艱難的決定，市民也有這個(gè)要求，國(guó)家利益也要求我這么做。我從來(lái)就不是一個(gè)半途而廢的人。

在我到任之前便離任，我感到渾身的不自在。但作為總統(tǒng)應(yīng)把國(guó)家利益放在首位。美國(guó)需要一位全心全意的總統(tǒng)和全心全意國(guó)會(huì)，特別是現(xiàn)在我們處于國(guó)內(nèi)外的各種困難時(shí)期。

繼續(xù)幾個(gè)月前的個(gè)人辯護(hù)將占去總統(tǒng)和國(guó)會(huì)幾乎所有的時(shí)間，而這時(shí)我們應(yīng)該做的卻是致力于世界和平及無(wú)通貨膨脹的國(guó)家繁榮。

因此，我決定明天中午正式辭去總統(tǒng)職務(wù)，副總統(tǒng)福特將同時(shí)在這里宣誓就職。

第五篇：尼克松訪華祝酒詞

Toast Speech by Richard Nixon 尼克松訪華祝酒詞

Mr.Prime Minister and all of your distinguished guests this evening:

On behalf of all of your American-guests, I wish to thank you for the incomparably hospitality for which the Chinese people are justly famous throughout the world.I particularly want to pay tribute, not only to those who prepared the magnificent dinner, but also to those who have provided the splendid music.Never have I heard American music played better in a foreign land.Mr.Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent remarks.At this very moment, through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world.Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered.What we do here can change the world.As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people.If our two peoples are enemies the future of this world we share, together is dark indeed.But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace is immeasurably increased.In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize our talks this week, let us recognize at the outset these points: We have at times in the past been enemies.We have great differences today.What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences.As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles.But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.So, let us, in these next five days, start a long march together, not in lockstep, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside interference or domination.The world watches.The world listens.The world waits to see what we will do.What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today.As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People's Republic of China.What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?

There is no reason for us to be enemies.Neither of us seeks the territory of the other;neither of us seeks domination over the other;neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.Chairman Mao has written, "So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently;The world rolls on, Time presses.Ten thousand years are too long, Seize the day, seize the hour!”

This is the hour.This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a better world.In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Chou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people which can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.(A toast given by president Nixon on his first visit to China in 1972)總理先生，在座的各位貴賓：

我謹(jǐn)代表你們的所有美國(guó)客人向你們表示感謝，感謝你們的無(wú)可比擬的盛情款待。中國(guó)人民以這種盛情款待而聞名世界。我不僅要特別贊揚(yáng)那些準(zhǔn)備了這次盛大晚宴的人，而且還要贊揚(yáng)那些給我們演奏這樣美好的音樂的人。我在外國(guó)從來(lái)沒有聽到過演奏得這么好的美國(guó)音樂。

總理先生，我要感謝你熱情洋溢而又令人信服的講話。就在這個(gè)時(shí)刻，通過電訊的奇跡，看到和聽到我們講話的人比在整個(gè)世界歷史上任何其他這樣的場(chǎng)合都要多。不過，我在這里講的話，人們不會(huì)長(zhǎng)久記住。我們?cè)谶@里所做的事卻能改變世界。

正如你在祝酒時(shí)講的那樣，中國(guó)人民是偉大的人民，美國(guó)人民是偉大的人民。我們兩國(guó)人民不是敵人，否則我們共同居住的這個(gè)世界的前途就的確是黑暗的了。如果我們能夠找到進(jìn)行合作的共同點(diǎn)，那么實(shí)現(xiàn)世界和平的機(jī)會(huì)就無(wú)可估量地大大增加。

我希望我們這個(gè)星期的會(huì)談將是坦率的。本著這種坦率的精神，我們一開始就認(rèn)識(shí)到這樣幾點(diǎn)：過去的一些時(shí)期我們?cè)菙橙?。今天我們有巨大的分歧．使我們走到一起的，是我們有超過這些分歧的共同利益。在我們討論我們的分歧的時(shí)候，我們哪一方都不會(huì)在我們的原則上妥協(xié)。但是，雖然我們不能彌合我們之間的鴻溝，我們卻能夠設(shè)法搭一座橋，以便我們能夠越過它進(jìn)行會(huì)談。

因此，讓我們?cè)诮窈蟮奈逄炖镌谝黄痖_始一次長(zhǎng)征吧，不是在一起邁步，而是在不同的道路上向同一目標(biāo)前進(jìn)。這個(gè)目標(biāo)就是建立一個(gè)和平和正義的世界結(jié)構(gòu)，在這個(gè)世界結(jié)構(gòu)中，所有的人都可以在一起享有同等的尊嚴(yán)；每個(gè)國(guó)家，不論大小，都有權(quán)利決定它自己的政府形式，而不受外來(lái)的干涉或統(tǒng)治。全世界在注視著，全世界在傾聽著，全世界在等待著看我們將做些什么。這個(gè)世界是什么呢?就個(gè)人來(lái)講，我想到我的大女兒，因?yàn)榻裉焓撬纳?。?dāng)我想到她的時(shí)候，我就想到全世界的兒童。亞洲、非洲、歐洲以及美洲的兒童，他們大多數(shù)都是在中華人民共和國(guó)成立以后出生的。

我們將給我們的孩子們留下什么遺產(chǎn)呢?他們的命運(yùn)是要為那些使舊世界受苦受難的仇恨而死去呢，還是他們的命運(yùn)是由我們有締造一個(gè)新世界的遠(yuǎn)見而活下去呢？

我們沒有理由要成為敵人。我們哪一方都不企圖取得對(duì)方的領(lǐng)土，我們哪一方都不企圖統(tǒng)治對(duì)方，我們哪一方都不企圖伸出手去統(tǒng)治世界。

毛主席寫過：“多少事，從來(lái)急；天地轉(zhuǎn)，光陰迫。一萬(wàn)年太久，只爭(zhēng)朝夕?！?/p>

現(xiàn)在就是只爭(zhēng)朝夕的時(shí)候了，是我們兩國(guó)人民攀登那種可以締造—個(gè)新的、更美好的世界的偉大境界的高峰的時(shí)候了。

本著這種精神，我請(qǐng)求諸位同我一起舉杯，為毛主席，為周總理，為能夠?qū)е氯澜缢腥嗣竦挠颜x與和平的中國(guó)人民和美國(guó)人民之間的友誼，干杯。

（美國(guó)尼克松總統(tǒng)1972年訪華時(shí)的一次祝酒詞)