第一篇：李世默TED演講稿(英文)

Good morning.My name is Eric Li, and I was born here.But no, I wasn’t born there.This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution.My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries.When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know that humanity.It went like this.All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism!Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development.The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph.That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx.And the Chinese bought it.We were taught that grand story day in and day out.It became part of us, and we believed in it.The story was a bestseller.About on third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta narrative.Then, the world changed overnight.As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie.Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened.As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one.This one was just as grand.It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end.This one went as follows.All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote.Because they all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after.Paradise on earth, again.Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil.The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.Now.This story also became a bestseller.According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010.In the last 20years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world.Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success.Those who do not are doomed to fail.But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it.Fool me once… The rest is history.In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy.Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty.Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China.In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps.Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point.Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions.So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds.Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day.Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history.Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening.So I went and did the only thing I could.I studied it.Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections.There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time.Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate.Well, the assumptions are wrong.The opposites are true.Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction.It won’t last long because it cannot adapt.Now here are the facts.In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule.So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions.For example, term limits.Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules.Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes.So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform.But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias.See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform.The truth is, political reforms have never stopped.Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today.Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform.The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow.Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let’s first look at the larger context.Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you.The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today.China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members.In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings.The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds.In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller.The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top.Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department.The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations.It operates a rotation pyramid made up of there components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program.The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials.They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu.Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business.The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company.Once a year, the department reviews their performance.They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates.They vet their personal conduct.They conduct public opinion surveys.Then they promote the winners.Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks.Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels.There, they enter high, officialdom.By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels.After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee.The process takes two to three decades.Does patronage play a role? Yes of course.But merit remains the fundamental driver.In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system.China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job.Even for him, the career took 30 years.He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S.dollars.Now, please don’t get me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone.It’s just a statement of fact.George W.Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown.Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system.Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest.Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department.Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy.I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election.Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts.In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 42 years old.Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years.Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent.Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%.Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent.Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week.Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future.Now, if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is.In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance.I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals.With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife.Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election.Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret.At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy.Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom.The country faces enormous challenges.Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mine-boggling.Pollution is one.Food safety.Population issues.On the political front, the worst problem is corruption.Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy.But most analysts mis-diagnose the disease.They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system.But a more careful look would tell us otherwise.Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it’s been moving up.India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping.For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies.So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can’t fix it? Now, I’m a venture capitalist.I make bets.It wouldn’t be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions.So here they are.In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S.and become the largest economy in the world.Income per capital will be near the top of all developing countries.Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I.ranking.Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm.We live in the dusk of an era.Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st.Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside.Now, I want to clarify something.I’m not here to make an indictment of democracy.On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world.It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West’s current ills.If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance.China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn’t pretend to be universal.It cannot be exported.But that is the point precisely.The significance of China’s example is not that it provides and alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist.Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives.Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over.Let us stop telling people and our children there’s only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve.It is wrong.It is irresponsible.And worst of all, it is boring.Let universality make way for plurality.Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us.Are we brave enough to welcome it?

第二篇：2016李世默在清華演講稿全文

2016李世默在清華演講稿全文

李世默在清華演講稿全文，2016年，李世默在清華大學(xué)時(shí)事大講堂上，借用五位政治學(xué)學(xué)者的理論，分析認(rèn)為21世紀(jì)是靠改革競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的世紀(jì)，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的中國(guó)必將在此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中脫穎而出，因?yàn)檎幵谏倌昶诘闹袊?guó)政治體制在全世界大國(guó)中最具有改革能力。在演講中一起上了一堂“從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革”的公開課從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革“為題從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革”為題李世默在清華演講稿全文

大家下午好，很開心來清華和同學(xué)們交流。我不是老師，我是生意人，但賺錢以外，我的業(yè)余愛好是研究中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨。首先，我要聲明我不是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨黨員，小時(shí)候試過，但可能因?yàn)樯钭黠L(fēng)有問題，被拒絕了(笑)。后來入黨未成，一不小心當(dāng)上了資本家。我平時(shí)是周一到周五做資本家，周六周日研究中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨。今天我跟大家分享我這些年研究中共的一點(diǎn)——不能說是學(xué)問——只是一些心得，希望大家能夠?qū)ξ业男牡锰岢鲆庖姾团小?/p>

我要講的題目是《從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革》。政治學(xué)，英語叫politicalscience，就是政治科學(xué)，但政治學(xué)是一門軟科學(xué)，就是用科學(xué)的方式來研究社會(huì)，研究政治，研究軟的東西

那么科學(xué)的方式是什么呢?一般的科學(xué)方式是：第一步是要設(shè)立一個(gè)假定，拿這個(gè)假定到實(shí)驗(yàn)室里去驗(yàn)證，有的假定被驗(yàn)證出是對(duì)的，有的假定被驗(yàn)證出是錯(cuò)的。驗(yàn)證了對(duì)的假定可能成為理論。過一段時(shí)間又有人有新的假定，新的假定被驗(yàn)證以后就推翻以前的理論，成為新的理論?？茖W(xué)就是這樣發(fā)展的。我今天講的所有內(nèi)容都只是假定。

今天的假定是：全世界都需要改革。

21世紀(jì)是一個(gè)在改革中競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的時(shí)代。能成功改革的國(guó)家將是贏家，改革失敗的國(guó)家將是輸家。

在這場(chǎng)改革競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的中國(guó)將在全球大國(guó)中脫穎而出。所以，21世紀(jì)是中國(guó)的世紀(jì)。

全世界幾乎所有國(guó)家都面臨治理危機(jī)，從發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家到發(fā)展中國(guó)家，都在說“我們需要改革，不改革不行了”?？墒菐缀踉谒袊?guó)家，改革都陷入了巨大的困境，舉步維艱，四面楚歌，為什么?

我想借用五位世界一流的政治學(xué)學(xué)者的眼光來講這個(gè)題目。塞繆爾·亨廷頓：政治衰敗

塞繆爾·亨廷頓《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》

第一位叫塞繆爾·亨廷頓，大家都知道他寫的《文明的沖突與世界秩序的重建》，但在政治學(xué)里我覺得他最好的著作是《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》。亨廷頓發(fā)明了一個(gè)概念叫“政治衰敗”(politicaldecay)，這是近代政治學(xué)里很重要的一個(gè)概念。

亨廷頓在《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》里研究了二戰(zhàn)以后新獨(dú)立的國(guó)家，這些國(guó)家的大環(huán)境在發(fā)生巨大的變遷，可是他們的政治制度不能相應(yīng)地改變，去適應(yīng)新的環(huán)境。這種情況下，就發(fā)生了政治衰敗。他還說在體制很穩(wěn)定、很成功的情況下也會(huì)發(fā)生政治衰敗。意思就是說，現(xiàn)有政治體制發(fā)生了所謂的固化，固化到一定程度，環(huán)境發(fā)生了變化，社會(huì)發(fā)生了變化，世界變了，可是政治體制沒有辦法去推動(dòng)質(zhì)的變化來適應(yīng)外部環(huán)境和社會(huì)內(nèi)在的變化，那么這個(gè)政治體制就發(fā)生了政治衰敗。

曼瑟爾·奧爾森《國(guó)家興衰探源》

第二位叫曼瑟爾·奧爾森，他的代表作是《國(guó)家興衰探源》。他創(chuàng)造的概念叫“分利聯(lián)盟”(distributivecoalition)。

奧爾森在《國(guó)家興衰探源》里研究民主體制，他說民主體制里邊必然出現(xiàn)利益集團(tuán)，這些利益集團(tuán)通過多年不斷積累權(quán)力，形成分利聯(lián)盟。意思就是利益集團(tuán)權(quán)力強(qiáng)大到一定程度，他們可以尋租，他們可以俘獲甚至操控政治體制，使政治體制為分利聯(lián)盟的利益服務(wù)，而不是為整體利益服務(wù)，甚至以損害整體利益為代價(jià)來維護(hù)分利聯(lián)盟的利益。奧爾森說在民主體制里，分利聯(lián)盟俘獲政治體制這個(gè)問題是一個(gè)無解的困境。只有兩種東西可以打破這個(gè)困境，一個(gè)是革命，一個(gè)是外部的沖擊。如戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。這是非常悲觀的一個(gè)角度，無解。

弗朗西斯·福山：否決制

弗朗西斯·福山《政治秩序的起源》、《政治秩序和政治衰敗》

第三位叫弗朗西斯·福山，最近兩/fanwen/1545本書叫《政治秩序的起源》與《政治秩序和政治衰敗》。福山把前兩個(gè)人所創(chuàng)造的概念——“政治衰敗”和“分利聯(lián)盟”——組合起來討論政治衰敗。

第一，他說政治衰敗在任何政治體制內(nèi)部都可能發(fā)生，無論是威權(quán)體制還是民主體制。福山說，現(xiàn)代治理需要三大要素：一是強(qiáng)政府，二是法治，三是民主問責(zé)。

福山說美國(guó)現(xiàn)在正處于政治衰敗中，原因之一是當(dāng)代美國(guó)是強(qiáng)法治、強(qiáng)民主、弱政府。而這個(gè)局面使得美國(guó)無法推進(jìn)急需的改革。

福山還提到兩種問責(zé)制，一種叫自下而上的問責(zé)制，一種叫自上而下的問責(zé)制，兩種制度各有優(yōu)劣。

自下而上的問責(zé)制即通常說的民主制度，你不好老百姓把你選下去。它的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于有一個(gè)自動(dòng)回應(yīng)機(jī)制，你做的不好老百姓可以選另外一位。它的劣勢(shì)在于分利聯(lián)盟，福山又創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)新詞叫“否決制”——“Vetocracy”，就是分利聯(lián)盟把持政治體制，為了維護(hù)自己的利益，損害集體的利益?！癡etocracy”其實(shí)就是中國(guó)人說的，成事不足敗事有余。自上而下的問責(zé)制，也許中國(guó)是自上而下的問責(zé)制，私人企業(yè)也是自上而下的問責(zé)制，它有強(qiáng)大的執(zhí)行力，這來自于政治獨(dú)立性，就是福山說的“politicalautonomy”。它的困境和弊端，第一是信息的困境，底下的人不把正確的信息給老板，老板摸不清楚下面到底怎么回事，導(dǎo)致決策錯(cuò)誤。第二是福山說的所謂的“壞皇帝”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，老板出問題了怎么辦?

福山說改革在美國(guó)正在失敗，美國(guó)沒有辦法改革。為什么?他舉了一些原因。第一，民主和透明成了美國(guó)改革的絆腳石。美國(guó)太多的公眾參與，太多的透明，也就是說太多的民主，使這個(gè)國(guó)家的改革寸步難行。

第二，公民社會(huì)在某種程度上也不利于美國(guó)的改革。公民社會(huì)孵化了利益集團(tuán)的形成，利益集團(tuán)積累權(quán)力形成分利聯(lián)盟，分利聯(lián)盟導(dǎo)致否決制。在這樣的公民社會(huì)里，只要有一個(gè)分利聯(lián)盟不喜歡一件事，它就能把這件事給黃了。要所有人都覺得沒問題才能做，結(jié)果是什么事都做不成，改革更做不成。

第三，是法治。美國(guó)的法治出現(xiàn)了治理的司法化。就是說所有的政治、所有治理都要通過立法。立法的過程遭到分利聯(lián)盟的俘獲，即便立了法，分利聯(lián)盟再通過司法程序百般阻撓它的執(zhí)行。

最后，是自由。福山說自由和特權(quán)是一步之遙，一不小心自由就變成了特權(quán)。美國(guó)最高法院今年判決說政治獻(xiàn)金沒有上限，這是憲法說的言論自由。就是說我自己合法賺來的錢，為什么不能在電視上買廣告，說某某政客好，說哪些政策好，哪些政策不好?給政治獻(xiàn)金設(shè)上限是違反言論自由的。而維護(hù)言論自由的后果是什么呢?當(dāng)然是越有錢越牛，所以自由與特權(quán)是一步之遙。

王紹光：中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策

王紹光《中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策》

第四位政治學(xué)學(xué)者，是王紹光，他是香港中文大學(xué)的教授。他研究國(guó)家能力和國(guó)家建設(shè)。他近期的著作叫《中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策》。王老師用中國(guó)在2016年啟動(dòng)的醫(yī)保改革為案例，仔細(xì)闡述了當(dāng)代中國(guó)的政治體制如何超越利益集團(tuán)，成功推動(dòng)改革。

中國(guó)治理模式的三大要素

我認(rèn)為中國(guó)的治理模式有三大核心要素。

一是賢能治理。這是理想狀態(tài)，賢能治理也會(huì)出問題。中國(guó)選賢任能的模式，就是中國(guó)的官員來自于草根，最有能耐的人通過這個(gè)體系一步步往上爬，最終進(jìn)入中國(guó)的最高治理階層。

二是實(shí)驗(yàn)治理。中國(guó)幾十年來推/fanwen/1545行很多政策，都是從小地方先試起來。失敗了就算了。成功了就讓各個(gè)地方學(xué)，再成功了就全國(guó)推廣。失敗的成本較低。這樣的實(shí)驗(yàn)治理只能在中央集權(quán)的國(guó)家才能實(shí)現(xiàn)，在美國(guó)不可能，你在舊金山實(shí)驗(yàn)一個(gè)東西成了，然后華盛頓讓麻省也試，做不到的。

三是回應(yīng)治理。有沒有能力回應(yīng)人民的需求，回應(yīng)制度到底健康不健康。據(jù)我了解，中共其實(shí)有非常復(fù)雜和有效及時(shí)的反應(yīng)機(jī)制。

三中全會(huì)是政治改革的又一個(gè)里程碑

中國(guó)30多年的改革開放，取得巨大的成就，也面臨巨大挑戰(zhàn)。

經(jīng)濟(jì)挑戰(zhàn)非常嚴(yán)峻，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)模式走到現(xiàn)在創(chuàng)造了巨大的財(cái)富，但這個(gè)模式要改。環(huán)境變了，經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)變了，所以要改變這個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)，可是在改變過程中增長(zhǎng)率就會(huì)下降，又會(huì)引發(fā)其他問題。這個(gè)平衡怎么掌握，很難。

腐敗是一個(gè)巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。環(huán)境也是巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。這么大規(guī)模，這么快速工業(yè)化，人類歷史上前所未有，造成的環(huán)境問題是巨大的。

三中全會(huì)好像有600多條改革的政策，國(guó)企改革、土地改革、法律改革、經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。三中全會(huì)開完后，很多學(xué)者、媒體都說中國(guó)開始實(shí)施大膽的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，可是政治改革停滯不前甚至開倒車。我覺得這是一個(gè)誤讀。

我覺得三中全會(huì)啟動(dòng)了中國(guó)幾十年來最大膽的政治改革。很多人把政治改革的定義定死了，認(rèn)為只有往某種方向去改變的政策才叫政治改革，朝其他方向作的改變，再巨大也不叫政治改革。但如果把政治改革作為一個(gè)中性詞，就是對(duì)政治體制動(dòng)刀，對(duì)政治體制做質(zhì)的改變，我想三中全會(huì)是一個(gè)里程碑。

為什么是里程碑?我認(rèn)為有三方面。

一是中央和地方政府權(quán)力分配發(fā)生了巨大變化。三中全會(huì)比較重要的一點(diǎn)就是國(guó)家預(yù)算，以前中國(guó)的國(guó)家稅收只有一半在中央政府手里，這次把它變成了全國(guó)的預(yù)算，這是巨大的權(quán)力再分配。

二是黨紀(jì)和國(guó)法的權(quán)力分配發(fā)生了巨大變化。三中全會(huì)對(duì)中紀(jì)委進(jìn)行了重組，把地方紀(jì)委的決策權(quán)力從地方黨委那里抽出來。這又是一個(gè)巨大的權(quán)力再分配。

三是黨和國(guó)家的關(guān)系發(fā)生了巨大變化。1949年建國(guó)時(shí)引進(jìn)的蘇聯(lián)模式“三駕馬車”——人大對(duì)應(yīng)最高蘇維埃、黨中央對(duì)應(yīng)蘇共黨中央、國(guó)務(wù)院對(duì)應(yīng)蘇聯(lián)的部長(zhǎng)聯(lián)席會(huì)。三中全會(huì)——我認(rèn)為——把三駕馬車的格局打破了。國(guó)家成立了很多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組和委員會(huì)，都是黨中央在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。比如，中央國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)，負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)內(nèi)國(guó)外的安全;深化改革領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組，負(fù)責(zé)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革政策。這是一個(gè)驚人的權(quán)力再分配，是一個(gè)巨大的政治改革。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨走到了中國(guó)國(guó)家治理的前臺(tái)中央。

所以，我覺得三中全會(huì)是中國(guó)改革歷程中一個(gè)巨大的里程碑，很多人把新中國(guó)的60多年分成兩個(gè)30年，我覺得三中全會(huì)啟動(dòng)了第三個(gè)30年。第三個(gè)30年最重要的兩個(gè)方向：一是政治治理的完善，一是全方位民族復(fù)興。中國(guó)政治體制改革的原動(dòng)力

近些年來，政治學(xué)里流行的說法是，選舉民主制國(guó)家最善于自我糾正，也就是改革，因?yàn)槟軌蛲ㄟ^選舉更換執(zhí)政黨。但是現(xiàn)實(shí)卻恰恰相反。民主國(guó)家普遍陷入治理危機(jī)和改革困境。而中國(guó)呢?

回顧中華人民共和國(guó)的65年歷史，在中共的一黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，中國(guó)經(jīng)歷的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)變革，幅度和深度是近代史上罕見的，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出幾乎所有其他國(guó)家，包括所有民主選舉制的國(guó)家。為什么?我認(rèn)為這是中國(guó)政治體制的獨(dú)特性質(zhì)的結(jié)果。在中國(guó)，核心是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨，中共本身就是中國(guó)的政治體制。中國(guó)是世界上大國(guó)中唯一的一個(gè)擁有這么一個(gè)獨(dú)立于社會(huì)又同時(shí)來自于社會(huì)的政治力量，正如福山所說的，politicalautonomy。中共來自于中國(guó)社會(huì)的草根，又高于中國(guó)社會(huì)的所有利益集團(tuán)，這個(gè)機(jī)制就是中國(guó)改革的原動(dòng)力。

尼可羅·馬基雅維利：

每種政治制度都有它衰敗的一面

尼可羅·馬基雅維利《論李維》

回到最開始我說要跟大家分享五位政治學(xué)家，前面講了四位，都是我們同時(shí)代的人。

第五位是一位古人，這位古人是政治學(xué)的泰斗，沒有他就沒有政治學(xué)，他叫尼可羅·馬基雅維利，是500年前佛洛倫薩共和國(guó)的外交長(zhǎng)官。美第奇家族復(fù)辟以后，把他打入監(jiān)獄，施以酷刑，然后將他流放到鄉(xiāng)村。在寫給友人弗蘭西斯科·維托里的信中，馬基雅維利講述了自己的流放生活。在漫長(zhǎng)而平靜的日子里，每當(dāng)夜深人靜的時(shí)候，馬基雅維利總會(huì)換上宮廷的華服，進(jìn)入自己的書房。在那里，他廢寢忘食地閱讀先哲遺篇，與古賢心照神交。只有在那樣的漫漫長(zhǎng)夜里，他才感覺不到饑餓干渴，也不再懼怕死亡。在那里，他寫下了流傳百世的代表作《論李維》，這本書是所有政治學(xué)的基石。

他在這本書里，把全世界所有政治制度歸納成三種：一是君主制;一是貴族制，他說的貴族制是希臘語的貴族，就是我們講的選賢任能或賢能制，不是后來歐洲出現(xiàn)的世襲制的貴族;三是民主制。

他說每一種政治制度都能夠表現(xiàn)得非常好，可是每一種政治制度都有它衰敗的一面。君主制會(huì)衰敗成暴政，貴族制會(huì)衰敗成寡頭制，民主制會(huì)衰敗成放蕩制。

我想留給大家的一個(gè)想法，就是也許世界上沒有永遠(yuǎn)的東西。我們研究政治學(xué)，研究任何一個(gè)國(guó)家的政治體制，最值得研究的就是這個(gè)政治體制在它的生命周期里，是在哪個(gè)點(diǎn)上。如果在少年期那是一種預(yù)測(cè)，如果在中年期和老年期就是另一種預(yù)測(cè)。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，也許沒有一個(gè)政治體制是永恒的。每一個(gè)政治體制，不管是君主制也好，貴族制也好，民主制也好——中國(guó)現(xiàn)在實(shí)行的也許是賢能制，美國(guó)是民主制——所有這些政治體制最終都可能走向衰敗/fanwen/1545，就像人的身體一樣。政治學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)就是，把政治體制、社會(huì)當(dāng)人的身體一樣研究。把政治體制比作人的身體，就像人小時(shí)候經(jīng)常生病，每年都感冒，病歷卡很厚，但是一到發(fā)育的時(shí)候什么病都沒有了，到七八十歲病又回來了，也就臨近死亡了。

我經(jīng)常把當(dāng)代中國(guó)比作美國(guó)100多年前，100多年前的美國(guó)也在發(fā)生巨大的變革，快速地工業(yè)化，那個(gè)時(shí)候的美國(guó)，它的腐敗、它的暴力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過今天的中國(guó)，但那個(gè)時(shí)候的美國(guó)，它的政治體制在它的少年期，那些再嚴(yán)重的問題也沒能阻擋它成為超級(jí)大國(guó)。中國(guó)的政治體制也有很多問題。每個(gè)人身體里邊都有癌細(xì)胞，就看它什么時(shí)候出來。每個(gè)政治體制的基因里邊也有癌細(xì)胞。我的假定是，中國(guó)的政治體制在少年期。美國(guó)政治體制，以及整個(gè)西方的政治體制，倒是一個(gè)值得研究的問題，它們肯定不處在少年期。我們要研究的問題就是西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的政治體制，在它們的生命周期里邊是中年期還是晚年期?如果美國(guó)的政治體制是一個(gè)50歲的人，它還有一次機(jī)會(huì)可以重新復(fù)興。如果是80歲呢，就像福山講的那樣，政治衰敗就是眼前的宿命。

中國(guó)的政治體制處在少年期，它具有巨大的活力——也就是改革的能力，21世紀(jì)是中國(guó)的世紀(jì)。

以上這篇李世默在清華演講稿全文為您介紹到這里，希望它對(duì)您有幫助。如果您喜歡這篇文章，請(qǐng)分享給您的好友。更多演講盡在：精彩演講望大家多支持本網(wǎng)站，謝謝

第三篇：李世默演講觀后感

如果他們?cè)谂_(tái)下

——李世默演講觀后感

白荷菲 201355003

筆者總結(jié)李世默的演講，主要有兩個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容：

1、元敘事危害著社會(huì)的正常發(fā)展。無論是原始社會(huì)到共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)的單線發(fā)展敘事還是傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)到現(xiàn)代社會(huì)選舉創(chuàng)造民主美好社會(huì)的單一導(dǎo)向敘事都與現(xiàn)實(shí)相左，且引導(dǎo)社會(huì)走向極端的深淵。

2、中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的中國(guó)模式前景是美好的。不同于西方認(rèn)為的僵化、封閉和不具合法性，中國(guó)的一黨制模式具備自我糾錯(cuò)能力，能夠不斷進(jìn)行政治改革，與時(shí)俱進(jìn)；能夠通過一套成熟的黨內(nèi)機(jī)制選賢任能；而且以其卓越的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力贏得合法性，獲得民心。

下面，筆者將試圖以哈耶克、伯林、羅爾斯和施密特的立場(chǎng)和觀點(diǎn)來看待李世默的這一場(chǎng)演講。作一個(gè)大膽的假設(shè)，如果這四位政治思想家當(dāng)時(shí)都坐在臺(tái)下，他們應(yīng)該會(huì)對(duì)演講的內(nèi)容褒貶不一，但至少不是全盤否定的。

哈耶克大概是會(huì)贊成李世默對(duì)元敘事的辛辣諷刺的，因?yàn)檫@完全契合哈耶克認(rèn)為的人無法克服其無知，人的理性是有限的。且不論是否真的存在社會(huì)發(fā)展的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)路線，即使存在人們也無法認(rèn)識(shí)或驗(yàn)證。而哈耶克推崇的演進(jìn)理性主義更是相信社會(huì)秩序是在人與人、人與自然的復(fù)雜互動(dòng)中經(jīng)過漫長(zhǎng)的無目標(biāo)的過程逐漸生成的，元敘事否定偶然性、否定演化過程的自生自發(fā)，無疑會(huì)受到哈耶克的批駁。在筆者看來，柏林對(duì)“積極自由”的警惕批判，認(rèn)為若信奉積極自由最終的一個(gè)可能是會(huì)迫使他人自由，這與哈耶克的演進(jìn)理性主義不無共通之處，在人類社會(huì)發(fā)展的層面上來看便是反對(duì)元敘事。伯林觀點(diǎn)讓人對(duì)元敘事不由得產(chǎn)生恐懼，若單一線性發(fā)展路線被個(gè)體或群體認(rèn)定為“真理”，那么“沒有人有權(quán)反對(duì)理性”，加諸于異見者身上的一切便具備了強(qiáng)制性與合法性。而羅爾斯對(duì)理性多元論的承認(rèn)也讓筆者相信其對(duì)元敘事是不屑一顧的，然而羅爾斯的自由主義觀點(diǎn)集中于對(duì)公平正義的論證，筆者未能了解到更多與李世默這一觀點(diǎn)相關(guān)的內(nèi)容。施密特雖與前三者不同處于一個(gè)陣營(yíng)，但他卻從另一個(gè)角度對(duì)元敘事給予了批判，施密特堅(jiān)信歷史的發(fā)展是由一個(gè)又一個(gè)的“非常狀態(tài)”構(gòu)成的，主權(quán)者的決斷在其中發(fā)揮著至關(guān)重要的作用，那么認(rèn)為每一個(gè)社會(huì)的非常狀態(tài)都將有同樣的結(jié)果、每一位主權(quán)者的決斷都將趨同也就荒誕不羈了。

行文至此，筆者發(fā)現(xiàn)，雖屬于政治思想的不同陣營(yíng)，但不論是自由主義還是保守主義的學(xué)者都傾向于贊同演講中的第一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，即社會(huì)發(fā)展并非一個(gè)元敘事。而這也逐漸成為當(dāng)今社會(huì)的普世價(jià)值，在這個(gè)時(shí)代若仍處處提意識(shí)形態(tài)的根本對(duì)立也越來越顯得不合時(shí)宜。想來具有智慧的政治思想家們?cè)缇筒辉谠獢⑹滦胁煌ㄟ@一點(diǎn)共識(shí)上進(jìn)行爭(zhēng)論了，盡管他們中的不少人仍然堅(jiān)信社會(huì)主義遠(yuǎn)不及資本主義。

然而當(dāng)落腳到具體的中國(guó)模式，思想家們的分歧也許就小不了了。在此拋開自由主義學(xué)者對(duì)社會(huì)主義的根本排斥，筆者希望將各位思想家思想中的具體觀點(diǎn)對(duì)應(yīng)上中國(guó)模式的特點(diǎn)和元素并加以分析。當(dāng)然，今日的“中國(guó)模式”已不同于他們那個(gè)時(shí)代計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的社會(huì)主義了，也正因此才有探討的價(jià)值。天馬行空一想，四位學(xué)者若能目睹今日世界上的特例，其學(xué)說不知又會(huì)發(fā)生什么樣的變革。由此推想，中國(guó)模式應(yīng)當(dāng)對(duì)政治思想界產(chǎn)生相當(dāng)大的沖擊才是，對(duì)自由主義等各學(xué)派的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展也當(dāng)產(chǎn)生影響，何以目前尚未在學(xué)術(shù)界形成一股潮流，亦或已在醞釀之中也未可知，這值得筆者進(jìn)行更多的了解和學(xué)習(xí)。

哈耶克雖不會(huì)像批判納粹主義一般指責(zé)當(dāng)今中國(guó)，但對(duì)中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)定是不會(huì)支持的，因?yàn)榭吹靡姷氖值淖饔萌匀痪薮?，與哈耶克所提倡的完全自由市場(chǎng)有一定距離。另一可能是哈耶克也許會(huì)視中國(guó)的改革方向是披著社會(huì)主義外衣的資本主義，一如現(xiàn)在頗有說服力的一派觀點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為中國(guó)已不是社會(huì)主義國(guó)家。而對(duì)于李世默提及的中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的自我糾錯(cuò)能力，憑借哈耶克對(duì)構(gòu)建理性主義的駁斥他是一定不會(huì)贊同的，因?yàn)檫@種自我糾錯(cuò)能力畢竟強(qiáng)調(diào)的是共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)部的力量，很大程度上取決于人為努力和自我約束。堅(jiān)持法治為自由護(hù)航的哈耶克對(duì)演講中所提及的以現(xiàn)實(shí)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力獲得合法性想必也不會(huì)贊成，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的選賢舉能機(jī)制存在著實(shí)質(zhì)法律的因素，即便具有法律依據(jù)卻不符合哈耶克所說的法治。法治的確是當(dāng)下中國(guó)模式最大的漏洞之一。李世默的演講有回避這一問題的傾向，但中國(guó)要真的實(shí)現(xiàn)他所作的預(yù)測(cè)在十年內(nèi)獲得那些成就，法治是必須直面的。這里所說的直面并不只是強(qiáng)調(diào)其重要性，而是將解決憲法和中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的關(guān)系問題提到日程上來。

中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨選賢任能的機(jī)制亦與伯林對(duì)消極自由和積極自由的界定相關(guān)，柏林大概會(huì)認(rèn)為中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨所謂的黨內(nèi)民主很可能是摧毀個(gè)人主權(quán)的看上去科學(xué)有效的途徑，實(shí)際上則走上了積極自由的危險(xiǎn)道路，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨對(duì)自我糾正能力越有信心，這套糾偏機(jī)制就越接近于絕對(duì)理性，而且會(huì)有數(shù)不清的現(xiàn)實(shí)理由為之作辯護(hù)。然而，伯林的多元論思想?yún)s是對(duì)中國(guó)模式有所包容的。筆者也同意其承認(rèn)人類價(jià)值目標(biāo)多樣但并非無限，且不能錯(cuò)誤指向相對(duì)主義的觀點(diǎn)。中國(guó)模式的開創(chuàng)者鄧小平“不管黑貓白貓抓到老鼠就是好貓”的話語在此維度上意義重大。

羅爾斯的政治自由主義學(xué)說認(rèn)為自由憲政不是各種社會(huì)力量博弈而取得暫時(shí)妥協(xié)的結(jié)果，強(qiáng)調(diào)了公民對(duì)政體的理性基礎(chǔ)的理解與支持才是政體合法性能夠穩(wěn)固的保證。這為人們提供了對(duì)李世默中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的合法性來源論述的思考角度。在奪取政權(quán)和鞏固政權(quán)的許多關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨在博弈中都取得了勝利，然而這樣的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力就足以構(gòu)成合法性了嗎？如果論及對(duì)其理性基礎(chǔ)的理解和支持，又如何判斷呢？李世默給出的民意調(diào)查結(jié)構(gòu)一定程度上或許可以反映真實(shí)情況，然而自上而下的調(diào)查就能替代自下而上的承認(rèn)嗎？筆者對(duì)此仍然存有疑惑。而羅爾斯兩個(gè)正義原則中爭(zhēng)議最大的第二原則，強(qiáng)調(diào)公平優(yōu)先于效率，則正是對(duì)中國(guó)模式現(xiàn)存的貧富懸殊和腐敗問題的叩問。如果這位學(xué)者當(dāng)時(shí)坐在臺(tái)下，也許會(huì)對(duì)這一現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行詬病。

施密特的“非常狀態(tài)”理論讓筆者感觸頗多。而反思中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的執(zhí)政歷程，歷史又何嘗不是由非常狀態(tài)來決定的呢，這在新中國(guó)的六十四年中尤為明顯，中國(guó)的發(fā)展都帶有每一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人鮮明的印記，這似乎與去人格化的趨勢(shì)是背道而行的。那么，在施密特看來，是不是就可以說一個(gè)政黨或者政府的合法性很大程度上就取決于主權(quán)者在非常狀態(tài)下的決斷呢？這在中國(guó)模式的語境下，就是說中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨是否有民意的基礎(chǔ)不能僅看經(jīng)濟(jì)成就，不能僅考察其日常的民意支持度，更要研究其在非常時(shí)刻的決斷是否符合人民的根本利益。也許這讓人對(duì)中國(guó)未來的判斷蒙上了一絲保守主義的悲觀色彩，然而，筆者卻認(rèn)為這個(gè)角度的思考是有利的，有助于安全的。

以上是筆者在觀看李世默演講后結(jié)合當(dāng)代西方政治思潮這一門課程所得出的一些感想。非要用這四位政治思想家的觀點(diǎn)去看待和評(píng)論這一場(chǎng)演講雖然稍有牽強(qiáng)，但是筆者所想要表達(dá)的是，這些學(xué)說和觀點(diǎn)對(duì)于研究當(dāng)今中國(guó)模式仍有重要價(jià)值，并不因其所屬的是自由主義或保守主義陣營(yíng)便能斷論，學(xué)術(shù)界需要的是將他們的學(xué)說分條理析地與中國(guó)當(dāng)下實(shí)情作一一的對(duì)應(yīng)研究，而中國(guó)模式也必將對(duì)政治學(xué)思想領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生沖擊。

第四篇：ted英文演講稿

ted英文演講稿：犯錯(cuò)的價(jià)值

每個(gè)人都會(huì)避免犯錯(cuò)，但或許避免犯錯(cuò)本身就是一種錯(cuò)誤?請(qǐng)看以下這篇“犯錯(cuò)家“凱瑟琳舒爾茨告訴我們，或許我們不只該承認(rèn)錯(cuò)誤，更應(yīng)該大力擁抱人性中“我錯(cuò)故我在“的本質(zhì)。

So it's 1995, I'm in college, and a friend and I go on a road trip from Providence, Rhode Island to Portland, Oregon.And you know, we're young and unemployed, so we do the whole thing on back roads through state parks and national forests--basically the longest route we can possibly take.當(dāng)時(shí)是95年 我在上大學(xué) 我和一個(gè)朋友開車去玩 從羅得島的普羅旺斯區(qū)出發(fā) 到奧勒岡州的波特蘭市。我們年輕、無業(yè)，于是整個(gè)旅程都在鄉(xiāng)間小道 經(jīng)過州立公園 和國(guó)家保護(hù)森林 我們盡可能繞著最長(zhǎng)的路徑

And somewhere in the middle of South Dakota, I turn to my friend and I ask her a question that's been bothering me for 2,000 miles.“What's up with the Chinese character I keep seeing by the side of the road?”My friend looks at me totally blankly.在南達(dá)科塔州之中某處 我轉(zhuǎn)向我的朋友 問她一個(gè) 兩千英里路途上 一直煩惱我的問題，“路邊那個(gè)一直出現(xiàn)的中文字到底是什么?”我的朋友露出疑惑的神情

There's actually a gentleman in the front row who's doing a perfect imitation of her look.(Laughter)And I'm like, “You know, all the signs we keep seeing with the Chinese character on them.”

正如現(xiàn)在坐在第一排的這三位男士 所露出的神情一樣，笑聲)我說“你知道的 我們一直看到的那個(gè)路牌 寫著中文的那個(gè)啊”

She just stares at me for a few moments, and then she cracks up, because she figures out what I'm talking about.她瞪著我的臉一陣子 突然笑開了 因?yàn)樗偹阒牢宜笧楹?/p>

And what I'm talking about is this.我說的是這個(gè)

(Laughter)Right, the famous Chinese character for picnic area.(笑聲)沒錯(cuò)，這就是代表野餐區(qū)的那個(gè)中文字

(Laughter)I've spent the last five years of my life thinking about situations exactly like this--why we sometimes misunderstand the signs around us，(笑聲)過去的五年 我一直在思考 剛剛我所描述的狀況 為什么我們會(huì)對(duì)身邊的征兆 產(chǎn)生誤解

and how we behave when that happens, and what all of this can tell us about human nature.當(dāng)誤解發(fā)生時(shí)我們作何反應(yīng) 以及這一切所告訴我們的人性

In other words, as you heard Chris say, I've spent the last five years thinking about being wrong.換句話說，就像 Chris 剛才說的 過去五年的時(shí)間 我都在思考錯(cuò)誤的價(jià)值

This might strike you as a strange career move, but it actually has one great advantage: no job competition.你可能覺得這是個(gè)奇異的專業(yè) 但有一項(xiàng)好處是不容置疑的： 沒有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。

(Laughter)In fact, most of us do everything we can to avoid thinking about being wrong, or at least to avoid thinking about the possibility that we ourselves are wrong.(笑聲)事實(shí)上，我們大部分的人 都盡力不思考錯(cuò)誤的價(jià)值 或至少避免想到我們有可能犯錯(cuò)。

We get it in the abstract.我們都知道這個(gè)模糊的概念。

We all know everybody in this room makes mistakes.我們都知道這里的每個(gè)人都曾經(jīng)犯錯(cuò)

The human species, in general, is fallible--okay fine.人類本來就會(huì)犯錯(cuò)一只走鵑鳥 都會(huì)跳下懸崖

which is fine, he's a bird, he can fly.反正牠是鳥，牠可以飛

But the thing is, the coyote runs off the cliff right after him.但土狼也會(huì)跟著牠一起跳崖

And what's funny--at least if you're six years old--is that the coyote's totally fine too.那很好笑 如果你是個(gè)六歲兒童 土狼也很好

He just keeps running--right up until the moment that he looks down and realizes that he's in mid-air.牠就這么繼續(xù)跑 直到牠往下看 發(fā)現(xiàn)自己漫步在空中

That's when he falls.這時(shí)候他才會(huì)往下掉

When we're wrong about something--not when we realize it, but before that--we're like that coyote after he's gone off the cliff and before he looks down.在我們犯錯(cuò)時(shí) 在我們意識(shí)到我們犯錯(cuò)時(shí) 我們就像那只土狼 還沒意識(shí)到自己奔出懸崖

You know, we're already wrong, we're already in trouble, but we feel like we're on solid ground.我們已經(jīng)錯(cuò)了 已經(jīng)惹上麻煩了 但仍然感覺像走在地上

So I should actually correct something I said a moment ago.我應(yīng)該改變我之前的說法

It does feel like something to be wrong;it feels like being right.犯錯(cuò)的感覺就和 正確的感覺一樣

(Laughter)So this is one reason, a structural reason, why we get stuck inside this feeling of rightness.(笑聲)事實(shí)上我們這種自以為對(duì)的感受 是有構(gòu)造性的原因的

I call this error blindness.我稱之為錯(cuò)誤盲點(diǎn)

Most of the time, we don't have any kind of internal cue to let us know that we're wrong about something, until it's too late.大部份的時(shí)間里 我們身體里沒有任何機(jī)制 提醒我們錯(cuò)了 直到木已成舟

But there's a second reason that we get stuck inside this feeling as well--and this one is cultural.但還有第二個(gè)理由 文化性的理由

Think back for a moment to elementary school.回想小學(xué)時(shí)代

You're sitting there in class, and your teacher is handing back quiz papers, and one of them looks like this.你坐在課堂里 你的老師發(fā)回小考考卷 像這樣的小考考卷

This is not mine, by the way.雖然這張不是我的

(Laughter)So there you are in grade school, and you know exactly what to think about the kid who got this paper.(笑聲)你從小學(xué)時(shí)代 就知道該對(duì)拿這張考卷的同學(xué) 下甚么評(píng)語

It's the dumb kid, the troublemaker, the one who never does his homework.笨蛋，搗蛋鬼 從不做功課的壞學(xué)生

So by the time you are nine years old, you've already learned, first of all, that people who get stuff wrong are lazy, irresponsible dimwits--

你不過才九歲 你已經(jīng)懂得，首先 那些犯錯(cuò)的人 都是懶惰、不負(fù)責(zé)任的傻瓜

and second of all, that the way to succeed in life is to never make any mistakes.第二 想要在人生中成功 就不要犯錯(cuò)

We learn these really bad lessons really well.我們很早就得到這些錯(cuò)誤訊息

And a lot of us--and I suspect, especially a lot of us in this room--deal with them by just becoming perfect little A students，而我們 尤其是這個(gè)大廳里的許多人 都因此成為好學(xué)生 拿全A perfectionists, over-achievers.完美主義、永不滿意

Right, Mr.CFO, astrophysicist, ultra-marathoner? 不是嗎? 財(cái)務(wù)長(zhǎng)、天體物理學(xué)家、超級(jí)馬拉松先生們?

us.(Laughter)You're all CFO, astrophysicists, ultra-marathoners, it turns out.(笑聲)結(jié)果是你們?nèi)闪素?cái)務(wù)長(zhǎng)、天體物理學(xué)家、跑超級(jí)馬拉松 Okay, so fine.那很好

Except that then we freak out at the possibility that we've gotten something wrong.但一旦我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有可能犯錯(cuò) 就開始手足無措

Because according to this, getting something wrong means there's something wrong with

因?yàn)橐勒找?guī)定 犯錯(cuò) 代表我們一定也有甚么不對(duì)勁

So we just insist that we're right, because it makes us feel smart and responsible and virtuous and safe.于是我們堅(jiān)持己見 因?yàn)槟亲屛覀兏杏X聰明、得體 安全和可靠

So let me tell you a story.讓我告訴你們一個(gè)故事

A couple of years ago, a woman comes into Beth Israel Deaconess medical center for a surgery.幾年前 一個(gè)女人到 Beth Israel Deaconess 診所做手術(shù)

Beth Israel's in Boston.Beth Israel 在波士頓

It's the teaching hospital for Harvard--one of the best hospitals in the country.是哈佛大學(xué)的教學(xué)附屬醫(yī)院 全國(guó)數(shù)一數(shù)二的醫(yī)療中心

So this woman comes in and she's taken into the operating room.這個(gè)女人被送進(jìn)開刀房

She's anesthetized, the surgeon does his thing--stitches her back up, sends her out to the recovery room.麻醉，外科醫(yī)生做完手術(shù) 縫合，將她送進(jìn)恢復(fù)室

Everything seems to have gone fine.一切看上去都很好

And she wakes up, and she looks down at herself, and she says, “Why is the wrong side of my body in bandages?”

她醒來，往自己身上一看 說“為甚么我的左腿綁著繃帶?”

Well the wrong side of her body is in bandages because the surgeon has performed a major operation on her left leg instead of her right one.她應(yīng)該接受治療的是右腿 但為他做手術(shù)的外科醫(yī)生 卻把刀開在左腿

When the vice president for health care quality at Beth Israel spoke about this incident, he said something very interesting.當(dāng)副院長(zhǎng)出來為醫(yī)院的醫(yī)療質(zhì)量 和這次意外做出解釋時(shí) 他說了句很有趣的話

He said, “For whatever reason, the surgeon simply felt that he was on the correct side of the patient.”

他說“無論如何 這位外科醫(yī)生感覺 他開下的刀是在正確的一側(cè)”

(Laughter)The point of this story is that trusting too much in the feeling of being on the correct side of anything can be very dangerous.(笑聲)故事的重點(diǎn)是 相信自己的判斷力 相信自己站在對(duì)的一邊 是非常危險(xiǎn)的

This internal sense of rightness that we all experience so often is not a reliable guide to what is actually going on in the external world.我們心中時(shí)常感覺到的 理直氣壯的感覺 在真實(shí)世界中 并不是個(gè)可靠的向?qū)А?/p>

And when we act like it is, and we stop entertaining the possibility that we could be wrong, well that's when we end up doing things

當(dāng)我們依此行事 不再思考我們是否犯錯(cuò) 我們就有可能

88.like dumping 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, or torpedoing the global economy.把兩百灣加侖的石油倒進(jìn)墨西哥灣 或是顛覆世界經(jīng)濟(jì)

So this is a huge practical problem.這是個(gè)很實(shí)際的問題

But it's also a huge social problem.這也是個(gè)很大的社會(huì)問題

Think for a moment about what it means to feel right.“感覺對(duì)”究竟是什么意思

It means that you think that your beliefs just perfectly reflect reality.這代表著你認(rèn)為你的信念 和真實(shí)是一致的

And when you feel that way, you've got a problem to solve, which is, how are you going to explain all of those people who disagree with you?

當(dāng)你有這種感覺的時(shí)候 你的問題就大了 因?yàn)槿绻闶菍?duì)的 為甚么還有人和你持不同意見?

It turns out, most of us explain those people the same way, by resorting to a series of unfortunate assumptions.于是我們往往用同一種 思考方式去解釋這些異議

The first thing we usually do when someone disagrees with us is we just assume they're ignorant.第一是當(dāng)他人不同意我們的說法 我們便覺得他們無知

They don't have access to the same information that we do, and when we generously share that information with them, they're going to see the light and come on over to our team.他們不像我們懂得這么多 當(dāng)我們慷慨地和他們分享我們的知識(shí) 他們便會(huì)理解，并加入我們的行列

When that doesn't work, when it turns out those people have all the same facts that we do and they still disagree with us, then we move on to a second assumption，如果不是這樣 如果這些人和我們獲得的信息一樣多 卻仍然不認(rèn)同我們 我們便有了下一個(gè)定論

which is that they're idiots.那就是他們是白癡

(Laughter)They have all the right pieces of the puzzle, and they are too moronic to put them together correctly.(笑聲)他們已經(jīng)有了所有的信息 卻笨到無法拼湊出正確的圖像

And when that doesn't work, when it turns out that people who disagree with us have all the same facts we do and are actually pretty smart，一旦第二個(gè)定論也不成立 當(dāng)這些反對(duì)我們的人 和我們有一樣的信息 又聰明

then we move on to a third assumption: they know the truth, and they are deliberately distorting it for their own malevolent purposes.我們便有了第三個(gè)結(jié)論 他們知道事實(shí)是甚么 但卻為了自己的好處 故意曲解真實(shí)。

So this is a catastrophe.這真是個(gè)大災(zāi)難

This attachment to our own rightness keeps us from preventing mistakes when we absolutely need to and causes us to treat each other terribly.我們的自以為是 讓我們?cè)谧钚枰臅r(shí)候 無法預(yù)防犯錯(cuò) 更讓我們互相仇視

104.But to me, what's most baffling and most tragic about this is that it misses the whole point of being human.對(duì)我來說 最大的悲劇是 它讓我們錯(cuò)失了身為人的珍貴意義

It's like we want to imagine that our minds are just these perfectly translucent windows and we just gaze out of them and describe the world as it unfolds.那就像是想象 我們的心靈之窗完全透明 我們向外觀看 描述在我們之前展開的世界

And we want everybody else to gaze out of the same window and see the exact same thing.我們想要每個(gè)人和我們有一樣的窗子 對(duì)世界做出一樣的觀察

That is not true, and if it were, life would be incredibly boring.那不是真的 如果是，人生將會(huì)多么無聊

The miracle of your mind isn't that you can see the world as it is.心靈的神奇之處 不在你懂得這個(gè)世界是甚么樣子

It's that you can see the world as it isn't.而是去理解那些你不懂的地方

We can remember the past, and we can think about the future, and we can imagine what it's like to be some other person in some other place.我們記得過去 思考未來 我們想象 自己成為他人，在他方

And we all do this a little differently, which is why we can all look up at the same night sky and see this and also this and also this.我們的想象都有些不同 于是當(dāng)我們抬頭看同一個(gè)夜空 我們看到這個(gè) 這個(gè) 和這個(gè)

And yeah, it is also why we get things wrong.這也是我們搞錯(cuò)事情的原因

1,200 years before Descartes said his famous thing about “I think therefore I am,”

在笛卡兒說出那句有名的”我思故我在“ 的一千兩百年前

this guy, St.Augustine, sat down and wrote “Fallor ergo sum”--“I err therefore I am.”

圣奧古斯丁，坐下來 寫下“Fallor ergo sum”“我錯(cuò)故我在”

Augustine understood that our capacity to screw up, it's not some kind of embarrassing defect in the human system, something we can eradicate or overcome.奧古斯丁懂得 我們犯錯(cuò)的能力 這并不是人性中 一個(gè)令人難堪的缺陷 不是我們可以克服或消滅的

It's totally fundamental to who we are.這是我們的本質(zhì)

Because, unlike God, we don't really know what's going on out there.因?yàn)槲覀儾皇巧系?我們不知道我們之外究竟發(fā)生了甚么

And unlike all of the other animals, we are obsessed with trying to figure it out.而不同于其它動(dòng)物的是 我們都瘋狂地想找出解答

To me, this obsession is the source and root of all of our productivity and creativity.對(duì)我來說 這種尋找的沖動(dòng) 就是我們生產(chǎn)力和創(chuàng)造力的來源

Last year, for various reasons, I found myself listening to a lot of episodes of the Public Radio show This American Life.因?yàn)橐恍┚壒?去年我在廣播上 聽了很多集的“我們的美國(guó)人生”

And so I'm listening and I'm listening, and at some point, I start feeling like all the stories are about being wrong.我聽著聽著 突然發(fā)現(xiàn) 這些故事全和犯錯(cuò)有關(guān)

And my first thought was, “I've lost it.我的第一個(gè)念頭是 “我完了

I've become the crazy wrongness lady.我寫書寫瘋了

I just imagined it everywhere,”

四處都看到有關(guān)犯錯(cuò)的幻覺”

which has happened.說真的是這樣

But a couple of months later, I actually had a chance to interview Ira Glass, who's the host of the show.但幾個(gè)月后 我訪問了那個(gè)廣播節(jié)目的主持人 Ira Glass

And I mentioned this to him, and he was like, “No actually, that's true.我向他提到這件事 他回答我“事實(shí)上

In fact,” he says, “as a staff, we joke that every single episode of our show has the same crypto-theme.你是對(duì)的”他說 “我們這些工作人員總是 開玩笑說每集節(jié)目之中的 秘密主題都是一樣的

And the crypto-theme is: 'I thought this one thing was going to happen and something else happened instead.' And thing is,” says Ira Glass, “we need this.這個(gè)秘密主題就是 ”我以為這件事會(huì)這樣發(fā)生 結(jié)果其它事情發(fā)生了“ 他說”但是，這就是我們需要的

We need these moments of surprise and reversal and wrongness to make these stories work.“

我們需要這些意外 這些顛倒和錯(cuò)誤 這些故事才能成立?！?/p>

And for the rest of us, audience members, as listeners, as readers, we eat this stuff up.而我們身為觀眾 聽眾、讀者 我們吸收這些故事

We love things like plot twists and red herrings and surprise endings.我們喜歡故事轉(zhuǎn)折 令人驚訝的結(jié)局

When it comes to our stories, we love being wrong.我們喜歡在故事里 看到犯錯(cuò)

But, you know, our stories are like this because our lives are like this.但，故事會(huì)這樣寫 是因?yàn)槿松褪沁@樣

We think this one thing is going to happen and something else happens instead.我們以為某些事情會(huì)這樣發(fā)生 發(fā)生的卻是其它事

George Bush thought he was going to invade Iraq, find a bunch of weapons of mass destruction, liberate the people and bring democracy to the Middle East.小布什以為他入侵伊拉克 會(huì)找到大規(guī)模毀滅性武器 解放中東百姓，為他們帶來民主自由

And something else happened instead.但卻不是這樣

And Hosni Mubarak thought he was going to be dictator of Egypt for the rest of his life, until he got too old or too sick and could pass the reigns of power onto his son.穆巴拉克以為 他到死都會(huì)是埃及的獨(dú)裁者 一直到他年老或臥病 再把他的權(quán)力交給下一代

And something else happened instead.但卻不是這樣

And maybe you thought you were going to grow up and marry your high school sweetheart and move back to your home town and raise a bunch of kids together.或許你想過 你會(huì)長(zhǎng)大、嫁給你的初戀情人 搬回老家，生一群孩子

And something else happened instead.但卻不是這樣

And I have to tell you that I thought I was writing an incredibly nerdy book about a subject everybody hates for an audience that would never materialize.我必須說 我以為我寫的是一本很冷僻的書 有關(guān)一個(gè)人人討厭的主題 為一些從不存在的讀者

And something else happened instead.但卻不是這樣

(Laughter)I mean, this is life.(笑聲)我們的人生

For good and for ill, we generate these incredible stories about the world around us, and then the world turns around and astonishes us.無論好壞 我們創(chuàng)造了啦 那包圍我們的世界 而世界轉(zhuǎn)過頭來，令我們大吃一驚

No offense, but this entire conference is an unbelievable monument to our capacity to get stuff wrong.說真的，這整個(gè)會(huì)議 充斥著這樣難以置信的時(shí)刻 我們一次又一次地意識(shí)到自己的錯(cuò)誤

We just spent and entire week talking about innovations and advancements and improvements, but you know why we need all of those innovations

我們花了整整一周 討論創(chuàng)新，進(jìn)步 和改善 你知道我們?yōu)樯趺葱枰@些創(chuàng)新

and advancements and improvements?

進(jìn)步和改善嗎?

Because half the stuff that's the most mind-boggling and world altering--TED 1998--eh.因?yàn)槠渲杏幸话?來自最應(yīng)該改變世界的 98年的TED 呃

(Laughter)Didn't really work out that way, did it.(笑聲)真是出人意料之外啊，不是嗎

(Laughter)Where's my jet pack, Chris?

(笑聲)我的逃生火箭在哪，Chris?

(Laughter)(Applause)So here we are again.(笑聲)(掌聲)于是我們又在這里

And that's how it goes.事情就是這樣

We come up with another idea.我們重新想出其它點(diǎn)子

We tell another story.我們有了新的故事

We hold another conference.我們開了另一個(gè)會(huì)議

The theme of this one, as you guys have now heard seven million times, is the rediscovery of wonder.這次的主題是 如果你還沒有聽到耳朵出油的話 是重新找到想象的力量

And to me, if you really want to rediscover wonder, you need to step outside of that tiny, terrified space of rightness and look around at each other

對(duì)我來說 如果你真的想重新找到想象的力量 你需要離開 那個(gè)小小的、自我感覺良好的小圈圈 看看彼此

and look out at the vastness and complexity and mystery of the universe and be able to say, “Wow, I don't know.看看宇宙的 廣大無垠 復(fù)雜神秘 然后真正地說 “哇，我不知道

Maybe I'm wrong.”

或許我錯(cuò)了?！?/p>

Thank you.謝謝各位

(Applause)Thank you guys.

第五篇：ted演講稿 英文

ted演講稿 英文

歡迎來到聘才網(wǎng)，以下是聘才小編為大家搜索整理的ted演講稿 英文，歡迎大家閱讀。萊溫斯基ted演講稿(英文版)

You're looking at a woman who was publicly silent for a decade.Obviously, that's changed, but only recently.It was several months ago that I gave my very first major public talk at the Forbes 30 Under 30 summit:1,500 brilliant people, all under the age of 30.That meant that in 1998, the oldest among the group were only 14, and the youngest, just four.I joked with them that some might only have heard of me from rap songs.Yes, I'm in rap songs.Almost 40 rap songs.But the night of my speech, a surprising thing happened.At the age of 41, I was hit on by a 27-year-old guy.I know, right? He was charming and I was flattered, and I declined.You know what his unsuccessful pickup line was? He could make me feel 22 again.I realized later that night, I'm probably the only person over 40 who does not want to be 22 again.At the age of 22, I fell in love with my boss, and at the age of 24, I learned the devastating consequences.Can I see a show of hands of anyone here who didn't make a mistake or do something they regretted at 22? Yep.That's what I thought.So like me, at 22, a few of you may have also taken wrong turns and fallen in love with the wrong person, maybe even your boss.Unlike me, though, your boss probably wasn't the president of the United States of America.Of course, life is full of surprises.Not a day goes by that I'm not reminded of my mistake, and I regret that mistake deeply.In 1998, after having been swept up into an improbable romance, I was then swept up into the eye of a political, legal and media maelstrom like we had never seen before.Remember, just a few years earlier,news was consumed from just three places: reading a newspaper or magazine, listening to the radio, or watching television.That was it.But that wasn't my fate.Instead, this scandal was brought to you by the digital revolution.That meant we could access all the information we wanted, when we wanted it, anytime, anywhere, and when the story broke in January 1998, it broke online.It was the first time the traditional news was usurped by the Internet for a major news story, a click that reverberated around the world.What that meant for me personally was that overnight I went from being a completely private figure to a publicly humiliated one worldwide.I was patient zero of losing a personal reputation on a global scale almost instantaneously.This rush to judgment, enabled by technology, led to mobs of virtual stone-throwers.Granted, it was before social media, but people could still comment online, email stories, and, of course, email cruel jokes.News sources plastered photos of me all over to sell newspapers, banner ads online, and to keep people tuned to the TV.Do you recall a particular image of me, say, wearing a beret?

Now, I admit I made mistakes, especially wearing that beret.But the attention and judgment that I received, not the story, but that I personally received, was unprecedented.I was branded as a tramp, tart, slut, whore, bimbo, and, of course, that woman.I was seen by many but actually known by few.And I get it: it was easy to forget that that woman was dimensional, had a soul, and was once unbroken.When this happened to me 17 years ago, there was no name for it.Now we call it cyberbullying(網(wǎng)絡(luò)欺凌)andonline harassment(網(wǎng)絡(luò)騷擾).Today, I want to share some of my experience with you, talk about how that experience has helped shape my cultural observations, and how I hope my past experience can lead to a change that results in less suffering for others.In 1998, I lost my reputation and my dignity.I lost almost everything, and I almost lost my life.Let me paint a picture for you.It is September of 1998.I'm sitting in a windowless office room inside the Office of the Independent Counsel underneath humming fluorescent lights.I'm listening to the sound of my voice, my voice on surreptitiously taped phone calls that a supposed friend had made the year before.I'm here because I've been legally required to personally authenticate all 20 hours of taped conversation.For the past eight months, the mysterious content of these tapes has hung like the Sword of Damocles over my head.I mean, who can remember what they said a year ago? Scared and mortified, I listen, listen as I prattle on about the flotsam and jetsam of the day;listen as I confess my love for the president, and, of course, my heartbreak;listen to my sometimes catty, sometimes churlish, sometimes silly self being cruel, unforgiving, uncouth;listen, deeply, deeply ashamed, to the worst version of myself,a self I don't even recognize.A few days later, the Starr Report is released to Congress, and all of those tapes and trans, those stolen words, form a part of it.That people can read the trans is horrific enough, but a few weeks later, the audio tapes are aired on TV, and significant portions made available online.The public humiliation was excruciating.Life was almost unbearable.This was not something that happened with regularity back then in 1998, and by this, I mean the stealing of people's private words, actions, conversations or photos, and then making them public--public without consent, public without context, and public without compassion.Fast forward 12 years to XX, and now social media has been born.The landscape has sadly become much more populated with instances like mine, whether or not someone actually make a mistake, and now it's for both public and private people.The consequences for some have become dire, very dire.I was on the phone with my mom in September of XX, and we were talking about the news of a young college freshman from Rutgers University named Tyler Clementi.Sweet, sensitive, creative Tyler was secretly webcammed by his roommate while being intimate with another man.When the online world learned of this incident, the ridicule and cyberbullying ignited.A few days later, Tyler jumped from the George Washington Bridge to his death.He was 18.My mom was beside herself about what happened to Tyler and his family, and she was gutted with painin a way that I just couldn't quite understand, and then eventually I realized she was reliving 1998, reliving a time when she sat by my bed every night, reliving a time when she made me shower with the bathroom door open, and reliving a time when both of my parents feared that I would be humiliated to death,literally.Today, too many parents haven't had the chance to step in and rescue their loved ones.Too many have learned of their child's suffering and humiliation after it was too late.Tyler's tragic, senseless death was a turning point for me.It served to recontextualize my experiences, and I then began to look at the world of humiliation and bullying around me and see something different.In 1998, we had no way of knowing where this brave new technology called the Internet would take us.Since then, it has connected people in unimaginable ways, joining lost siblings, saving lives, launching revolutions, but the darkness, cyberbullying, and slut-shaming that I experienced had mushroomed.Every day online, people, especially young people who are not developmentally equipped to handle this, are so abused and humiliated that they can't imagine living to the next day, and some, tragically, don't, and there's nothing virtual about that.ChildLine, a nonprofit that's focused on helping young people on various issues,released a staggering statistic late last year: From XX to XX, there was an 87 percent increase in calls and emails related to cyberbullying.A meta-analysis done out of the Netherlands showed that for the first time, cyberbullying was leading to suicidal ideations more significantly than offline bullying.And you know what shocked me, although it shouldn't have, was other research last year that determined humiliation was a more intensely felt emotion than either happiness or even anger.Cruelty to others is nothing new, but online, technologically enhanced shaming is amplified, uncontained, and permanently accessible.The echo of embarrassment used to extend only as far as your family, village, school or community, but now it's the online community too.Millions of people, often anonymously, can stab you with their words, and that's a lot of pain, and there are no perimeters around how many people can publicly observe you and put you in a public stockade.There is a very personal price to public humiliation, and the growth of the Internet has jacked up that price.For nearly two decades now, we have slowly been sowing the seeds of shame and public humiliation in our cultural soil, both on-and offline.Gossip websites, paparazzi, reality programming, politics, news outlets and sometimes hackers all traffic in shame.It's led to desensitization and a permissive environment online which lends itself to trolling, invasion of privacy, and cyberbullying.This shift has created what Professor Nicolaus Mills calls a culture of humiliation.Consider a few prominent examples just from the past six months alone.Snapchat, the service which is used mainly by younger generationsand claims that its messages only have the lifespan of a few seconds.You can imagine the range of content that that gets.A third-party app which Snapchatters use to preserve the lifespan of the messages was hacked, and 100,000 personal conversations, photos, and videos were leaked online to now have a lifespan of forever.Jennifer Lawrence and several other actors had their iCloud accounts hacked, and private, intimate, nude photos were plastered across the Internet without their gossip website had over five million hits for this one story.And what about the Sony Pictures cyberhacking? The documents which received the most attention were private emails that had maximum public embarrassment value.But in this culture of humiliation, there is another kind of price tag attached to public shaming.The price does not measure the cost to the victim, which Tyler and too many others, notably women, minorities,and members of the LGBTQ community have paid, but the price measures the profit of those who prey on them.This invasion of others is a raw material, efficiently and ruthlessly mined, packaged and sold at a profit.A marketplace has emerged where public humiliation is a commodity and shame is an is the money made? Clicks.The more shame, the more clicks.The more clicks, the more advertising dollars.We're in a dangerous cycle.The more we click on this kind of gossip, the more numb we get to the human lives behind it, and the more numb we get, the more we click.All the while, someone is making money off of the back of someone else's suffering.With every click, we make a choice.The more we saturate our culture with public shaming, the more accepted it is, the more we will see behavior like cyberbullying, trolling, some forms of hacking, and online harassment.Why? Because they all have humiliation at their cores.This behavior is a symptom of the culture we've created.Just think about it.Changing behavior begins with evolving beliefs.We've seen that to be true with racism, homophobia, and plenty of other biases, today and in the past.As we've changed beliefs about same-sex marriage, more people have been offered equal freedoms.When we began valuing sustainability, more people began to recycle.So as far as our culture of humiliation goes, what we need is a cultural revolution.Public shaming as a blood sport has to stop, and it's time for an intervention on the Internet and in our culture.The shift begins with something simple, but it's not easy.We need to return to a long-held value of compassion--compassion and empathy.Online, we've got a compassion deficit, an empathy crisis.Researcher Brené Brown said, and I quote, “Shame can't survive empathy.” Shame cannot survive empathy.I've seen some very dark days in my life, and it was the compassion and empathy from my family, friends, professionals, and sometimes even strangers that saved me.Even empathy from one person can make a difference.The theory of minority influence, proposed by social psychologist Serge Moscovici, says that even in small numbers, when there's consistency over time, change can happen.In the online world, we can foster minority influence by becoming upstanders.To become an upstander means instead of bystander apathy, we can post a positive comment for someone or report a bullying situation.Trust me, compassionate comments help abate the negativity.We can also counteract the culture by supporting organizations that deal with these kinds of issues, like the Tyler Clementi Foundation in the , In the , there's Anti-Bullying Pro, and in Australia, there's Project Rockit.We talk a lot about our right to freedom of expression, but we need to talk more about our responsibility to freedom of expression.We all want to be heard, but let's acknowledge the difference between speaking up with intention and speaking up for attention.The Internet is the superhighway for the id, but online, showing empathy to others benefits us all and helps create a safer and better world.We need to communicate online with compassion, consume news with compassion, and click with compassion.Just imagine walking a mile in someone else's headline.I'd like to end on a personal note.In the past nine months, the question I've been asked the most is why.Why now? Why was I sticking my head above the parapet? You can read between the lines in those questions, and the answer has nothing to do with politics.The top note answer was and is because it's time: time to stop tip-toeing around my past;time to stop living a life of opprobrium;and time to take back my narrative.It's also not just about saving myself.Anyone who is suffering from shame and public humiliation needs to know one thing: You can survive it.I know it's hard.It may not be painless, quick or easy, but you can insist on a different ending to your story.Have compassion for yourself.We all deserve compassion, and to live both online and off in a more compassionate world.Thank you for listening.