第一篇：弟子規(guī)(李默)

圣人語(yǔ)，弟子行

——讀《弟子規(guī)》有感

“弟子規(guī) 圣人訓(xùn) 守孝悌 次謹(jǐn)信??”每當(dāng)我背《弟子規(guī)》時(shí)，耳邊就會(huì)響起媽媽那語(yǔ)重心長(zhǎng)的話(huà)語(yǔ)：“這《弟子規(guī)》啊，背起來(lái)容易，當(dāng)要將它理解好了，并把圣人的教誨在生活中實(shí)踐起來(lái)卻很難?！币郧拔衣?tīng)了，都不以為意，直到今天——

一大早，走出房門(mén)，便看到媽媽像以往一樣在打掃衛(wèi)生，但動(dòng)作又和以往不同，顯得有氣無(wú)力的。我也沒(méi)多想，轉(zhuǎn)身便到洗手間刷牙洗臉去了。“咳！咳！咳咳！”時(shí)不時(shí)地有幾聲咳嗽聲傳到我的耳中。我想：媽媽喉嚨又上火了吧。剛洗漱完走進(jìn)房門(mén)，就聽(tīng)到媽媽那虛弱的呼聲：“默兒，幫媽媽把地掃掃?！蔽乙宦?tīng)，心里就不耐煩了，剛想對(duì)媽媽說(shuō)我還要寫(xiě)作業(yè)呢，腦海就響起了自己朗朗的讀書(shū)聲——“父母呼 應(yīng)勿緩 父母命 行勿懶 父母教 須敬聽(tīng) 父母責(zé) 須順承”。是啊，這不正是古今流芳百年的孝敬父母的文明行為嗎？我把《弟子規(guī)》記在了腦海，可我何時(shí)又聽(tīng)從過(guò)這些教誨呢！太慚愧了！我快步走出房間，從媽媽手中拿過(guò)掃把，低著頭，邊掃邊說(shuō)：“媽媽?zhuān)匚襾?lái)掃，您去做早餐吧?！?/p>

媽媽慢慢地走進(jìn)廚房，準(zhǔn)備做早餐?！翱瓤龋瓤瓤??”可那咳嗽聲卻一聲大過(guò)一聲。媽媽病了，我這做女兒的卻還只顧著自己，這是讀過(guò)圣言書(shū)的人嗎？我大步地走進(jìn)廚房，對(duì)她說(shuō)：“媽?zhuān)バ菹?，早餐還是我來(lái)做。”媽媽一聽(tīng)，頭一抬，眼睛好像立刻就生動(dòng)了，望著我，仿佛在說(shuō)我懂事了似的，但她什么話(huà)也沒(méi)說(shuō)出口，轉(zhuǎn)身 1

就走進(jìn)臥室了。

早餐做好后，我端著湯面，走進(jìn)媽媽的臥室。媽媽躺在床上靜靜地看著我，一臉欣慰的笑，但眼睛卻是濕潤(rùn)的，說(shuō)：“我的乖女兒，長(zhǎng)大了?！蔽衣?tīng)后，心里甜滋滋的，比考試得了一百分還要高興，嘴角也忍不住直往上揚(yáng)。把湯面遞給媽媽?zhuān)骸皨寢專(zhuān)斐?！”看著媽媽津津有味地吃著面，我心里感到無(wú)比的幸福。忍不住悄悄地走到媽媽耳邊輕輕地說(shuō)：“媽媽?zhuān)椰F(xiàn)在總算明白了《弟子規(guī)》的真正含義了，以后我一定要力行圣人的教誨?！?/p>

第二篇：李世默演講觀(guān)后感

如果他們?cè)谂_(tái)下

——李世默演講觀(guān)后感

白荷菲 201355003

筆者總結(jié)李世默的演講，主要有兩個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容：

1、元敘事危害著社會(huì)的正常發(fā)展。無(wú)論是原始社會(huì)到共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)的單線(xiàn)發(fā)展敘事還是傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)到現(xiàn)代社會(huì)選舉創(chuàng)造民主美好社會(huì)的單一導(dǎo)向敘事都與現(xiàn)實(shí)相左，且引導(dǎo)社會(huì)走向極端的深淵。

2、中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的中國(guó)模式前景是美好的。不同于西方認(rèn)為的僵化、封閉和不具合法性，中國(guó)的一黨制模式具備自我糾錯(cuò)能力，能夠不斷進(jìn)行政治改革，與時(shí)俱進(jìn)；能夠通過(guò)一套成熟的黨內(nèi)機(jī)制選賢任能；而且以其卓越的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力贏得合法性，獲得民心。

下面，筆者將試圖以哈耶克、伯林、羅爾斯和施密特的立場(chǎng)和觀(guān)點(diǎn)來(lái)看待李世默的這一場(chǎng)演講。作一個(gè)大膽的假設(shè)，如果這四位政治思想家當(dāng)時(shí)都坐在臺(tái)下，他們應(yīng)該會(huì)對(duì)演講的內(nèi)容褒貶不一，但至少不是全盤(pán)否定的。

哈耶克大概是會(huì)贊成李世默對(duì)元敘事的辛辣諷刺的，因?yàn)檫@完全契合哈耶克認(rèn)為的人無(wú)法克服其無(wú)知，人的理性是有限的。且不論是否真的存在社會(huì)發(fā)展的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)路線(xiàn)，即使存在人們也無(wú)法認(rèn)識(shí)或驗(yàn)證。而哈耶克推崇的演進(jìn)理性主義更是相信社會(huì)秩序是在人與人、人與自然的復(fù)雜互動(dòng)中經(jīng)過(guò)漫長(zhǎng)的無(wú)目標(biāo)的過(guò)程逐漸生成的，元敘事否定偶然性、否定演化過(guò)程的自生自發(fā)，無(wú)疑會(huì)受到哈耶克的批駁。在筆者看來(lái)，柏林對(duì)“積極自由”的警惕批判，認(rèn)為若信奉積極自由最終的一個(gè)可能是會(huì)迫使他人自由，這與哈耶克的演進(jìn)理性主義不無(wú)共通之處，在人類(lèi)社會(huì)發(fā)展的層面上來(lái)看便是反對(duì)元敘事。伯林觀(guān)點(diǎn)讓人對(duì)元敘事不由得產(chǎn)生恐懼，若單一線(xiàn)性發(fā)展路線(xiàn)被個(gè)體或群體認(rèn)定為“真理”，那么“沒(méi)有人有權(quán)反對(duì)理性”，加諸于異見(jiàn)者身上的一切便具備了強(qiáng)制性與合法性。而羅爾斯對(duì)理性多元論的承認(rèn)也讓筆者相信其對(duì)元敘事是不屑一顧的，然而羅爾斯的自由主義觀(guān)點(diǎn)集中于對(duì)公平正義的論證，筆者未能了解到更多與李世默這一觀(guān)點(diǎn)相關(guān)的內(nèi)容。施密特雖與前三者不同處于一個(gè)陣營(yíng)，但他卻從另一個(gè)角度對(duì)元敘事給予了批判，施密特堅(jiān)信歷史的發(fā)展是由一個(gè)又一個(gè)的“非常狀態(tài)”構(gòu)成的，主權(quán)者的決斷在其中發(fā)揮著至關(guān)重要的作用，那么認(rèn)為每一個(gè)社會(huì)的非常狀態(tài)都將有同樣的結(jié)果、每一位主權(quán)者的決斷都將趨同也就荒誕不羈了。

行文至此，筆者發(fā)現(xiàn)，雖屬于政治思想的不同陣營(yíng)，但不論是自由主義還是保守主義的學(xué)者都傾向于贊同演講中的第一個(gè)觀(guān)點(diǎn)，即社會(huì)發(fā)展并非一個(gè)元敘事。而這也逐漸成為當(dāng)今社會(huì)的普世價(jià)值，在這個(gè)時(shí)代若仍處處提意識(shí)形態(tài)的根本對(duì)立也越來(lái)越顯得不合時(shí)宜。想來(lái)具有智慧的政治思想家們?cè)缇筒辉谠獢⑹滦胁煌ㄟ@一點(diǎn)共識(shí)上進(jìn)行爭(zhēng)論了，盡管他們中的不少人仍然堅(jiān)信社會(huì)主義遠(yuǎn)不及資本主義。

然而當(dāng)落腳到具體的中國(guó)模式，思想家們的分歧也許就小不了了。在此拋開(kāi)自由主義學(xué)者對(duì)社會(huì)主義的根本排斥，筆者希望將各位思想家思想中的具體觀(guān)點(diǎn)對(duì)應(yīng)上中國(guó)模式的特點(diǎn)和元素并加以分析。當(dāng)然，今日的“中國(guó)模式”已不同于他們那個(gè)時(shí)代計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)的社會(huì)主義了，也正因此才有探討的價(jià)值。天馬行空一想，四位學(xué)者若能目睹今日世界上的特例，其學(xué)說(shuō)不知又會(huì)發(fā)生什么樣的變革。由此推想，中國(guó)模式應(yīng)當(dāng)對(duì)政治思想界產(chǎn)生相當(dāng)大的沖擊才是，對(duì)自由主義等各學(xué)派的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展也當(dāng)產(chǎn)生影響，何以目前尚未在學(xué)術(shù)界形成一股潮流，亦或已在醞釀之中也未可知，這值得筆者進(jìn)行更多的了解和學(xué)習(xí)。

哈耶克雖不會(huì)像批判納粹主義一般指責(zé)當(dāng)今中國(guó)，但對(duì)中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)定是不會(huì)支持的，因?yàn)榭吹靡?jiàn)的手的作用仍然巨大，與哈耶克所提倡的完全自由市場(chǎng)有一定距離。另一可能是哈耶克也許會(huì)視中國(guó)的改革方向是披著社會(huì)主義外衣的資本主義，一如現(xiàn)在頗有說(shuō)服力的一派觀(guān)點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為中國(guó)已不是社會(huì)主義國(guó)家。而對(duì)于李世默提及的中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的自我糾錯(cuò)能力，憑借哈耶克對(duì)構(gòu)建理性主義的駁斥他是一定不會(huì)贊同的，因?yàn)檫@種自我糾錯(cuò)能力畢竟強(qiáng)調(diào)的是共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)部的力量，很大程度上取決于人為努力和自我約束。堅(jiān)持法治為自由護(hù)航的哈耶克對(duì)演講中所提及的以現(xiàn)實(shí)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力獲得合法性想必也不會(huì)贊成，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的選賢舉能機(jī)制存在著實(shí)質(zhì)法律的因素，即便具有法律依據(jù)卻不符合哈耶克所說(shuō)的法治。法治的確是當(dāng)下中國(guó)模式最大的漏洞之一。李世默的演講有回避這一問(wèn)題的傾向，但中國(guó)要真的實(shí)現(xiàn)他所作的預(yù)測(cè)在十年內(nèi)獲得那些成就，法治是必須直面的。這里所說(shuō)的直面并不只是強(qiáng)調(diào)其重要性，而是將解決憲法和中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的關(guān)系問(wèn)題提到日程上來(lái)。

中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨選賢任能的機(jī)制亦與伯林對(duì)消極自由和積極自由的界定相關(guān)，柏林大概會(huì)認(rèn)為中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨所謂的黨內(nèi)民主很可能是摧毀個(gè)人主權(quán)的看上去科學(xué)有效的途徑，實(shí)際上則走上了積極自由的危險(xiǎn)道路，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨對(duì)自我糾正能力越有信心，這套糾偏機(jī)制就越接近于絕對(duì)理性，而且會(huì)有數(shù)不清的現(xiàn)實(shí)理由為之作辯護(hù)。然而，伯林的多元論思想?yún)s是對(duì)中國(guó)模式有所包容的。筆者也同意其承認(rèn)人類(lèi)價(jià)值目標(biāo)多樣但并非無(wú)限，且不能錯(cuò)誤指向相對(duì)主義的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。中國(guó)模式的開(kāi)創(chuàng)者鄧小平“不管黑貓白貓抓到老鼠就是好貓”的話(huà)語(yǔ)在此維度上意義重大。

羅爾斯的政治自由主義學(xué)說(shuō)認(rèn)為自由憲政不是各種社會(huì)力量博弈而取得暫時(shí)妥協(xié)的結(jié)果，強(qiáng)調(diào)了公民對(duì)政體的理性基礎(chǔ)的理解與支持才是政體合法性能夠穩(wěn)固的保證。這為人們提供了對(duì)李世默中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的合法性來(lái)源論述的思考角度。在奪取政權(quán)和鞏固政權(quán)的許多關(guān)鍵時(shí)刻中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨在博弈中都取得了勝利，然而這樣的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力就足以構(gòu)成合法性了嗎？如果論及對(duì)其理性基礎(chǔ)的理解和支持，又如何判斷呢？李世默給出的民意調(diào)查結(jié)構(gòu)一定程度上或許可以反映真實(shí)情況，然而自上而下的調(diào)查就能替代自下而上的承認(rèn)嗎？筆者對(duì)此仍然存有疑惑。而羅爾斯兩個(gè)正義原則中爭(zhēng)議最大的第二原則，強(qiáng)調(diào)公平優(yōu)先于效率，則正是對(duì)中國(guó)模式現(xiàn)存的貧富懸殊和腐敗問(wèn)題的叩問(wèn)。如果這位學(xué)者當(dāng)時(shí)坐在臺(tái)下，也許會(huì)對(duì)這一現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行詬病。

施密特的“非常狀態(tài)”理論讓筆者感觸頗多。而反思中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨的執(zhí)政歷程，歷史又何嘗不是由非常狀態(tài)來(lái)決定的呢，這在新中國(guó)的六十四年中尤為明顯，中國(guó)的發(fā)展都帶有每一代領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人鮮明的印記，這似乎與去人格化的趨勢(shì)是背道而行的。那么，在施密特看來(lái)，是不是就可以說(shuō)一個(gè)政黨或者政府的合法性很大程度上就取決于主權(quán)者在非常狀態(tài)下的決斷呢？這在中國(guó)模式的語(yǔ)境下，就是說(shuō)中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨是否有民意的基礎(chǔ)不能僅看經(jīng)濟(jì)成就，不能僅考察其日常的民意支持度，更要研究其在非常時(shí)刻的決斷是否符合人民的根本利益。也許這讓人對(duì)中國(guó)未來(lái)的判斷蒙上了一絲保守主義的悲觀(guān)色彩，然而，筆者卻認(rèn)為這個(gè)角度的思考是有利的，有助于安全的。

以上是筆者在觀(guān)看李世默演講后結(jié)合當(dāng)代西方政治思潮這一門(mén)課程所得出的一些感想。非要用這四位政治思想家的觀(guān)點(diǎn)去看待和評(píng)論這一場(chǎng)演講雖然稍有牽強(qiáng)，但是筆者所想要表達(dá)的是，這些學(xué)說(shuō)和觀(guān)點(diǎn)對(duì)于研究當(dāng)今中國(guó)模式仍有重要價(jià)值，并不因其所屬的是自由主義或保守主義陣營(yíng)便能斷論，學(xué)術(shù)界需要的是將他們的學(xué)說(shuō)分條理析地與中國(guó)當(dāng)下實(shí)情作一一的對(duì)應(yīng)研究，而中國(guó)模式也必將對(duì)政治學(xué)思想領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生沖擊。

第三篇：2016李世默在清華演講稿全文

2016李世默在清華演講稿全文

李世默在清華演講稿全文，2016年，李世默在清華大學(xué)時(shí)事大講堂上，借用五位政治學(xué)學(xué)者的理論，分析認(rèn)為21世紀(jì)是靠改革競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的世紀(jì)，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的中國(guó)必將在此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中脫穎而出，因?yàn)檎幵谏倌昶诘闹袊?guó)政治體制在全世界大國(guó)中最具有改革能力。在演講中一起上了一堂“從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革”的公開(kāi)課從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革“為題從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革”為題李世默在清華演講稿全文

大家下午好，很開(kāi)心來(lái)清華和同學(xué)們交流。我不是老師，我是生意人，但賺錢(qián)以外，我的業(yè)余愛(ài)好是研究中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨。首先，我要聲明我不是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨黨員，小時(shí)候試過(guò)，但可能因?yàn)樯钭黠L(fēng)有問(wèn)題，被拒絕了(笑)。后來(lái)入黨未成，一不小心當(dāng)上了資本家。我平時(shí)是周一到周五做資本家，周六周日研究中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨。今天我跟大家分享我這些年研究中共的一點(diǎn)——不能說(shuō)是學(xué)問(wèn)——只是一些心得，希望大家能夠?qū)ξ业男牡锰岢鲆庖?jiàn)和批判。

我要講的題目是《從全球政治學(xué)視野看中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨與改革》。政治學(xué)，英語(yǔ)叫politicalscience，就是政治科學(xué)，但政治學(xué)是一門(mén)軟科學(xué)，就是用科學(xué)的方式來(lái)研究社會(huì)，研究政治，研究軟的東西

那么科學(xué)的方式是什么呢?一般的科學(xué)方式是：第一步是要設(shè)立一個(gè)假定，拿這個(gè)假定到實(shí)驗(yàn)室里去驗(yàn)證，有的假定被驗(yàn)證出是對(duì)的，有的假定被驗(yàn)證出是錯(cuò)的。驗(yàn)證了對(duì)的假定可能成為理論。過(guò)一段時(shí)間又有人有新的假定，新的假定被驗(yàn)證以后就推翻以前的理論，成為新的理論?？茖W(xué)就是這樣發(fā)展的。我今天講的所有內(nèi)容都只是假定。

今天的假定是：全世界都需要改革。

21世紀(jì)是一個(gè)在改革中競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的時(shí)代。能成功改革的國(guó)家將是贏家，改革失敗的國(guó)家將是輸家。

在這場(chǎng)改革競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中，中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的中國(guó)將在全球大國(guó)中脫穎而出。所以，21世紀(jì)是中國(guó)的世紀(jì)。

全世界幾乎所有國(guó)家都面臨治理危機(jī)，從發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家到發(fā)展中國(guó)家，都在說(shuō)“我們需要改革，不改革不行了”?？墒菐缀踉谒袊?guó)家，改革都陷入了巨大的困境，舉步維艱，四面楚歌，為什么?

我想借用五位世界一流的政治學(xué)學(xué)者的眼光來(lái)講這個(gè)題目。塞繆爾·亨廷頓：政治衰敗

塞繆爾·亨廷頓《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》

第一位叫塞繆爾·亨廷頓，大家都知道他寫(xiě)的《文明的沖突與世界秩序的重建》，但在政治學(xué)里我覺(jué)得他最好的著作是《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》。亨廷頓發(fā)明了一個(gè)概念叫“政治衰敗”(politicaldecay)，這是近代政治學(xué)里很重要的一個(gè)概念。

亨廷頓在《變化社會(huì)中的政治秩序》里研究了二戰(zhàn)以后新獨(dú)立的國(guó)家，這些國(guó)家的大環(huán)境在發(fā)生巨大的變遷，可是他們的政治制度不能相應(yīng)地改變，去適應(yīng)新的環(huán)境。這種情況下，就發(fā)生了政治衰敗。他還說(shuō)在體制很穩(wěn)定、很成功的情況下也會(huì)發(fā)生政治衰敗。意思就是說(shuō)，現(xiàn)有政治體制發(fā)生了所謂的固化，固化到一定程度，環(huán)境發(fā)生了變化，社會(huì)發(fā)生了變化，世界變了，可是政治體制沒(méi)有辦法去推動(dòng)質(zhì)的變化來(lái)適應(yīng)外部環(huán)境和社會(huì)內(nèi)在的變化，那么這個(gè)政治體制就發(fā)生了政治衰敗。

曼瑟爾·奧爾森《國(guó)家興衰探源》

第二位叫曼瑟爾·奧爾森，他的代表作是《國(guó)家興衰探源》。他創(chuàng)造的概念叫“分利聯(lián)盟”(distributivecoalition)。

奧爾森在《國(guó)家興衰探源》里研究民主體制，他說(shuō)民主體制里邊必然出現(xiàn)利益集團(tuán)，這些利益集團(tuán)通過(guò)多年不斷積累權(quán)力，形成分利聯(lián)盟。意思就是利益集團(tuán)權(quán)力強(qiáng)大到一定程度，他們可以尋租，他們可以俘獲甚至操控政治體制，使政治體制為分利聯(lián)盟的利益服務(wù)，而不是為整體利益服務(wù)，甚至以損害整體利益為代價(jià)來(lái)維護(hù)分利聯(lián)盟的利益。奧爾森說(shuō)在民主體制里，分利聯(lián)盟俘獲政治體制這個(gè)問(wèn)題是一個(gè)無(wú)解的困境。只有兩種東西可以打破這個(gè)困境，一個(gè)是革命，一個(gè)是外部的沖擊。如戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。這是非常悲觀(guān)的一個(gè)角度，無(wú)解。

弗朗西斯·福山：否決制

弗朗西斯·福山《政治秩序的起源》、《政治秩序和政治衰敗》

第三位叫弗朗西斯·福山，最近兩/fanwen/1545本書(shū)叫《政治秩序的起源》與《政治秩序和政治衰敗》。福山把前兩個(gè)人所創(chuàng)造的概念——“政治衰敗”和“分利聯(lián)盟”——組合起來(lái)討論政治衰敗。

第一，他說(shuō)政治衰敗在任何政治體制內(nèi)部都可能發(fā)生，無(wú)論是威權(quán)體制還是民主體制。福山說(shuō)，現(xiàn)代治理需要三大要素：一是強(qiáng)政府，二是法治，三是民主問(wèn)責(zé)。

福山說(shuō)美國(guó)現(xiàn)在正處于政治衰敗中，原因之一是當(dāng)代美國(guó)是強(qiáng)法治、強(qiáng)民主、弱政府。而這個(gè)局面使得美國(guó)無(wú)法推進(jìn)急需的改革。

福山還提到兩種問(wèn)責(zé)制，一種叫自下而上的問(wèn)責(zé)制，一種叫自上而下的問(wèn)責(zé)制，兩種制度各有優(yōu)劣。

自下而上的問(wèn)責(zé)制即通常說(shuō)的民主制度，你不好老百姓把你選下去。它的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于有一個(gè)自動(dòng)回應(yīng)機(jī)制，你做的不好老百姓可以選另外一位。它的劣勢(shì)在于分利聯(lián)盟，福山又創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)新詞叫“否決制”——“Vetocracy”，就是分利聯(lián)盟把持政治體制，為了維護(hù)自己的利益，損害集體的利益?！癡etocracy”其實(shí)就是中國(guó)人說(shuō)的，成事不足敗事有余。自上而下的問(wèn)責(zé)制，也許中國(guó)是自上而下的問(wèn)責(zé)制，私人企業(yè)也是自上而下的問(wèn)責(zé)制，它有強(qiáng)大的執(zhí)行力，這來(lái)自于政治獨(dú)立性，就是福山說(shuō)的“politicalautonomy”。它的困境和弊端，第一是信息的困境，底下的人不把正確的信息給老板，老板摸不清楚下面到底怎么回事，導(dǎo)致決策錯(cuò)誤。第二是福山說(shuō)的所謂的“壞皇帝”的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，老板出問(wèn)題了怎么辦?

福山說(shuō)改革在美國(guó)正在失敗，美國(guó)沒(méi)有辦法改革。為什么?他舉了一些原因。第一，民主和透明成了美國(guó)改革的絆腳石。美國(guó)太多的公眾參與，太多的透明，也就是說(shuō)太多的民主，使這個(gè)國(guó)家的改革寸步難行。

第二，公民社會(huì)在某種程度上也不利于美國(guó)的改革。公民社會(huì)孵化了利益集團(tuán)的形成，利益集團(tuán)積累權(quán)力形成分利聯(lián)盟，分利聯(lián)盟導(dǎo)致否決制。在這樣的公民社會(huì)里，只要有一個(gè)分利聯(lián)盟不喜歡一件事，它就能把這件事給黃了。要所有人都覺(jué)得沒(méi)問(wèn)題才能做，結(jié)果是什么事都做不成，改革更做不成。

第三，是法治。美國(guó)的法治出現(xiàn)了治理的司法化。就是說(shuō)所有的政治、所有治理都要通過(guò)立法。立法的過(guò)程遭到分利聯(lián)盟的俘獲，即便立了法，分利聯(lián)盟再通過(guò)司法程序百般阻撓它的執(zhí)行。

最后，是自由。福山說(shuō)自由和特權(quán)是一步之遙，一不小心自由就變成了特權(quán)。美國(guó)最高法院今年判決說(shuō)政治獻(xiàn)金沒(méi)有上限，這是憲法說(shuō)的言論自由。就是說(shuō)我自己合法賺來(lái)的錢(qián)，為什么不能在電視上買(mǎi)廣告，說(shuō)某某政客好，說(shuō)哪些政策好，哪些政策不好?給政治獻(xiàn)金設(shè)上限是違反言論自由的。而維護(hù)言論自由的后果是什么呢?當(dāng)然是越有錢(qián)越牛，所以自由與特權(quán)是一步之遙。

王紹光：中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策

王紹光《中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策》

第四位政治學(xué)學(xué)者，是王紹光，他是香港中文大學(xué)的教授。他研究國(guó)家能力和國(guó)家建設(shè)。他近期的著作叫《中國(guó)式共識(shí)型決策》。王老師用中國(guó)在2016年啟動(dòng)的醫(yī)保改革為案例，仔細(xì)闡述了當(dāng)代中國(guó)的政治體制如何超越利益集團(tuán)，成功推動(dòng)改革。

中國(guó)治理模式的三大要素

我認(rèn)為中國(guó)的治理模式有三大核心要素。

一是賢能治理。這是理想狀態(tài)，賢能治理也會(huì)出問(wèn)題。中國(guó)選賢任能的模式，就是中國(guó)的官員來(lái)自于草根，最有能耐的人通過(guò)這個(gè)體系一步步往上爬，最終進(jìn)入中國(guó)的最高治理階層。

二是實(shí)驗(yàn)治理。中國(guó)幾十年來(lái)推/fanwen/1545行很多政策，都是從小地方先試起來(lái)。失敗了就算了。成功了就讓各個(gè)地方學(xué)，再成功了就全國(guó)推廣。失敗的成本較低。這樣的實(shí)驗(yàn)治理只能在中央集權(quán)的國(guó)家才能實(shí)現(xiàn)，在美國(guó)不可能，你在舊金山實(shí)驗(yàn)一個(gè)東西成了，然后華盛頓讓麻省也試，做不到的。

三是回應(yīng)治理。有沒(méi)有能力回應(yīng)人民的需求，回應(yīng)制度到底健康不健康。據(jù)我了解，中共其實(shí)有非常復(fù)雜和有效及時(shí)的反應(yīng)機(jī)制。

三中全會(huì)是政治改革的又一個(gè)里程碑

中國(guó)30多年的改革開(kāi)放，取得巨大的成就，也面臨巨大挑戰(zhàn)。

經(jīng)濟(jì)挑戰(zhàn)非常嚴(yán)峻，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)模式走到現(xiàn)在創(chuàng)造了巨大的財(cái)富，但這個(gè)模式要改。環(huán)境變了，經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)變了，所以要改變這個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)，可是在改變過(guò)程中增長(zhǎng)率就會(huì)下降，又會(huì)引發(fā)其他問(wèn)題。這個(gè)平衡怎么掌握，很難。

腐敗是一個(gè)巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。環(huán)境也是巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。這么大規(guī)模，這么快速工業(yè)化，人類(lèi)歷史上前所未有，造成的環(huán)境問(wèn)題是巨大的。

三中全會(huì)好像有600多條改革的政策，國(guó)企改革、土地改革、法律改革、經(jīng)濟(jì)改革。三中全會(huì)開(kāi)完后，很多學(xué)者、媒體都說(shuō)中國(guó)開(kāi)始實(shí)施大膽的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，可是政治改革停滯不前甚至開(kāi)倒車(chē)。我覺(jué)得這是一個(gè)誤讀。

我覺(jué)得三中全會(huì)啟動(dòng)了中國(guó)幾十年來(lái)最大膽的政治改革。很多人把政治改革的定義定死了，認(rèn)為只有往某種方向去改變的政策才叫政治改革，朝其他方向作的改變，再巨大也不叫政治改革。但如果把政治改革作為一個(gè)中性詞，就是對(duì)政治體制動(dòng)刀，對(duì)政治體制做質(zhì)的改變，我想三中全會(huì)是一個(gè)里程碑。

為什么是里程碑?我認(rèn)為有三方面。

一是中央和地方政府權(quán)力分配發(fā)生了巨大變化。三中全會(huì)比較重要的一點(diǎn)就是國(guó)家預(yù)算，以前中國(guó)的國(guó)家稅收只有一半在中央政府手里，這次把它變成了全國(guó)的預(yù)算，這是巨大的權(quán)力再分配。

二是黨紀(jì)和國(guó)法的權(quán)力分配發(fā)生了巨大變化。三中全會(huì)對(duì)中紀(jì)委進(jìn)行了重組，把地方紀(jì)委的決策權(quán)力從地方黨委那里抽出來(lái)。這又是一個(gè)巨大的權(quán)力再分配。

三是黨和國(guó)家的關(guān)系發(fā)生了巨大變化。1949年建國(guó)時(shí)引進(jìn)的蘇聯(lián)模式“三駕馬車(chē)”——人大對(duì)應(yīng)最高蘇維埃、黨中央對(duì)應(yīng)蘇共黨中央、國(guó)務(wù)院對(duì)應(yīng)蘇聯(lián)的部長(zhǎng)聯(lián)席會(huì)。三中全會(huì)——我認(rèn)為——把三駕馬車(chē)的格局打破了。國(guó)家成立了很多領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組和委員會(huì)，都是黨中央在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。比如，中央國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)，負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)內(nèi)國(guó)外的安全;深化改革領(lǐng)導(dǎo)小組，負(fù)責(zé)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革政策。這是一個(gè)驚人的權(quán)力再分配，是一個(gè)巨大的政治改革。中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨走到了中國(guó)國(guó)家治理的前臺(tái)中央。

所以，我覺(jué)得三中全會(huì)是中國(guó)改革歷程中一個(gè)巨大的里程碑，很多人把新中國(guó)的60多年分成兩個(gè)30年，我覺(jué)得三中全會(huì)啟動(dòng)了第三個(gè)30年。第三個(gè)30年最重要的兩個(gè)方向：一是政治治理的完善，一是全方位民族復(fù)興。中國(guó)政治體制改革的原動(dòng)力

近些年來(lái)，政治學(xué)里流行的說(shuō)法是，選舉民主制國(guó)家最善于自我糾正，也就是改革，因?yàn)槟軌蛲ㄟ^(guò)選舉更換執(zhí)政黨。但是現(xiàn)實(shí)卻恰恰相反。民主國(guó)家普遍陷入治理危機(jī)和改革困境。而中國(guó)呢?

回顧中華人民共和國(guó)的65年歷史，在中共的一黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，中國(guó)經(jīng)歷的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)變革，幅度和深度是近代史上罕見(jiàn)的，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出幾乎所有其他國(guó)家，包括所有民主選舉制的國(guó)家。為什么?我認(rèn)為這是中國(guó)政治體制的獨(dú)特性質(zhì)的結(jié)果。在中國(guó)，核心是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨，中共本身就是中國(guó)的政治體制。中國(guó)是世界上大國(guó)中唯一的一個(gè)擁有這么一個(gè)獨(dú)立于社會(huì)又同時(shí)來(lái)自于社會(huì)的政治力量，正如福山所說(shuō)的，politicalautonomy。中共來(lái)自于中國(guó)社會(huì)的草根，又高于中國(guó)社會(huì)的所有利益集團(tuán)，這個(gè)機(jī)制就是中國(guó)改革的原動(dòng)力。

尼可羅·馬基雅維利：

每種政治制度都有它衰敗的一面

尼可羅·馬基雅維利《論李維》

回到最開(kāi)始我說(shuō)要跟大家分享五位政治學(xué)家，前面講了四位，都是我們同時(shí)代的人。

第五位是一位古人，這位古人是政治學(xué)的泰斗，沒(méi)有他就沒(méi)有政治學(xué)，他叫尼可羅·馬基雅維利，是500年前佛洛倫薩共和國(guó)的外交長(zhǎng)官。美第奇家族復(fù)辟以后，把他打入監(jiān)獄，施以酷刑，然后將他流放到鄉(xiāng)村。在寫(xiě)給友人弗蘭西斯科·維托里的信中，馬基雅維利講述了自己的流放生活。在漫長(zhǎng)而平靜的日子里，每當(dāng)夜深人靜的時(shí)候，馬基雅維利總會(huì)換上宮廷的華服，進(jìn)入自己的書(shū)房。在那里，他廢寢忘食地閱讀先哲遺篇，與古賢心照神交。只有在那樣的漫漫長(zhǎng)夜里，他才感覺(jué)不到饑餓干渴，也不再懼怕死亡。在那里，他寫(xiě)下了流傳百世的代表作《論李維》，這本書(shū)是所有政治學(xué)的基石。

他在這本書(shū)里，把全世界所有政治制度歸納成三種：一是君主制;一是貴族制，他說(shuō)的貴族制是希臘語(yǔ)的貴族，就是我們講的選賢任能或賢能制，不是后來(lái)歐洲出現(xiàn)的世襲制的貴族;三是民主制。

他說(shuō)每一種政治制度都能夠表現(xiàn)得非常好，可是每一種政治制度都有它衰敗的一面。君主制會(huì)衰敗成暴政，貴族制會(huì)衰敗成寡頭制，民主制會(huì)衰敗成放蕩制。

我想留給大家的一個(gè)想法，就是也許世界上沒(méi)有永遠(yuǎn)的東西。我們研究政治學(xué)，研究任何一個(gè)國(guó)家的政治體制，最值得研究的就是這個(gè)政治體制在它的生命周期里，是在哪個(gè)點(diǎn)上。如果在少年期那是一種預(yù)測(cè)，如果在中年期和老年期就是另一種預(yù)測(cè)。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，也許沒(méi)有一個(gè)政治體制是永恒的。每一個(gè)政治體制，不管是君主制也好，貴族制也好，民主制也好——中國(guó)現(xiàn)在實(shí)行的也許是賢能制，美國(guó)是民主制——所有這些政治體制最終都可能走向衰敗/fanwen/1545，就像人的身體一樣。政治學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)就是，把政治體制、社會(huì)當(dāng)人的身體一樣研究。把政治體制比作人的身體，就像人小時(shí)候經(jīng)常生病，每年都感冒，病歷卡很厚，但是一到發(fā)育的時(shí)候什么病都沒(méi)有了，到七八十歲病又回來(lái)了，也就臨近死亡了。

我經(jīng)常把當(dāng)代中國(guó)比作美國(guó)100多年前，100多年前的美國(guó)也在發(fā)生巨大的變革，快速地工業(yè)化，那個(gè)時(shí)候的美國(guó)，它的腐敗、它的暴力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)今天的中國(guó)，但那個(gè)時(shí)候的美國(guó)，它的政治體制在它的少年期，那些再?lài)?yán)重的問(wèn)題也沒(méi)能阻擋它成為超級(jí)大國(guó)。中國(guó)的政治體制也有很多問(wèn)題。每個(gè)人身體里邊都有癌細(xì)胞，就看它什么時(shí)候出來(lái)。每個(gè)政治體制的基因里邊也有癌細(xì)胞。我的假定是，中國(guó)的政治體制在少年期。美國(guó)政治體制，以及整個(gè)西方的政治體制，倒是一個(gè)值得研究的問(wèn)題，它們肯定不處在少年期。我們要研究的問(wèn)題就是西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的政治體制，在它們的生命周期里邊是中年期還是晚年期?如果美國(guó)的政治體制是一個(gè)50歲的人，它還有一次機(jī)會(huì)可以重新復(fù)興。如果是80歲呢，就像福山講的那樣，政治衰敗就是眼前的宿命。

中國(guó)的政治體制處在少年期，它具有巨大的活力——也就是改革的能力，21世紀(jì)是中國(guó)的世紀(jì)。

以上這篇李世默在清華演講稿全文為您介紹到這里，希望它對(duì)您有幫助。如果您喜歡這篇文章，請(qǐng)分享給您的好友。更多演講盡在：精彩演講望大家多支持本網(wǎng)站，謝謝

第四篇：李世默--兩種制度的傳說(shuō)

Good morning, and my name is Eric Li, and I was born here.No, I wasn’t born there;this was whereI was born.Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution.My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries.When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity.It went like this.All human society develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism!Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of the culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development.The entire world’s people will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph.That of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx.And the Chinese bought it.We were taught the grand story day in and day out.It became part of us, and we believed in it.The story was a bestseller.About one third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta-narrative.Then the world changed overnight.As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie.Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened.As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one.This one was just as grand.It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end.This one went as follows: all societies, regardless of culture, be a Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote.Because they are all rational, once given the vote, they produce the good government and live happily ever after.Paradise on earth,again.Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil.The good belongs to those who are democracies and charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.This story also became a bestseller.According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010.In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on then is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world.Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success.Those who do not are doomed to fail.But this time, the Chinese did not buy it.Fool me once, the rest is history.In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to a second-largest economy.650 million people were lifted out of poverty.80% of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China.In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps.Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point.Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother’s portions.So I ask myself, what is wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bound.Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day.Middle class is expending in speed and scale unprecedented in human history.Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening.So I went and did the only thing I could.I studied it.Yes, China is a one party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections.Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time.Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate.Well, the assumptions are wrong.The opposites are true.Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.Now most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction.It won’t last long because it cannot adapt.Now here is the facts.In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies has been wider than another country in the recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then the privatization of farmland, then the Cultural revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule.So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions.For example, term limits.Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules.Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule les to disastrous mistakes.So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform.But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias.See, some have decide a priori what kinds of change they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform.The truth is political reform have never stopped.Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years ago, even 10years ago, every aspect of Chinese society how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today.Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform.The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hand of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow.Indeed, corruption is a big problem.But let’s first look at the larger context.Now this may be counterintuitive to you.The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today.China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members.In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called princelings.The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds.In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller.The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top.Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you will find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department.The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations.It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like university or community program.They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials.They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called keyuan.Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu.Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business.The range of position is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city distract to manger in a company.Once a year, the department reviews their performance.They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates.They vet their personal conduct.They conduct public opinion surveys.Then they promote the winners.Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks.Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju, and ju levels.There, they enter high officialdom.By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a distract with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of millions of dollars in revenue.Just show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fuke and ke levels, 600,000 fuchu and chu levels, and onlu 40,000 fuju and ju levels.Afer the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee.The process takes a two to three decades.Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course.But merit remains the fundamental driver.In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system.China’s new president, Xi Jinping, is a son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job.Even for him, the career tool a 30 years.He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion US dollars.Now, please don’t get me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone, it is just a statement of fact.George W.Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown.Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system.Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest.Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department.Now, westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy.I was asked once, “the party wasn’t voted in by election.Where is the source of legitimacy?”Isaid, “how about competency?” we all know the facts.In 1949, when the party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old.Today it is the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.Pew research polls Chinese public attitudes and here are the numbers in recent years.Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent.Those who think they’re better off than five years ago: 70%.Those who expect the future to be better a whopping 82%.Financial Times polls global youth attitudes, and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week.93% of China’s Generation Y are optimistic about their country’s future.Now if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is.In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance.Idon’t need to elaborate this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals.With a few exceptions, the vast number of the developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife.Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election.Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret.At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy.Now I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom.The country faces enormous challenges.Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mind-boggling.Pollution is one, food safety, population issues.On the political front, the worst problem is corruption.Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its legitimacy.But most analystmis-diagnose the disease.They say the corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore in order to cure it you have to do away with the entire system.But more careful look would tell us otherwise.Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it’s still moving up.India, the largest democracy in the world, is 94 and dropping.For the hundreds or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies.So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries cannot fix it? Now, I’m a venture capitalist.I make bets.It wouldn’t be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions.So here they are.In the next 10 years, China will surpass the US and become the largest economy in the world;income per capital will be near the top of all developing countries.Corruption will be curbed, not eliminated and China will move up 10-20 notches to above 60 in TI ranking.Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will be holding firm.We live in the dust of an era.Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st.meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside.Now I want to clarify something.I’m not here to make an indictment of democracy.On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the west and the creation of the modern world.It is the universal claim that many western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is the heart of the West’s current ills.If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance.China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn’t pretend to be universal.It cannot be exported.But that is the point precisely.The significance of China’s example is not that it provides and alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist.Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives.Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over.Let us stop telling people and our children there is only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve.It is wrong and it is irresponsible and worst of all, it is boring.Let universality make way for plurality.Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us.Are we brave enough to welcome it? Thank you.

第五篇：李世默TED演講稿(英文)

Good morning.My name is Eric Li, and I was born here.But no, I wasn’t born there.This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution.My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries.When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know that humanity.It went like this.All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism!Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development.The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph.That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx.And the Chinese bought it.We were taught that grand story day in and day out.It became part of us, and we believed in it.The story was a bestseller.About on third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta narrative.Then, the world changed overnight.As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie.Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened.As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one.This one was just as grand.It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end.This one went as follows.All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote.Because they all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after.Paradise on earth, again.Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich.But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil.The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.Now.This story also became a bestseller.According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010.In the last 20years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world.Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success.Those who do not are doomed to fail.But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it.Fool me once… The rest is history.In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy.Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty.Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China.In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps.Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point.Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions.So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds.Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day.Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history.Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening.So I went and did the only thing I could.I studied it.Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections.There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time.Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate.Well, the assumptions are wrong.The opposites are true.Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction.It won’t last long because it cannot adapt.Now here are the facts.In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule.So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions.For example, term limits.Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules.Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes.So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform.But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias.See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform.The truth is, political reforms have never stopped.Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today.Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform.The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow.Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let’s first look at the larger context.Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you.The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today.China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members.In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings.The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds.In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller.The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top.Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department.The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations.It operates a rotation pyramid made up of there components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program.The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials.They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu.Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business.The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company.Once a year, the department reviews their performance.They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates.They vet their personal conduct.They conduct public opinion surveys.Then they promote the winners.Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks.Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels.There, they enter high, officialdom.By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels.After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee.The process takes two to three decades.Does patronage play a role? Yes of course.But merit remains the fundamental driver.In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system.China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job.Even for him, the career took 30 years.He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S.dollars.Now, please don’t get me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone.It’s just a statement of fact.George W.Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown.Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system.Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest.Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department.Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy.I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election.Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts.In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 42 years old.Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years.Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent.Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%.Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent.Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week.Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future.Now, if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is.In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance.I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals.With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife.Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election.Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret.At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy.Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom.The country faces enormous challenges.Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mine-boggling.Pollution is one.Food safety.Population issues.On the political front, the worst problem is corruption.Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy.But most analysts mis-diagnose the disease.They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system.But a more careful look would tell us otherwise.Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it’s been moving up.India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping.For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies.So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can’t fix it? Now, I’m a venture capitalist.I make bets.It wouldn’t be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions.So here they are.In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S.and become the largest economy in the world.Income per capital will be near the top of all developing countries.Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I.ranking.Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm.We live in the dusk of an era.Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st.Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside.Now, I want to clarify something.I’m not here to make an indictment of democracy.On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world.It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West’s current ills.If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance.China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn’t pretend to be universal.It cannot be exported.But that is the point precisely.The significance of China’s example is not that it provides and alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist.Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives.Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over.Let us stop telling people and our children there’s only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve.It is wrong.It is irresponsible.And worst of all, it is boring.Let universality make way for plurality.Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us.Are we brave enough to welcome it?