第一篇：森林城市主要術(shù)語標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

森林城市主要術(shù)語標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

（一）城市建成區(qū)

城市行政區(qū)內(nèi)實(shí)際已成片開發(fā)建設(shè)、市政公用設(shè)施和公共設(shè)施基本具備的地區(qū)。城市建成區(qū)范圍的劃定，要考慮自然地形、地貌、基層行政單位的管理界線等因素，以及城市各項(xiàng)用地的完整性，并盡可能與人口統(tǒng)計(jì)的地域范圍相一致。城市近郊的一些建成地段，盡管未同市區(qū)聯(lián)成一片，但同市區(qū)的聯(lián)系十分密切，已成為城市不可分割的一部分，也可視作城市建成區(qū)。

（二）城市規(guī)劃區(qū)

城市市區(qū)、近郊區(qū)以及城市行政區(qū)域內(nèi)其他因城市建設(shè)和發(fā)展需要實(shí)行規(guī)劃控制的區(qū)域。

（三）城市綠地

城市中專門用以改善生態(tài)、保護(hù)環(huán)境、為居民提供游憩場地和美化景觀的綠化用地和在城市組團(tuán)之間、城市周圍或相鄰城市之間設(shè)置的用以控制城市擴(kuò)展的綠色開敞空間。包括公園綠地、附屬綠地、防護(hù)綠地、生產(chǎn)綠地和其它綠地。

1、公園綠地：城市中向公眾開放的、以游憩為主要功能，有一定的游想設(shè)施和服務(wù)設(shè)施，同時(shí)兼有健全生態(tài)、美化景觀、防災(zāi)減災(zāi)等綜合作用的綠化用地。它是城市建設(shè)用地、城市綠地系統(tǒng)和城市市政公用設(shè)施的重要組成部分，是表示城市整體環(huán)境水平和居民生活質(zhì)量的一項(xiàng)重要指標(biāo)。包括綜合公園、社區(qū)公園、專類公園、帶狀公園和街旁綠地。

2、附屬綠地：城市建設(shè)用地中綠地之外各類用地中的附屬綠化用地，包括居住區(qū)綠地、單位綠地、道路綠地、對(duì)外交通用地、市政設(shè)施用地等綠地等。

3、防護(hù)綠地：為了滿足城市對(duì)衛(wèi)生、隔離、安全的要求而設(shè)置的，其功能是對(duì)自然災(zāi)害和城市公害起到一定的防護(hù)或減弱作用，不宜兼作公園綠地使用。如：護(hù)岸綠地和護(hù)坡綠地。

4、生產(chǎn)綠地：為城市綠化服務(wù)，能力城市提供苗木、草坪、花卉和種子的各類苗圃地。

5、其它綠地：對(duì)城市生態(tài)環(huán)境質(zhì)量、居民休閑生活、城市景觀和生物多樣性保護(hù)有直接影響的綠地。如：風(fēng)景林地、水源保護(hù)區(qū)、郊野公園、森林公園、自然保護(hù)區(qū)、風(fēng)景林地、城市綠化隔離帶、野生動(dòng)植物園、濕地、垃圾填埋場恢復(fù)綠地等。

（四）綠地面積

城市建設(shè)用地中用于種植各種植物所占的土地面積（垂直投影面積）。

（五）綠化覆蓋面積

所有綠化植物冠幅的垂直投影面積，包括林木綠化覆蓋面積，草坪、花臺(tái)、隔離帶綠化覆蓋面積。

（六）綠地率

一定區(qū)域內(nèi)各類綠地用地面積的總和與該區(qū)域土地總面積之比。

（七）綠化覆蓋率

一定區(qū)域內(nèi)所有植物（包括草坪）的垂直投影面積與該區(qū)域

土地總面積之比。

建成區(qū)綠化覆蓋率：指在城市建成區(qū)的綠化覆蓋面積占建成區(qū)面積的百分比。綠化覆蓋面積是指城市中喬木、灌木、草坪等所有植被的垂直投影面積。城市建成區(qū)內(nèi)綠化覆蓋面積應(yīng)包括各類綠地(公園綠地、附屬綠地、防護(hù)綠地、生產(chǎn)綠地、其它綠地)的實(shí)際綠化種植覆蓋面積(含被綠化種植包圍的水面)、街道綠化覆蓋面積、屋頂綠化覆蓋面積以及零散樹木的覆蓋面積。這些面積數(shù)據(jù)可以通過遙感、普查、抽樣調(diào)查估算等辦法來獲得。

（八）森林覆蓋率

森林覆蓋率（創(chuàng)建森林城市統(tǒng)計(jì)方法）：是指以行政區(qū)域?yàn)閱挝?，森林面積與土地面積的百分比。森林面積，包括郁閉度0.2以上的喬木林地面積和竹林地面積、國家特別規(guī)定的灌木林地面積、農(nóng)田林網(wǎng)以及村旁、路旁、水旁、宅旁林木的覆蓋面積（四旁樹面積按111株/畝計(jì)算）。其中，建成區(qū)森林覆蓋率可將城市中各種綠地中的喬木樹種的覆蓋面積納入計(jì)算。

（九）郁閉度

林地中林木樹冠垂直投影面積與林地面積之比。

（十）人均公園綠地（人均公共綠地）

指在城市建成區(qū)的公園綠地面積與相應(yīng)范圍城市人口（非農(nóng)業(yè)人口）之比。

城市（城鎮(zhèn)）city

城市（城鎮(zhèn)）：以非農(nóng)不業(yè)和非農(nóng)業(yè)人口聚集為主要特征的居民點(diǎn)。包括按

國家行政建制設(shè)立的市和鎮(zhèn)。

第二篇：前臺(tái)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)術(shù)語

接聽電話程序

工作步驟 工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及要求

“早上好/中午好/晚上好，前臺(tái)，× × 先生/女士，我可以幫您

一，回答客人

嗎？”

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 問候+崗位+員工姓名（先英文，后中文）

? 講清部門+員工姓名+回答電話上顯示的客人姓名

“早上好/中午好/晚上好，× ×先生/女士，這里是前臺(tái)× ×，二、從房間打來

您需要幫助嗎？”

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 電話回應(yīng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

三、來電等候 當(dāng)客人需要在線等候時(shí)，告知客人需要等待，按下背景音樂鍵

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 獲得客人的信任，體現(xiàn)我們的誠信

1.“× ×先生/女士，我馬上幫您查找”

四、給客人回電 2.如等待時(shí)間較長，告知客人留下電話號(hào)碼，我們將給予回電

3.“× ×先生/女士，我們將5分鐘后給您回電”

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 如果你沒有給客人回電話，就是欺騙客人

1.“您好，× ×先生/女士，我是前臺(tái)× ×”

五、轉(zhuǎn)接電話 2.轉(zhuǎn)電話時(shí)要告知客人 “××先生/女士，我將把您的電話

轉(zhuǎn)到 × ×，謝謝來電”

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 告知客人將要把電話轉(zhuǎn)入相關(guān)部門

2.辦理有預(yù)訂散客入住程序

工作步驟 工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及要求

一，問候客人

微笑并真誠問候客人“您好，× ×先生/女士，歡迎光臨”

（1）第一次入住客人

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 上崗前檢查工服是否整齊干凈，服務(wù)過程中運(yùn)用規(guī)范用語，始終保持與

客人的眼神交流

? 3米內(nèi)要與客人目光接觸

微笑并真誠的問候客人“您好，× ×先生/女士，歡迎再次光臨”

（2）再次入住的客人

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 對(duì)于再次下榻的客人，可詢問是否按照上一次入住進(jìn)行安排

? 盡快根據(jù)客人的需要，給與安排和入住登記

? 對(duì)上一次入住后的情況進(jìn)行復(fù)查，如果有拖欠款項(xiàng)的情況，及時(shí)跟進(jìn)落實(shí)

1.“× ×先生/女士，您這次預(yù)訂的是 × × 房型，住 × × 天，二、和客人確認(rèn)預(yù)

您的房價(jià)是每晚 × × 元人民幣”

訂內(nèi)容

2.“請(qǐng)問您有 × × × 卡嗎？

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 與客人低聲確認(rèn)房價(jià)、房型及入住天數(shù)，語氣親切自然，大方得體，在服

務(wù)過程中注意稱呼客人姓氏

? 如公司支付房費(fèi)不要與客人確認(rèn)房價(jià)

三、為客人辦理入

“× ×先生/女士，請(qǐng)出示你的身份證/護(hù)照，我?guī)湍顚懭胱〉?/p>

?。?）第一次入

記單，請(qǐng)您在登記單上簽字并留下聯(lián)系電話

住的客人

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 在服務(wù)過程中始終微笑面對(duì)客人，在服務(wù)中至少稱呼姓氏兩遍，檢查客人

證件（身份證或護(hù)照）的有效期并確認(rèn)是本人登記，登記驗(yàn)證工作做到

“三清”、“三核對(duì)”

（2）再次入住的請(qǐng)客人在提前打印出的登記單上確認(rèn)簽字

客人 “× ×先生/女士，請(qǐng)您在登記單上簽字”

操作要點(diǎn)：

? 利用電腦系統(tǒng)中的信息盡快生成登記表格

? 在具有客人歷史信息的基礎(chǔ)上，力求登記及辦理手續(xù)時(shí)間縮短，并令客人

感到方便

第三篇：IEC61508標(biāo)準(zhǔn)術(shù)語

基本術(shù)語

一、IEC 61508標(biāo)準(zhǔn)術(shù)語

說明：以下術(shù)語摘錄自功能安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)IEC61508和國家標(biāo)準(zhǔn)GB/T20438。4。故術(shù)語標(biāo)號(hào)也未曾改動(dòng)。3.1安全術(shù)語 3.1.1 傷害 harm physical injury or damage to the health of people either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment.由于對(duì)財(cái)產(chǎn)或環(huán)境的破壞而導(dǎo)致的直接或間接地對(duì)人體健康的損害或?qū)θ松淼膿p傷。3.1.2 危險(xiǎn) hazard potential source of harm 傷害的潛在根源 3.1.3 危險(xiǎn)情況 hazardous situation circumstance in which a person is exposed to hazard(s)人暴露于危險(xiǎn)的環(huán)境。3.1.4

危險(xiǎn)事件 hazardous event hazardous situation which results in harm 導(dǎo)致傷害的危險(xiǎn)情況。3.1.5風(fēng)險(xiǎn) risk combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm 出現(xiàn)傷害的概率及該傷害嚴(yán)重性的組合。3.1.6 允許風(fēng)險(xiǎn) tolerable risk risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society 根據(jù)當(dāng)今社會(huì)的水準(zhǔn),在給定的范圍內(nèi)能夠接受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.1.7 殘余風(fēng)險(xiǎn) residual risk risk remaining after protective measures have been taken 采取防護(hù)措施以后仍存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.1.8 安全 safety

freedom from unacceptable risk 不存在不可接受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.1.9 功能安全 functional safety

part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities

與EUC和EUC控制系統(tǒng)有關(guān)的整體安全的組成部分，它取決于E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)，其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)和外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施功能的正確行使。3.1.10 安全狀態(tài) safe state State of the EUC when safety is achieved 達(dá)到安全時(shí)EUC的狀態(tài)。3.1.11

合理的可預(yù)見的誤用 reasonable foreseeable misuse

Use of a product, process or service under conditions or for purposes not intended by the supplier, but which can happen, induced by the product, process or service in combination with, or as a result of, common human behaviour

由于產(chǎn)品、過程或服務(wù)加上人的行為習(xí)慣而導(dǎo)致的，或者作為人的行為習(xí)慣的一個(gè)結(jié)果有可能發(fā)生的，未按照供方要求的條件和用途對(duì)產(chǎn)品、過程和服務(wù)的使用。

3.2 設(shè)備和裝置 Equipment and devices 3.2.1 功能單元 functional unit

Entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能夠完成規(guī)定目的的軟件、硬件或兩者相結(jié)合的實(shí)體。3.2.2 軟件 software

intellectual creation comprising the programs, procedures, data, rules and any associated documentation pertaining to the operation of a data processing system 包括程序、規(guī)程、數(shù)據(jù)、規(guī)則以及相關(guān)的數(shù)據(jù)處理系統(tǒng)操作文檔在內(nèi)的智能創(chuàng)作。3.2.3 受控設(shè)備 equipment under control(EUC)

equipment, machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical or other activities

用于制造、加工、運(yùn)輸、制藥或其它活動(dòng)的設(shè)備、機(jī)器、器械或成套裝置。3.2.4 EUC風(fēng)險(xiǎn) EUC risk

risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control system 由EUC或由EUC與EUC控制系統(tǒng)相互作用而產(chǎn)生的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.2.5 可編程電子（PE）programmable electronic（PE）

可編程電子以計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)，可以由硬件、軟件及其輸入和(或)輸出單元構(gòu)成。based on computer technology which may be comprised of hardware, software, and of input and/or output units 舉例：下列均是可編程電子裝置： ——微處理器； ——微控制器； ——可編程控制器；

——專用集成電路（ASIC）； ——可編程邏輯控制器（PLC）；

——其它以計(jì)算機(jī)為基礎(chǔ)的裝置（智能傳感器、變送器、執(zhí)行器）。3.2.6 電氣/電子/可編程電子（E/E/PE）electrical/electronic/programmable electronic Based on electrical(E)and/or electronic(E)and/or programmable electronic(PE)technology 基于電氣（E）和/或 電子（E）和/或 可編程電子（PE）的技術(shù)。舉例：電氣/電子/可編程電子裝置包括： ——電－機(jī)裝置（電氣）；

——使用電晶體的非可編程電子裝置（電子）； ——以計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)的電子裝置（可編程電子）3.2.7 有限可變語言 limited variability language

Software programming language, either textual or graphical, for commercial and industrial programmable electronic controllers with a range of capabilities limited to their application 能力范圍局限于應(yīng)用的，用于工商業(yè)可編程電子控制器的，文本的或圖形的軟件編程語言。

3.3 系統(tǒng)：一般概念 3.3.1 系統(tǒng) system Set of elements which interact according to a design, where an element of a system can be another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and may include hardware, software and human interaction 根據(jù)設(shè)計(jì)相互作用的一組元素，可能包括相互作用的硬件、軟件和人等。系統(tǒng)中的某一元素也可自成一個(gè)另外的系統(tǒng)，稱為子系統(tǒng)，子系統(tǒng)可以是控制系統(tǒng)也可以是被控系統(tǒng)。3.3.2 可編程電子系統(tǒng)(PES)programmable electronic system(PES)

System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices 基于一個(gè)或多個(gè)可編程電子裝置的控制、防護(hù)或監(jiān)視系統(tǒng)，包括系統(tǒng)中所有的元素，諸如電源、傳感器和其它輸入裝置，數(shù)據(jù)高速公路和其它通信路徑，以及執(zhí)行器和其它輸出裝置 3.3.3 電氣/電子/可編程電子系統(tǒng)（E/E/PES）electrical/electronic/programmable electronic system(E/E/PES)System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more electrical/electronic programmable electronic(E/E/PE)devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.基于一個(gè)或多個(gè)電氣/電子/可編程電子(E/E/PE)裝置的用于控制、防護(hù)或監(jiān)視的系統(tǒng)，包括系統(tǒng)中所有的元素,諸如電源、傳感器和其它輸入裝置，數(shù)據(jù)高速公路和其它通信途徑，以及執(zhí)行器和其它輸出裝置 3.3.4 EUC控制系統(tǒng) EUC control system System which responds to input signals from the process and/or from an operator and generates output signals causing the EUC to operate in the desired manner

對(duì)來自過程和(或)操作者的輸入信號(hào)起反應(yīng)，產(chǎn)生能使EUC按要求的方式工作的輸出信號(hào)的系統(tǒng)。3.3.5 結(jié)構(gòu) architecture Specific configuration of hardware and software elements in a system 在一個(gè)系統(tǒng)中硬件和軟件元素的特定配置。3.3.6 模塊 module Routine, discrete component or a functional set of encapsulated routines or discrete components belonging together 程序、分立部件、封裝程序的一個(gè)功能集、或一組歸并在一起的分立部件。3.3.7 軟件模塊 software module Construct that consists of procedures and/or data declarations and that can also interact with other such constructs

由規(guī)程和（或）數(shù)據(jù)說明組成的構(gòu)造，并能與其它這樣的構(gòu)造相互作用。3.3.8 通道 channel Element or group of elements that independently perform(s)a function 獨(dú)立執(zhí)行一個(gè)功能的一個(gè)或一組元素 3.3.9 多樣性 diversity different means of performing a required function 執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能的不同方法。3.3.10 冗余 redundancy means, in addition to the means which would be sufficient, for a functional unit to perform a required function or for data to represent information

對(duì)于執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能的功能單元或?qū)τ诒硎拘畔⒌臄?shù)據(jù)而言，除了夠用之外還有多余。3.4 系統(tǒng)：安全方面 3.4.1 安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng) safety-related system designated system that both:

implements the required safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC;and — is intended to achieve, on its own or with other E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction facilities, the necessary safety integrity for the required safety functions 所指的系統(tǒng)：

——必需要能實(shí)現(xiàn)要求的安全功能以達(dá)到或保持EUC的安全狀態(tài)；并且

——自身或與其它E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)、其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)或外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施一道,能夠達(dá)到要求的安全功能所需的安全完整性。3.4.2 其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng) other technology safety-related system safety-related system based on a technology other than electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 基于電氣/電子/可編程電子技術(shù)之外的安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)。3.4.3 外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施 external risk reduction facility

measure to reduce or mitigate the risks which are separate and distinct from, and do not use, E/E/PE safety-related systems or other technology safety-related systems 不使用E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)或其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)，且與上述系統(tǒng)分開并不同的降低或減輕風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的手段。3.4.4 簡單E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng) low complexity E/E/PE safety-related system — the failure modes of each individual component are well defined;and

— the behaviour of the system under fault conditions can be completely determined 一種E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng) 其中：

——已很好確定了每個(gè)單獨(dú)部件的失效模式； ——能完全確定在故障狀況下系統(tǒng)的行為。3.4.5 邏輯系統(tǒng) logic system Portion of a system that performs the function logic but excludes the sensors and final elements 系統(tǒng)的一部分，用于執(zhí)行功能邏輯，但不包括傳感器和最終元件。3.5 安全功能和安全完整性 3.5.1 安全功能 Safety function function to be implemented by an E/E/PE safety-related system, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event 針對(duì)特定的危險(xiǎn)事件，為達(dá)到或保持EUC的安全狀態(tài)，由E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)、其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)或外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施實(shí)現(xiàn)的功能 3.5.2 安全完整性 safety integrity probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time

在規(guī)定的條件下、規(guī)定的時(shí)間內(nèi)，安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)成功實(shí)現(xiàn)所要求的安全功能的概率。3.5.3 軟件安全完整性 software safety integrity measure that signifies the likelihood of software in a programmable electronic system achieving its safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of time 在所有規(guī)定條件下和規(guī)定時(shí)間內(nèi)表示軟件在可編程電子系統(tǒng)中執(zhí)行其安全功能的可能性的量值。3.5.4 系統(tǒng)安全完整性 systematic safety integrity part of the safety integrity of safety-related systems relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure 在危險(xiǎn)失效模式中與系統(tǒng)失效有關(guān)的安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)安全完整性的一部分 3.5.5 硬件安全完整性（hardware safety integrity）

part of the safety integrity of the safety related systems relating to random hardware failures in a dangerous mode of failure

在危險(xiǎn)失效模式中與隨機(jī)硬件失效有關(guān)的安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)安全完整性的一部分。3.5.6 安全完整性等級(jí)（SIL）safety integrity level（SIL）

discrete level(one out of a possible four)for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest

一種離散的等級(jí)（四種可能等級(jí)之一），用于規(guī)定分配給E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)的安全功能的安全完整性要求，在這里，安全完整性等級(jí)4是最高的，安全完整性等級(jí)1是最低的。3.5.7 軟件安全完整性等級(jí) software safety integrity level discrete level(one out of a possible four)for specifying the safety integrity of software in a safety-related system 一種離散的等級(jí)（四種可能等級(jí)之一）用于規(guī)定在安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)中軟件的安全完整性。3.5.8 安全要求規(guī)范 safety requirement specification

specification containing all the requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一種技術(shù)規(guī)定，包括安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)必須要執(zhí)行安全功能的所有要求。3.5.9 安全功能要求規(guī)范 safety function requirement specification

specification containing the requirements for the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一種技術(shù)規(guī)定，包括安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)必須要執(zhí)行的安全功能要求。3.5.10 安全完整性要求規(guī)范 safety integrity requirement specification

specification containing the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一種技術(shù)規(guī)定，包括安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)必須要執(zhí)行的安全功能的安全完整性要求。3.5.11 安全相關(guān)軟件 safety-related software software that is used to implement safety functions in a safety-related system 在安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)中用于實(shí)現(xiàn)安全功能的軟件。3.5.12 操作模式 mode of operation Way in which a safety-related system is intended to be used, with respect to the frequency of demands made upon it, which may be either

-low demand mode: where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof-test frequency-high demand or continuous mode: where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year or greater than twice the proof-check frequency ——低要求模式：在這種模式下，對(duì)一個(gè)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)提出操作要求的頻率不大于每年一次和不大于二倍的檢驗(yàn)測試頻率。

——高要求或連續(xù)模式：在這種模式下，對(duì)一個(gè)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)提出操作要求的頻率大于每年一次或大于二倍的檢驗(yàn)測試頻率。3.5.13 目標(biāo)失效量 target failure measure Intended probability of dangerous mode failures to be achieved in respect of the safety integrity requirements, specified in terms of either-the average probability of failure to perform the design function on demand(for a low demand mode of operation)-the probability of a dangerous failure per hour(for a high demand or continuous mode of operation)相對(duì)于安全完整性要求要達(dá)到預(yù)計(jì)的危險(xiǎn)模式失效概率，規(guī)定為下列兩種之一： ——按要求執(zhí)行設(shè)計(jì)功能的平均失效概率（對(duì)于低要求操作模式）； ——每小時(shí)危險(xiǎn)失效的概率（對(duì)于高要求或連續(xù)操作模式）； 3.5.14 必要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低 necessary risk reduction risk reduction to be achieved by the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities in order to ensure that the tolerable risk is not exceeded

為保證不超過允許風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，由E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)、其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)和外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施達(dá)到的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低。3.6 故障、失效和錯(cuò)誤 3.6.1 故障 fault 使功能單元執(zhí)行要求之功能的能力降低或失去其能力的異常狀況。

abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function 3.6.2 故障避免 fault avoidance using techniques and procedures which aim to avoid the introduction of faults during any phase of the safety lifecycle of the safety-related system 在安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)安全生命周期的任何階段中為避免發(fā)生故障而使用的技術(shù)和規(guī)程。3.6.3 故障裕度 fault tolerance the ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors

在出現(xiàn)故障或錯(cuò)誤的情況下，功能單元繼續(xù)執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能的能力。3.6.4 失效 failure the termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function 功能單元執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能之能力的終止。3.6.5 隨機(jī)硬件失效 random hardware failure

failure, occurring at a random time, which results from one or more of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware

在硬件中，由一種或幾種機(jī)能退化可能產(chǎn)生的，按隨機(jī)時(shí)間出現(xiàn)的失效。3.6.6 系統(tǒng)失效 Systematic failure failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors

原因確定的失效，只有對(duì)設(shè)計(jì)或制造過程、操作規(guī)程、文檔或其它相關(guān)因素進(jìn)行修改后，才有可能排除這種失效。3.6.7 危險(xiǎn)失效 dangerous failure failure which has the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 使安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)處于潛在的危險(xiǎn)或喪失功能狀態(tài)的失效。3.6.8 安全失效 safe failure failure which does not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 不可能使安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)處于潛在的危險(xiǎn)或喪失功能狀態(tài)的失效。3.6.9 相關(guān)失效 dependent failure failure whose probability cannot be expressed as the simple product of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events which caused it 其概率不能表示為引起它的獨(dú)立事件的無條件概率的簡單乘積的失效。3.6.10 共同原因失效 common cause failure failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing coincident failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure 一種失效，它是一個(gè)或多個(gè)事件導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果，在多通道系統(tǒng)中引起兩個(gè)或多個(gè)分離通道同時(shí)失效，從而導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)失效。3.6.11 錯(cuò)誤 error discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition

計(jì)算、觀測和測量到的值或條件與真值、規(guī)定的或理論上的正確值或條件的差異。3.6.12 人為錯(cuò)誤 human error 失誤mistake human action or inaction that produces an unintended result 引發(fā)非期望結(jié)果的人的動(dòng)作或不動(dòng)作 3.7 生命周期活動(dòng) 3.7.1 安全生命周期 safety lifecycle necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety-related systems, occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities are no longer available for use 安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)實(shí)現(xiàn)過程中所必需的生命活動(dòng)，這些活動(dòng)發(fā)生在從一項(xiàng)工程的概念階段開始，直至所有的E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)，其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)，以及外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施停止使用為止的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)。3.7.2 軟件生命周期 software lifecycle activities occurring during a period of time that starts when software is conceived and ends when the software is permanently disused 從軟件開始構(gòu)思到軟件永久停用期間的活動(dòng)。3.7.3 配置管理 configuration management discipline of identifying the components of an evolving system for the purposes of controlling changes to those components and maintaining continuity and traceability throughout the lifecycle 為了控制系統(tǒng)部件的改變和在生命周期全過程中保持連續(xù)性和可追溯性，標(biāo)記一個(gè)進(jìn)化中的系統(tǒng)部件的規(guī)則。3.7.4 影響分析 impact analysis activity of determining the effect that a change to a function or component in a system will have to other functions or components in that system as well as to other systems 確定一個(gè)系統(tǒng)中的一個(gè)功能或部件的改變將對(duì)該系統(tǒng)中其它功能或部件以及其它系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生影響的活動(dòng)。3.8 安全量的證實(shí) 3.8.1 驗(yàn)證 verification confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the requirements have been fulfilled 通過檢查和提供客觀證據(jù)證實(shí)規(guī)定要求已經(jīng)滿足。3.8.2 確認(rèn) validation confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled

通過檢查和提供客觀證據(jù)來證明某一特定預(yù)期用途的特殊要求已經(jīng)滿足。3.8.3 功能安全評(píng)估 functional safety assessment

investigation, based on evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction facilities 通過調(diào)查，依據(jù)證據(jù)來判斷一個(gè)或多個(gè)E/E/PE安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)、其它技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)或外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施達(dá)到的功能安全。3.8.4 功能安全審核 functional safety audit systematic and independent examination to determine whether the procedures specific to the functional safety requirements comply with the planned arrangements, are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the specified objectives 對(duì)于按計(jì)劃安排的功能安全要求專用的規(guī)范是否有效地執(zhí)行并滿意地達(dá)到規(guī)定目的進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)地、獨(dú)立的檢查。3.8.5 檢驗(yàn)測試 proof test periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to an “as new” condition or as close as practical to this condition 用以檢測安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)失效的周期性測試，在必要時(shí)可把系統(tǒng)復(fù)原到正常狀態(tài)或?qū)嶋H上接近正常的狀態(tài)。3.8.6 診斷覆蓋率 diagnostic coverage

fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failure resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests

進(jìn)行自動(dòng)診斷測試而導(dǎo)致的硬件危險(xiǎn)失效概率的降低部分。3.8.7 診斷測試間隔 diagnostic test interval

interval between on-line tests to detect faults in a safety-related system that have a specified diagnostic coverage

在一個(gè)已經(jīng)規(guī)定了診斷覆蓋的安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)中，為檢測故障而進(jìn)行的在線測試的間隔。3.8.8 檢測到的 detected Detected revealed overt

in relation to hardware, detected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator intervention(for example physical inspection and manual tests), or through normal operation 揭露出的 明顯的

與硬件相關(guān)，用診斷測試、檢驗(yàn)測試、操作員干預(yù)（如設(shè)備檢測和人工測試）或通過正常操作所發(fā)現(xiàn)的。3.8.9 未檢測到的 undetected 未揭露的 unrevealed 不明顯的 covert in relation to hardware, undetected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator intervention(for example physical inspection and manual tests), or through normal operation 與硬件有關(guān)，用診斷測試、檢驗(yàn)測試、操作員干預(yù)（如設(shè)備檢測和人工測試）或通過正常操作未發(fā)現(xiàn)的。3.8.10 無關(guān)人員 independent person Person who is separate and distinct from the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or validation, and does not have responsibility for those activities 與整體的、E/E/PES的或軟件的安全生命周期特定階段中的活動(dòng)無關(guān)，并且不對(duì)其直接負(fù)責(zé)，但又從事功能安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的人。3.8.11 無關(guān)部門 independent department Department which is separate and distinct from the department responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or validation 與整體的、E/E/PES的或軟件的安全生命周期特定階段中的活動(dòng)無關(guān)，并且不對(duì)其直接負(fù)責(zé)，但又從事功能安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的部門。3.8.12 無關(guān)組織 independent organization

Organization which is separate and distinct, by management and other resources, from the organizations responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or vaildation 與整體的、E/E/PES的或軟件的安全生命周期特定階段中的活動(dòng)無關(guān)，并且不對(duì)其直接負(fù)責(zé)，但又從事功能安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的組織。3.8.13 動(dòng)畫 animation Simulated operation of the software system(or of some significant portion of the system)to display significant aspects of the behaviour of the system, for instance applied to a requirements specification in an appropriate format or an appropriate high-level representation of the system design 軟件系統(tǒng)（或系統(tǒng)的某一重要部分）的動(dòng)畫，以顯示系統(tǒng)行為的主要面貌，例如適用于適當(dāng)格式的要求規(guī)范或系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)的高級(jí)表述。3.8.14 動(dòng)態(tài)測試 dynamic testing Executing software and/or operating hardware in a controlled and systematic way, so as to demonstrate the presence of the required behaviour and the absence of unwanted behaviour 用系統(tǒng)的和受控的方式執(zhí)行軟件和（或）操作硬件以證明所要求的行為的存在以及非要求行為的不存在。3.8.15 測試裝置 test harness Facility that is capable of simulating(to some useful degree)the operating environment of software or hardware under development, by applying test cases to the software and recording the response 在開發(fā)階段能夠仿真軟件或硬件操作環(huán)境的裝置。通過把測試實(shí)例應(yīng)用于軟件，能夠模擬(達(dá)到某個(gè)可用的程度)開發(fā)中的軟件或硬件的操作環(huán)境并記錄響應(yīng)的設(shè)施。

二、IEC61511標(biāo)準(zhǔn)術(shù)語

說明：以下術(shù)語摘錄自IEC61511標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和相關(guān)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)翻譯稿，其中有一些術(shù)語在前面出現(xiàn)過，但表述略有不同，差別反映了過程控制領(lǐng)域的習(xí)慣與特殊性。3.2.1 結(jié)構(gòu) architecture Arrangement of hardware and/or software elements in a system, for example(1)arrangement of safety instrumented system(SIS)subsystems(2)internal structure of an SIS subsystem(3)arrangement of software programs 系統(tǒng)中硬件和/或軟件元素的安排，如：（1）安全儀表系統(tǒng)（SIS）子系統(tǒng)的安排；（2）SIS子系統(tǒng)的內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)；（3）軟件程序的安排。3.2.2 資產(chǎn)保護(hù) asset protection Function allocated to system design for the purpose of preventing loss to assets 為防止資產(chǎn)損失分配給系統(tǒng)設(shè)計(jì)的功能。3.2.3 基本過程控制系統(tǒng)（BPCS）basic process control system（BPCS）

System which responds to input signals form the process, its associated equipment, other programmable systems and/or an operator and generates output signals causing the process and its associated equipment to operate in the desired manner but which does not perform any safety instrumented functions with a claimed SIL≥1

對(duì)來自過程的、系統(tǒng)相關(guān)設(shè)備的、其他可編程系統(tǒng)的和/或某個(gè)操作員的輸入信號(hào)進(jìn)行響應(yīng)，并產(chǎn)生使過程和系統(tǒng)相關(guān)設(shè)備按要求方式運(yùn)行的系統(tǒng)，但它并不執(zhí)行任何具有被聲明的SIL≥1的儀表安全功能。3.2.4 通道 channel element or group of elements that independently perform(s)a function 獨(dú)立執(zhí)行一個(gè)功能的一個(gè)或一組元素。3.2.5 編碼 coding 3.2.6.1 共同原因失效 common cause failure failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure

由一個(gè)或多個(gè)事件引起一個(gè)多通道系統(tǒng)中的兩個(gè)或多個(gè)分離通道失效，從而導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)失效的一種失效。3.2.6.2 共同模式失效 common mode failure failure of two or more channels in the same way, causing the same erroneous result 兩個(gè)或多個(gè)通道以同樣的方式引起相同的誤差結(jié)果的失效。3.2.7 部件 component one of the parts of a system, subsystem, or device performing a specific function 執(zhí)行某一特定功能的系統(tǒng)、子系統(tǒng)或裝置的一個(gè)組成部分。3.2.8 配置 configuration 3.2.9 配置管理 configuration management discipline of identifying the components of an evolving(hardware and software)system for the purpose of controlling changes to those components and maintaining continuity and traceability throughout the life cycle

為了在生命周期全過程中控制組件的變化（硬件和軟件）和保持連續(xù)性和可追溯性，對(duì)進(jìn)化系統(tǒng)（硬件和軟件）中組件的識(shí)別規(guī)則。3.2.10 控制系統(tǒng) control system system which responds to input signals from the process and/or from an operator and generates output signals causing the process to operate in the desired manner 對(duì)來自過程和/或操作員的輸入信號(hào)進(jìn)行響應(yīng)，并產(chǎn)生使過程按要求方式運(yùn)行的輸出信號(hào)的系統(tǒng)。3.2.11 危險(xiǎn)失效 dangerous failure failure which has the potential to put the safety instrumented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 可能使安全儀表系統(tǒng)潛在地處于某種危險(xiǎn)或功能喪失狀態(tài)的失效。3.2.12 相關(guān)失效 dependent failure failure whose probability cannot be expressed as the simple product of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events which caused it 其概率不能表示為引起失效的獨(dú)立事件的無條件概率的簡單乘積的失效。3.2.13 檢測到的 detected 揭露的 revealed 明顯的 overt in relation to hardware failures and software faults, detected by the diagnostic tests or through normal operation 在與硬件失效和軟件故障有關(guān)時(shí)，通過診斷測試或正常操作發(fā)現(xiàn)的。3.2.14 裝置 device functional unit of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能實(shí)現(xiàn)某個(gè)規(guī)定目的的硬件或軟件或者二者結(jié)合的功能單元 3.2.15 診斷覆蓋率（DC）diagnostic coverage(DC)ratio of the detected failure rate to the total failure rate of the component or subsystem as detected by diagnostic tests.Diagnostic coverage does not include any faults detected by proof tests.診斷測試檢測到的部件或子系統(tǒng)的失效率與總失效率之比。診斷覆蓋率不包含由檢驗(yàn)測試檢測到的任何故障。3.2.16 多樣性 diversity existence of different means performing a required function 執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能存在不同方法。3.2.17 電氣/電子/可編程電子（E/E/PE）

electrical/electronic/programmable electronic

based on electrical(E)and/or electronic(E)and/or programmable electronic(PE)technology 基于電氣（E）和/或電子（E）和/或可編程電子（PE）技術(shù)。3.2.18 誤差 error discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition 計(jì)算出的、觀測到的和測量到的值或條件，和真實(shí)的、規(guī)定的或理論上正確的值或條件之間的差異。3.2.19 外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施 external risk reduction facilities measures to reduce or mitigate the risks, which are separate and distinct from the SIS 與SIS分離且性質(zhì)不同的降低或減少風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的措施。3.2.20 失效 failure termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function 功能單元執(zhí)行一個(gè)要求功能的能力的終止。3.2.21 故障 fault abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function

可能引起功能單元執(zhí)行要求功能的能力降低或喪失的異常狀況。3.2.22 故障避免 fault avoidance use of techniques and procedures which aim to avoid the introduction of faults during any phase of the safety life cycle of the safety instrumented system

在安全儀表系統(tǒng)安全生命周期的任何階段中為避免引入故障而使用的技術(shù)和程序。3.2.23 故障裕度 fault tolerance ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors 在出現(xiàn)故障或誤差的情況下，功能單元繼續(xù)執(zhí)行要求功能的能力。3.2.24 最終元件 final element part of a safety instrumented system which implements the physical action necessary to achieve a safe state 執(zhí)行實(shí)現(xiàn)某種安全狀態(tài)所必需的實(shí)際動(dòng)作的安全儀表系統(tǒng)的組成部分。3.2.25 功能安全 functional safety part of the overall safety relating to the process and the BPCS which depends on the correct functioning of the SIS and other protection layers

與過程和BPCS有關(guān)的整體安全的組成部分，它取決于SIS和其他保護(hù)層的正確功能執(zhí)行。3.2.26 功能安全評(píng)估 functional safety assessment

investigation, based on evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more protection layers 基于證據(jù)的調(diào)查，以判定由一個(gè)或多個(gè)保護(hù)層所實(shí)現(xiàn)的功能安全。3.2.27 功能安全審核 functional safety audit systematic and independent examination to determine whether the procedures specific to the functional safety requirements comply with the planned arrangements, are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the specified objectives 對(duì)于按計(jì)劃安排的功能安全要求專用的規(guī)范是否有效地執(zhí)行并滿意地達(dá)到規(guī)定目的進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)地、獨(dú)立的檢查。3.2.28 功能單元 functional unit entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能夠完成規(guī)定目的的軟件、硬件或兩者相結(jié)合的實(shí)體。3.2.29 硬件安全完整性 hardware safety integrity part of the safety integrity of the safety instrumented function relating to random hardware failures in a dangerous mode of failure

在危險(xiǎn)失效模式中，與硬件隨機(jī)失效有關(guān)的儀表安全功能的安全完整性的一部分。3.2.30 傷害 harm physical injury or damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly, as a result of damage to property or to the environment

由財(cái)產(chǎn)或環(huán)境的破壞而直接或間接導(dǎo)致的人身傷害或人體健康的損害。3.2.31 危險(xiǎn) hazard potential source of harm 傷害的潛在根源。3.2.32 人為誤差 human error 失誤 mistake human action or inaction that produces an unintended result 引發(fā)非期望結(jié)果的人的動(dòng)作或不動(dòng)作。3.2.33 影響分析 impact analysis activity of determining the effect that a change to a function or component will have to other functions or components in that system as well as to other systems 確定一個(gè)系統(tǒng)中的一個(gè)功能或部件的改變，對(duì)該系統(tǒng)和其他系統(tǒng)中其他功能或部件影響的活動(dòng)。3.2.34 獨(dú)立部門 independent department department which is separate and distinct form the departments responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or validation

在進(jìn)行安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的安全生命周期的特定階段中，同負(fù)責(zé)所發(fā)生活動(dòng)的部門分開且不同的部門。3.2.35 獨(dú)立組織 independent organization

organization which is separate and distinct, by management and other resources, from the organizations responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or validation 在進(jìn)行安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的安全生命周期的特定階段中，通過管理和其他資源同負(fù)責(zé)所發(fā)生活動(dòng)的組織分開且不同的組織。3.2.36 獨(dú)立人員 independent person person who is separate and distinct from the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety assessment or validation and does not have direct responsibility for those activities 在進(jìn)行安全評(píng)估或確認(rèn)的安全生命周期的特定階段中，同所發(fā)生活動(dòng)分開且不同的人員，這些人員并不直接負(fù)責(zé)那些活動(dòng)。3.2.37 輸入功能 input function function which monitors the process and its associated equipment in order to provide input information for the logic solver

為了給邏輯解算器提供輸入信息，監(jiān)視過程及其相關(guān)設(shè)備的功能。3.2.38 儀表 instrument apparatus used in performing an action(typically found in instrumented systems)在執(zhí)行某個(gè)動(dòng)作中使用的儀器（典型的可見儀表系統(tǒng)）。3.2.39 邏輯功能 logic function function which performs the transformations between input information(provided by one or more input functions)and output information(used by one or more output functions);logic functions provide the transformation from one or more input functions to one or more output functions

在輸入信息（由一個(gè)或幾個(gè)輸入功能提供）和輸出信息（由一個(gè)或幾個(gè)輸出功能使用）之間執(zhí)行變換的功能；邏輯功能提供從一個(gè)或幾個(gè)輸入功能到一個(gè)或幾個(gè)輸出功能的轉(zhuǎn)換。3.2.40 邏輯解算器 logic solver that portion of either a BPCS or SIS that performs one or more logic function(s)既可以是一個(gè)BPCS的一部分，也可以是SIS的一部分，它執(zhí)行一個(gè)或幾個(gè)邏輯功能。安全配置的邏輯解算器 safety configured logic solver general purpose industrial grade PE logic solver which is specifically configured for use in safety applications in accordance with 11.5 根據(jù)11.5為在安全應(yīng)用中使用專門配置的工業(yè)級(jí)通用型PE邏輯解算器。3.2.41 維護(hù)/工程接口 maintenance/engineering interface

maintenance/engineering interface is that hardware and software provided to allow proper SIS maintenance or modification.It can include instructions and diagnostics which may be found in software, programming terminals with appropriate communication protocols, diagnostic tools, indicators, bypass devices, test devices, and calibration devices

為能正確維護(hù)或修改SIS所提供的硬件和軟件。包括：在軟件中可能含有的指令和診斷程序、具有適當(dāng)通信協(xié)議的編程終端、診斷工具、指示器、旁路裝置、試驗(yàn)裝置和校正裝置。3.2.42 減輕 mitigation action that reduces the consequence(s)of a hazardous event 減小危險(xiǎn)事件后果的動(dòng)作。3.2.43 操作模式 mode of operation way in which a safety instrumented function operates 儀表安全功能運(yùn)行方式。

要求模式下的儀表安全功能 demand mode safety instrumented function where a specified action(for example, closing of a valve)is taken in response to process conditions or other demands.In the event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented function a potential hazard only occurs in the event of a failure in the process or the BPCS 響應(yīng)過程條件或其他要求而采取一個(gè)規(guī)定動(dòng)作（如關(guān)閉一個(gè)閥門）的場合。在儀表安全功能的危險(xiǎn)失效事件中，僅當(dāng)發(fā)生過程或BPCS的失效事件時(shí)，才發(fā)生潛在危險(xiǎn)。連續(xù)模式下的儀表安全功能 continuous mode safety instrumented function where in the event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented function a potential hazard will occur without further failure unless action is taken to prevent it 在儀表安全功能的危險(xiǎn)失效事件中，如果不采取預(yù)防動(dòng)作，即使沒有進(jìn)一步的失效，潛在危險(xiǎn)也會(huì)發(fā)生。3.2.44 模塊 module self-contained assembly of hardware components that performs a specific hardware function(i.e., digital input module, analogue output module), or reusable application program(can be internal to a program or a set of programs)that support a specific function, for example, portion of a computer program that carries out a specific function 執(zhí)行某個(gè)特定硬件功能的硬件部件的自含式組件（即數(shù)字輸入模塊、模擬輸出模塊），或支持某一特定功能的可重用應(yīng)用程序（可能是一個(gè)或一組內(nèi)固程序）。如執(zhí)行特定功能的計(jì)算機(jī)程序的一部分。3.2.45 從N中取M MooN safety instrumented system, or part thereof, made up of “N” independent channels, which are so connected, that “M” channels are sufficient to perform the safety instrumented function “N”個(gè)獨(dú)立通道構(gòu)成的安全儀表系統(tǒng)或其部分，它被連接成其中“M”個(gè)通道足以執(zhí)行儀表安全功能。3.2.46 必要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低 necessary risk reduction risk reduction required to ensure that the risk is reduced to a tolerable level 為保證把風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低到允許水平所需的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低。3.2.47 非可編程（NP）系統(tǒng) non-programmable(NP)system system based on non-computer technologies(i.e., a system not based on programmable electronics [PE] or software)基于非計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)的系統(tǒng)（即不基于可編程電子[PE]或軟件的系統(tǒng)）。3.2.48 操作員接口 operator interface means by which information is communicated between a human operator(s)and the SIS(for example, CRTs, indicating lights, push-buttons, horns, alarms);the operator interface is sometimes referred to as the human-machine interface(HMI)在操作人員和SIS之間進(jìn)行信息交換的手段（如陰極射線管CRT、指示燈、按鈕、操縱桿、報(bào)警器）；操作員接口有時(shí)又叫人機(jī)接口（HMI）。3.2.49 其他技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng) other technology safety related system safety related systems that are based on a technology other than electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic 不基于電氣、電子或可編程電子技術(shù)的安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)。3.2.50 輸出功能 output function function which controls the process and its associated equipment according to final actuator information from the logic function

根據(jù)來自邏輯功能的終端執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)的信息，控制過程及其相關(guān)設(shè)備的功能。3.2.51 階段 phase period within the safety life cycle where activities described in this standard take place 發(fā)生IEC61511中描述活動(dòng)的安全生命周期中的某個(gè)時(shí)段。3.2.52 預(yù)防 prevention action that reduces the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event 降低危險(xiǎn)事件發(fā)生頻率的動(dòng)作。3.2.53 以往使用 prior use 3.2.54 過程風(fēng)險(xiǎn) process risk risk arising from the process conditions caused by abnormal events(include BPCS malfunction)因異常事件（包括BPCS功能失常）引起過程條件產(chǎn)生的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.2.55 可編程電子（PE）programmable electronics

electronic component or device forming part of a PES and based on computer technology.The term encompasses both hardware and software and input and out units 基于計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)構(gòu)成PES一部分的電子部件或裝置。本術(shù)語包括硬件和軟件及輸入和輸出單元。3.2.56 可編程電子系統(tǒng)（PES）programmable electronic system(PES)

system for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, actuators and other output devices 基于一個(gè)或多個(gè)可編程電子裝置的，用于控制、防護(hù)或監(jiān)視的系統(tǒng)，包括系統(tǒng)中所有的元素，如電源、傳感器和其他輸入裝置、數(shù)據(jù)高速公路和其他通信途徑、以及執(zhí)行器和其他輸出裝置。3.2.57 編程 programming process of designing, writing and testing a set of instructions for solving a problem or processing data 為解決問題或處理數(shù)據(jù)而設(shè)計(jì)、編寫和測試一組指令的過程。3.2.58 檢驗(yàn)測試 proof test test performed to reveal undetected faults in a safety instrumented system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to its designed functionality

為揭露安全儀表系統(tǒng)中未檢測到的故障而執(zhí)行的測試，以便在必要時(shí)把系統(tǒng)修復(fù)到所設(shè)計(jì)的功能。3.2.59 保護(hù)層 protection layer any independent mechanism that reduces risk by control, prevention or mitigation 借助控制、預(yù)防或減輕以降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的任何獨(dú)立機(jī)制。3.2.60 經(jīng)使用驗(yàn)證的 proven-in-use when a documented assessment has shown that there is appropriate evidence, based on the previous use of the component, that the component is suitable for use in a safety instrumented system 當(dāng)文檔化的評(píng)估顯示有適當(dāng)證據(jù)表明：基于部件以往使用的情況，該部件適用于安全儀表系統(tǒng)時(shí)（見11.5中的“以往使用”）。3.2.61 質(zhì)量 quality totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs 一個(gè)實(shí)體滿足指明的和隱含需要的性能總和。3.2.62 硬件隨機(jī)失效 random hardware failure

failure, occurring at a random time, which results from a variety of degradation mechanisms in the hardware

在硬件中，由各種退化機(jī)制引起，以隨機(jī)時(shí)間發(fā)生的失效。3.2.63 冗余 redundancy use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same function;redundancy can be implemented by identical elements(identical redundancy)or by diverse elements(diverse redundancy)使用多個(gè)元素或系統(tǒng)來執(zhí)行同一種功能；冗余可以使用同種元素實(shí)現(xiàn)（同型冗余），或使用不同元素實(shí)現(xiàn)（異型冗余）。3.2.64 風(fēng)險(xiǎn) risk combination of the frequency of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm 出現(xiàn)傷害的概率及該傷害嚴(yán)重性的組合。3.2.65 安全失效 safe failure failure which does not have the potential to put the safety instrumented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 不會(huì)使安全儀表系統(tǒng)處于潛在的危險(xiǎn)狀態(tài)或功能故障狀態(tài)的失效。安全失效分?jǐn)?shù) safe failure fraction fraction of the overall random hardware failure rate of a device that results in either a safe failure or a detected dangerous failure

導(dǎo)致安全失效或者可檢測出的危險(xiǎn)失效的裝置總硬件隨機(jī)失效率分?jǐn)?shù)。3.2.66 安全狀態(tài) safe state state of the process when safety is achieved 達(dá)到安全時(shí)的過程狀態(tài)。3.2.67 安全 safety freedom from unacceptable risk 不存在不可接受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.2.68 安全功能 safety function function to be implemented by an SIS, other technology safety related system or external risk, reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the process, with respect to a specific hazardous event

針對(duì)特定的危險(xiǎn)事件，為達(dá)到或保持過程的安全狀態(tài)，由SIS、其他技術(shù)安全相關(guān)系統(tǒng)或外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低設(shè)施實(shí)現(xiàn)的功能。3.2.69 儀表安全控制功能 safety instrumented control function

safety instrumented function with a specified SIL operating in continuous mode which is necessary to prevent a hazardous condition from arising and/or to mitigate its consequences 具有某個(gè)規(guī)定的SIL并運(yùn)行在連續(xù)模式下，以防止發(fā)生危險(xiǎn)工況和/或減輕其后果所必需的儀表安全功能。3.2.70 儀表安全控制系統(tǒng) safety instrumented control system instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented control functions 用來實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)或幾個(gè)儀表安全控制功能的儀表系統(tǒng)。3.2.71 儀表安全功能(SIF)safety instrumented function

safety function with a specified safety integrity level which is necessary to achieve functional safety and which can be either a safety instrumented protection function or a safety instrumented control function

具有某個(gè)特定SIL的，用以達(dá)到功能安全的安全功能，它既可以是一個(gè)儀表安全保護(hù)功能，也可以是一個(gè)儀表安全控制功能。3.2.72 安全儀表系統(tǒng)(SIS)safety instrumented system

instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented functions.An SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final elements(s)用來實(shí)現(xiàn)一個(gè)或幾個(gè)儀表安全功能的儀表系統(tǒng)。SIS可以由傳感器、邏輯解算器和最終元件的任何組合組成。

3.2.73 安全完整性 safety integrity average probability of a safety instrumented system satisfactorily performing the required safety instrumented functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time

安全儀表系統(tǒng)在規(guī)定時(shí)段內(nèi)、在所有規(guī)定條件下滿意執(zhí)行要求的儀表安全功能的平均概率。3.2.74 安全完整性等級(jí)(SIL)safety integrity level(SIL)

discrete level(one out of four)for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems.Safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity;safety integrity level 1 has the lowest 用來規(guī)定分配給安全儀表系統(tǒng)的儀表安全功能的安全完整性要求的離散等級(jí)（4個(gè)等級(jí)中的一個(gè)）。SIL 4是安全完整性的最高等級(jí)，SIL 1為最低等級(jí)。3.2.75 安全完整性要求規(guī)范 safety integrity requirements specification

specification that contains the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed by the safety instrumented system(s)包含了安全儀表系統(tǒng)應(yīng)執(zhí)行的儀表安全功能的安全完整性要求的規(guī)范。3.2.76 安全生命周期 safety life cycle necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety instrumented function(s)occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the safety instrumented functions are no longer available for use 從項(xiàng)目概念階段開始到所有的儀表安全功能不再適用時(shí)為止所發(fā)生的、包含在儀表安全功能實(shí)現(xiàn)中的必要活動(dòng)。3.2.77 安全手冊 safety manual manual which defines how the device, subsystem or system can be safely applied 定義如何安全使用裝置、子系統(tǒng)或系統(tǒng)的手冊。3.2.78 安全要求規(guī)范 safety requirements specification

specification that contains all the requirements of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed by the safety instrumented systems 包含安全儀表系統(tǒng)應(yīng)執(zhí)行的儀表安全功能的所有要求的規(guī)范。3.2.79 安全軟件 safety software software in a safety instrumented system with application, embedded or utility software functionality 在安全儀表系統(tǒng)中具有應(yīng)用軟件功能性、嵌入式軟件功能性或工具軟件功能性的軟件。3.2.80 傳感器 sensor device or combination of devices, which measure the process condition(for example, transmitters, transducers, process switches, position switches)

測量過程條件的裝置或裝置組合（如：變送器、傳感器、過程開關(guān)和定位開關(guān)）。3.2.81 軟件 software intellectual creation comprising the programs, procedures, data, rules and any associated documentation pertaining to the operation of a data processing system 包括程序、進(jìn)程、數(shù)據(jù)、規(guī)則和關(guān)于數(shù)據(jù)處理系統(tǒng)操作的相關(guān)文檔的智能創(chuàng)作。固定程序語言（FPL）fixed program language

in this type of language, the user is limited to adjustment of a few parameters(for example, range of the pressure transmitter, alarm levels, network addresses)限定用戶只能調(diào)整幾個(gè)參數(shù)（如壓力變送器的量程、報(bào)警等級(jí)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)地址）的語言類型。有限可變語言（LVL）limited variability language this type of language is designed to be comprehensible to process sector users, and provides the capability to combine predefined, application specific, library functions to implement the safety requirements specifications.An LVL provides a close functional correspondence with the functions required to achieve the application 被設(shè)計(jì)成過程領(lǐng)域用戶容易理解并可為實(shí)現(xiàn)安全要求規(guī)范提供組合預(yù)定的、應(yīng)用專用的庫功能能力的一種語言類型。LVL可提供一種與達(dá)到應(yīng)用所要求的功能幾乎一致的功能。全可變語言(FVL)full variability language

this type of language is designed to be comprehensible to computer programmers and provides the capability to implement a wide variety of functions and applications 設(shè)計(jì)成計(jì)算機(jī)編程者易于理解，并可提供實(shí)現(xiàn)各種各樣功能和應(yīng)用的能力的一種語言。軟件程序類型 software program type 應(yīng)用軟件 application software software specific to the user application.In general, it contains logic sequences, permissives, limits and expressions that control the appropriate input, output, calculations, decisions necessary to meet the safety instrumented functional requirements.See fixed and limited variability language

用戶應(yīng)用專用軟件。通常，它包含控制正確輸入、輸出、計(jì)算和決策的邏輯時(shí)序、允許值、極值和表達(dá)式，用以滿足儀表安全功能所必須的要求。參見固定程序語言和有限可變語言。嵌入式軟件 embedded software software that is part of the system supplied by the manufacturer and is not accessible for modification by the end-user.Embedded software is also referred to as firmware or system software 作為系統(tǒng)組成部分由制造商提供的軟件，最終用戶不能對(duì)其進(jìn)行修改。嵌入式軟件又叫固件或系統(tǒng)軟件。

工具軟件 utility software software tools for the creation, modification, and documentation of application programs.These software tools are not required for the operation of the SIS 用來創(chuàng)建、修改和編寫應(yīng)用程序的軟件工具。操作SIS并不需要這些軟件工具。3.2.82 軟件生命周期 software life cycle activities occurring during a period of time that starts when software is conceived and ends when the software is permanently disused 從開始構(gòu)思軟件到永久性停用軟件期間發(fā)生的活動(dòng)。3.2.83 子系統(tǒng) subsystem 3.2.84 系統(tǒng) system set of elements, which interact according to a design;an element of a system can be another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and may include hardware, software and human interaction

根據(jù)設(shè)計(jì)相互聯(lián)系的一組元素；系統(tǒng)的一個(gè)元素可以是稱為子系統(tǒng)的另一系統(tǒng)，該子系統(tǒng)可以是一個(gè)主控系統(tǒng)，也可以是一個(gè)受控系統(tǒng)，它可能包含硬件、軟件和人的交互作用。3.2.85 系統(tǒng)失效 systematic failure failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors

與某種起因以確定性方式有關(guān)的失效，只有對(duì)設(shè)計(jì)或制造過程、操作規(guī)程、文檔或其他相關(guān)因素進(jìn)行修改才能消除這種失效。3.2.86 系統(tǒng)安全完整性 systematic safety integrity that part of the safety integrity of safety instrumented function relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure

在失效的危險(xiǎn)模式中與系統(tǒng)失效有關(guān)的儀表安全功能的安全完整性部分。3.2.87 目標(biāo)失效量 target failure measure intended probability of dangerous mode failure to be achieved in respect of the safety integrity requirements, specified in terms of either the average probability of failure to perform the design function on demand(for a demand mode of operation)or the frequency of a dangerous failure to perform the SIF per hour(for a continuous mode of operation)就安全完整性要求而言，應(yīng)達(dá)到的預(yù)計(jì)危險(xiǎn)模式失效概率，既可規(guī)定為要求時(shí)執(zhí)行設(shè)計(jì)功能的平均失效概率（要求操作模式時(shí)），也可規(guī)定為每小時(shí)執(zhí)行SIF的危險(xiǎn)失效頻率（連續(xù)操作模式時(shí)）。3.2.88 模板 template 軟件模板 software template structured non-specific piece of application software that can be easily altered to support specific functions while retaining the original structure;for example, an interactive screen template controls the process flow of the application screens, but is not specific to the data being presented;a programmer may take the generic template and make function-specific revisions to produce a new screen for the users 保持原有結(jié)構(gòu)的同時(shí)，易于改變以支持特定功能的結(jié)構(gòu)化非專用應(yīng)用軟件段；例如：交互界面模板控制應(yīng)用界面的過程流，但并非專用于正呈現(xiàn)的數(shù)據(jù)。程序員可以采用通用模板，并做特定功能修改，從而為用戶生成一個(gè)新界面。3.2.89 允許風(fēng)險(xiǎn) tolerable risk risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society 根據(jù)當(dāng)今社會(huì)的水準(zhǔn)，在給定范圍內(nèi)能夠接受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。3.2.90 未檢測到的 undetected 未揭露出的 unrevealed 不明顯的 covert in relation to hardware and software faults not found by the diagnostic tests or during normal operation 與硬件和軟件有關(guān)，未被診斷測試發(fā)現(xiàn)的或者在正常操作中未被發(fā)現(xiàn)的。3.2.91 確認(rèn) validation activity of demonstrating that the safety instrumented function(s)and safety instrumented system(s)under consideration after installation meets in all respects the safety requirements specification

用以證明被考慮的儀表安全功能和安全儀表系統(tǒng)在安裝之后，在各方面都能滿足安全要求規(guī)范的活動(dòng)。3.2.92 驗(yàn)證 verification activity of demonstrating for each phase of the relevant safety life cycle by analysis and/or tests, that, for specific inputs, the outputs meet in all respects the objectives and requirements set for the specific phase

在相關(guān)安全生命周期的每個(gè)階段，通過分析和/或測試，證明對(duì)于特定的輸入，輸出應(yīng)在各方面都能滿足為該特定階段所設(shè)置的目標(biāo)和要求的活動(dòng)。3.2.93 看門狗 watchdog combination of diagnostics and an output device(typically a switch)for monitoring the correct operation of the programmable electronic(PE)device and taking action upon detection of an incorrect operation 用來監(jiān)視可編程電子（PE）裝置正確運(yùn)行，并能在檢測到不正確運(yùn)行時(shí)采取動(dòng)作的診斷裝置和輸出裝置（典型如開關(guān)）的組合。

主辦單位：機(jī)械工業(yè)儀器儀表綜合技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所

第四篇：森林城市 教案

《森林城市》（美術(shù)）

活動(dòng)目標(biāo)：

１、通過聯(lián)想，表現(xiàn)城市中的高層建筑、立交橋等形象。

２、發(fā)揮想象，大膽畫出不同形狀的汽車。

2、對(duì)繪畫活動(dòng)感興趣。

3、以集體畫的形式開展活動(dòng)，培養(yǎng)集體意識(shí)。

活動(dòng)準(zhǔn)備：

1、范畫。

2、大鉛畫紙三紙、油畫棒、水粉顏料、小紙若干張、剪刀，固體膠。

3、已聽過童話故事〈野貓的城市〉。

活動(dòng)過程：

（一）知作畫方式，產(chǎn)生作畫興趣。

１、你們還記得〈野貓的城市〉這個(gè)童話故事嗎？一群小朋友坐著旅游車從城市來到森林旅游，小朋友們怎樣向小動(dòng)物們“比劃”，來介紹城市呢？

２、在充分討論后，教師出示范畫，引導(dǎo)幼兒根據(jù)有動(dòng)物可以看到的東西進(jìn)行“比劃”，介紹城市。教師引導(dǎo)幼兒大膽想象和聯(lián)想，如花藤想象成馬路、立交橋，將白云想象成屋頂、電腦、汽車等，將蘑菇想象成游樂場的設(shè)施。

３、教師提出繪畫要求：把小朋友分成三組，每組的一部分幼兒畫鉛畫紙上大的城市建筑，如：立交橋，高樓大廈等，大家安排好各自要畫的內(nèi)容，在樹，花、草、云等想象上添畫，表象城市里的東西，還有一部分幼兒在小的白紙上畫各種汽車、人、花草、紅綠燈等。

（二）分組進(jìn)行集體創(chuàng)作〈森林城市〉。

1、分工作畫，教師巡回指導(dǎo)，立交橋、大廈，可請(qǐng)能力強(qiáng)點(diǎn)的幼兒勾畫好輪廓，其他幼兒涂色。

2、畫好汽車、花草等裝飾物的幼兒，將作品剪下來帖在自己組的大鉛畫紙上。

（三）欣賞評(píng)比。

１、幼兒將作品放在展覽區(qū)，每組幼兒選一名為代表介紹自己組幼兒的作品。幼兒邊欣賞邊評(píng)比出好的作品

秋游

活動(dòng)目標(biāo)：

1、啟發(fā)幼兒用繪畫表現(xiàn)秋游的快樂情景。

2、培養(yǎng)幼兒的想像力和組織畫面的能力。

活動(dòng)準(zhǔn)備：

1、錄音機(jī)和《秋游》的磁帶。

2、《秋游》的一段錄象。

3、幼兒繪畫工具：紙、記號(hào)筆、蠟筆等。

活動(dòng)過程：

一、聽錄音邊唱邊走進(jìn)活動(dòng)室，激發(fā)幼兒興趣。

1、師：讓我們唱著歌去郊游吧。（聽音樂邊唱邊走進(jìn)活動(dòng)室）

2、師：大家開心嗎？唱著這首歌，你們會(huì)想到什么？

3、師：哎，ⅹⅹ小朋友想起了去秋游。這次秋游我們到過哪些地方？

二、看秋游的一段錄象，回憶秋游最開心的事。

1、師：你們真了不起，還記得秋游的事情，可是我有點(diǎn)忘了，我們一起來看一段錄像吧?？纯辞镉螘r(shí)什么事情讓你最開心、最難忘？

2、看完錄象后提問：誰愿意告訴大家秋游時(shí)什么事情讓你最開心、最難忘呢？（多請(qǐng)幾位幼兒回答）

3、教師小結(jié)：小朋友說得都很棒，怎樣把秋游的快樂留下來呢？（畫出來）對(duì)把它畫出來和好朋友一起分享。剛才有小朋友說：“和好伙伴坐在汽車?yán)镉姓f有笑，看著外面的風(fēng)景真開心，你就把它畫下來；有的說在蠡湖中央公園一邊休息一邊和好朋友分享食物很開心，你也把它畫下來；還有的人說到桔子園里采桔子特別難忘，你就畫下來。

三、提出作畫要。

1、秋游時(shí)讓我開心的事情很多，今天只要把最開心、最難忘的一件事情畫下來。

2、我們先想一想畫哪些人？畫什么景色？該畫在紙的哪里，想好了再畫。

3、比一比誰畫得和別人不一樣？

四、幼兒作畫，教師指導(dǎo)。

1、鼓勵(lì)幼兒大膽想像，合理布局。

2、幫助能力差的幼兒組織畫面。

3、引導(dǎo)先畫好的幼兒輕輕走下去欣賞別人的作品，或畫好的同伴之間互相講講自己的圖畫，鼓勵(lì)大膽的幼兒走下去講給客人老師聽。

五、作品欣賞與講評(píng)。

第五篇：創(chuàng)建森林城市

創(chuàng)建森林城市營造美麗臨武

臨武縣東山小學(xué)創(chuàng)建國家森林城市致學(xué)生一封信

親愛的同學(xué)們：

你們好！郴州市正在爭創(chuàng)國家森林城市，這是縣委、縣政府作出的一項(xiàng)讓我們的生活環(huán)境變得更美好的重大利民決策。生活在臨武，是我們每一位臨武人的幸福；保持生態(tài)文明，創(chuàng)建森林城市，是我們每一位臨武人的責(zé)任。

“森林是生命的搖籃”，生命來自于森林，依賴于森林。森林不僅為我們提供豐富的木材和林副產(chǎn)品，還給我們供應(yīng)新鮮的空氣和潔凈的水源，更是許多可愛的野生動(dòng)物自由嬉戲的家園。我們的生活離不開森林。森林與我們密不可分。保護(hù)森林，事關(guān)我們每一個(gè)人。根據(jù)縣教育局文件精神，特向同學(xué)們提出以下建議，希望每位同學(xué)積極配合：

一、國家森林城市是體現(xiàn)一個(gè)城市文明程度、綜合實(shí)力和整體水平的最高綜合性榮譽(yù)，是最有價(jià)值的無形資產(chǎn)和最珍貴的城市品牌。臨武是我家，文明靠大家。你們都是城市的小主人，是城市文明的建設(shè)者，也是城市文明的傳播者和受益者，保持生態(tài)文明，創(chuàng)建森林城市離不開廣大中小學(xué)生的參與和維護(hù)。希望你們積極行動(dòng)起來，為創(chuàng)建活動(dòng)盡一份心、出一份力，努力爭做文明的傳播者和踐行者。

二、植樹造林，森林防火，人人有責(zé)；保護(hù)森林就是保護(hù)人類自己，就是珍愛生命；我們應(yīng)該保護(hù)屬于我們的綠色森林，讓綠色永駐我們心間，讓綠色呼喚我們奔向未來！植樹造林，保護(hù)森林，就是保護(hù)自己；保護(hù)森林，就是保護(hù)了無數(shù)個(gè)生靈；保護(hù)森林，就是每個(gè)人的義務(wù)；保護(hù)森林，就是做了一件大好事；如果人人都植樹造林，保護(hù)森林，世界將更加美好、充滿歡樂！

三、主動(dòng)參與，積極融入。知曉森林城市建設(shè)、關(guān)心森林城市建設(shè)、宣傳森林城市建設(shè)、融入創(chuàng)森林城市建設(shè)，自覺爭做文明學(xué)生，以優(yōu)雅得體的文明言行，塑造當(dāng)代小學(xué)生的文明形象。主動(dòng)參與創(chuàng)建國家森林城市志愿者活動(dòng)，參加學(xué)校、社區(qū)開展的創(chuàng)建森林城市主題實(shí)踐活動(dòng)，敢于批評(píng)、制止身邊各類不愛護(hù)森林的不良行為。

四、宣傳森林城市建設(shè)，傳播新風(fēng)。向父母、長輩和周圍的人做好創(chuàng)建國家森林城市有關(guān)知識(shí)的宣傳，在家庭和社區(qū)傳播文明新風(fēng)。通過“小手拉大手，共創(chuàng)森林城市”活動(dòng)，動(dòng)員他們積極投身到創(chuàng)建國家森林城市活動(dòng)中，爭當(dāng)文明市民，為創(chuàng)建工作喝彩、出力，以自己的實(shí)際行動(dòng)做個(gè)好榜樣。

同學(xué)們，希望你們迅速行動(dòng)起來，從自身做起，從點(diǎn)滴小事做起，爭做創(chuàng)建活動(dòng)的小標(biāo)兵，爭當(dāng)文明小使者，讓文明鮮花盛開在臨武人的心田，讓歷史悠久的臨武縣城變得更有朝氣、更加靚麗、更富魅力、更加文明！