第一篇：英文畢業(yè)論文文獻綜述的寫法及

英文畢業(yè)論文文獻綜述的寫法及范文

英文（例子）：

[1] Bn, H D Tehing by Piniples: An Ineive ApphLnguge Pedggy[M] Penie Hll Regens, 1994

[] Bn, J Se l Siued Cgniin nd he Culue f Lening[J] Eduinl Resehe, 1, 1989

[3] Chis, Dede The Evluin f Cnsuivis Lening Envi-nens: Iesin in Disibued Viul Wlds[J] Ed-uinl Tehnlgy, Sep-O, 1995

[4] Hyes, DOn uniive peene[M] J B Pide;J Hles(eds)Silinguisis Hndsh: Penguin, 19

[5] L E Sbugh Ineulul uniin[M] Ne Buns-ik, NJUSA: Tnsin Bks, 1988

[6] Puhl, A Clss A ssessen[J] EnglishTehing Fu, 199

[] Ths, Jenny Css-ulul Pgi Filue[J] Applied Linguisis, 1983,(4): 91-111

[8] Willi B Gudykuns Ineulul uniin hey[M] Bevely Hills, CA: Sge Pub, 1983

第二篇：畢業(yè)論文 英文文獻翻譯

_______ 學(xué) 院

畢業(yè)論文文獻資料翻譯

原文名稱: “Goldilocks” Liberalization: The Uneven Path Toward Interest Rate Reform in China

課題名稱:利率市場化對我國商業(yè)銀行的影響分析

學(xué)生姓名:號:

指導(dǎo)老師:

所在系部:專業(yè)名稱:

年月

譯文

“金發(fā)”自由化：中國利率市場化改革的不平之路

Shih and Victor

中國政府的自由化

2003年，中國從亞洲金融危機進入到一段時間的持續(xù)增長后，利率市場化改革似乎終于在掌握之內(nèi)。就如以前一樣，中國人民銀行的熱衷者發(fā)布幾篇報告以支持利率市場化，而四大銀行的代表也提供放慢改革（成2002年）的理由。此外,中國在2003終于擺脫通貨緊縮的威脅并恢復(fù)相對高速的增長，只有在2004年有中等程度的通脹（圖3）。一些驚喜，在2004年10月29日，對貸款利率的上限被解除，允許銀行以他們想要的高利息收費（人民日報2005）。此外，銀行也可以給予儲戶低于存款基準利率的利率。類似總督戴顯龍的幾年前的時間表，中國人民銀行發(fā)布了一份報告，奠定了完全利率市場化的具體計劃。

盡管推行這種市場化，但金融體系的基本邏輯任然保持了一樣。在存款方面，存款利率上下限的去除主要是象征性的，因為銀行沒有理由去不必要地降低利率，使其低于他們的競爭對手所提供的利率。因此，很少數(shù)的銀行利用市場化的優(yōu)勢來給出低于存款基準利率的利率（2006年綠色）。關(guān)于貸款利率市場化，央行的理由是，它將使銀行“根據(jù)客戶不同風險的狀況給予不同的貸款和利率”（2005年中國人民銀行貨幣政策研究小組）。雖然這聽起來像一個顯著的效率增益，但這是發(fā)出了現(xiàn)實的信號，即銀行繼續(xù)提供廉價融資，給予有更低的官僚風險狀況的國家資助項目和國有企業(yè)。在此期間，通過存款利率上限和貸款利率的下限，銀行之間的“毀滅性競爭”仍然受到嚴格的限制。因此，銀行仍然不能通過提供更高的存款利率互相競爭。同樣，銀行無法通過提供給借款者更低的利率來相互競爭，因為銀行能提供的最低利率為基準利率的90％。中國人民銀行的一份報告顯示，整個國有銀行全部貸款的27％，被設(shè)臵于法定最低利率，這表明銀行將會通過給出法定最低利率來競爭（中國人民銀行貨幣政策的研究團隊 2005）。為了給中國人民銀行信貸，促使城市商業(yè)銀行和農(nóng)村信用社貸款利率的市場化，通過提供更多高利率的貸款給在私營部門的高風險的的借款人，提供融資給原先被凍結(jié)的正規(guī)銀行系統(tǒng)分部（中國人民銀行貨幣政策的研究團隊 2005）。

進入2008-2009年的經(jīng)濟衰退，對利率的再次控制促進了大規(guī)模的反周期投資驅(qū)動器。如圖2所示，中國人民銀行在全球經(jīng)濟低迷時繼續(xù)保證銀行業(yè)穩(wěn)健的利率傳導(dǎo)。移

除貸款利率的上限，銀行通過貸款賺更多的錢。因此，當中央要求銀行于2008年11月為4萬億人民幣經(jīng)濟刺激方案提供融資，銀行以極大的熱情回應(yīng)。導(dǎo)致2009年中國的貸款向上急速膨脹，比上年增長了驚人的30％。中國人民銀行在2009年原本設(shè)臵信貸配額是5萬億人民幣向上一點點。到今年年底，銀行已經(jīng)做出了歷史上最大量的新增貸款，總額近10萬億人民幣（潘克赫斯特,鄭,和王 2009）。銀行持有的存款利率低于基準利率而貸款利率高于基準利率，實際上可收獲可觀的利潤，即使在經(jīng)濟衰退期間（漢2009）。因此，貸款利率上界的自由化得益于所有有關(guān)的政治人物。高層的技術(shù)專家保留為最大的反周期投資驅(qū)動湊集資金的能力，這在中國的歷史上是相對容易的。銀行仍然防止“毀滅性競爭”，并繼續(xù)享有穩(wěn)健的貸款利率傳導(dǎo)。由于銀行為經(jīng)濟刺激計劃提供資金的意愿，財政部不需要發(fā)行很多的債務(wù)，從而限制財政赤字的規(guī)模。雖然一些大型國有企業(yè)由于釋放出的貸款利率可能付出更高的借貸成本，銀行急于提供大量的融資額給他們，使他們向其他實體轉(zhuǎn)貸資金而賺取利潤。隨著世界逐步擺脫經(jīng)濟危機，由于前兩年的快速信貸擴張，通貨膨脹的壓力在中國建立的非常迅速。2011年初，通貨膨脹調(diào)轉(zhuǎn)進入危險的境況。然而中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在危機模式下，利率進一步自由化的任何談話被擱臵。另一位金發(fā)的時刻必須在下一輪利率自由化之前提出，使其可以被理解。

結(jié)論

雖然中國并沒有回應(yīng)外部強加給我們的政策改革壓力，但是它已經(jīng)開始自身的重大經(jīng)濟改革。在城市里，許多規(guī)模較小的國有企業(yè)被私有化或關(guān)閉了，而私營部門被允許自由成長（諾頓1996）。大多數(shù)商品和服務(wù)價格已經(jīng)被放開（韋德曼2003）。盡管中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化，但是國家將繼續(xù)以控制社會的宏觀的經(jīng)濟杠桿，允許它通過重要的途徑影響經(jīng)濟效果。中央級的技術(shù)專家可以通過控制資金的流動和投資方向，確保通脹不上升至無法控制的地步，而增長依然強勁。同時，這些手段也允許他們購買被其他政治局成員保護的利益支持，包括當?shù)毓賳T和國有企業(yè)管理人員，特別是在經(jīng)濟停滯的時候。為了保持這些手段的有效性，他們需要儲戶在中國的國家金融體系的抵押品。如果私人銀行出現(xiàn)為存款人提供更高的利率，國有銀行必須匹配上更高的利率，從而增加了成本，為大規(guī)模的經(jīng)濟刺激計劃提供資金。盡管強大的激勵促使頂級技術(shù)專家保持現(xiàn)狀，但是利率市場化改革在中國已經(jīng)取得了一些進展。即使在20世紀80年代，非正式的銀行也提供著很高的存款利率。進入20世紀90年代，央行行長感受到西方關(guān)于貨幣政策以及中國人民銀行政治性角色的擔憂，開始認真的推行利率市場化。他們在通貨膨脹低，經(jīng)濟增長強勁的時候推進自由化改革。

雖然方便政策制定者制定政治目標，但是中國的利率管制將繼續(xù)使中國的儲戶以及一些國外的制造商肩負重但。只要銀行爭奪存款被禁止，數(shù)以百萬的儲戶將繼續(xù)被人為壓低存款利率，來補貼國有銀行的盈利能力。國家以較低的成本調(diào)動大量資金的能力，也有對世界的負面影響。大部分剩余的國有企業(yè)主要集中在重工業(yè)和大宗商品部門。因此，就如中國政府智囊團指出的那樣，通過寬松的信貸政策，使他們得以保留，而在全球經(jīng)濟衰退的時候，或者在某些情況下，他們甚至擴大自己的能力（國際金融研究中心2009年）。這加劇了全球的產(chǎn)能過剩，并導(dǎo)致中國某些行業(yè)的商品，特別是鋼材，在世界市場上引起傾銷。因此，政府的持續(xù)努力以操縱利率，這種行為的一個重要受害者是中國國有企業(yè)的全球競爭者。

第三篇：畢業(yè)論文英文文獻總結(jié)《品牌》

畢業(yè)論文中英翻譯

Brand

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20051235 Concepts Some people distinguish the psychological aspect of a brand from the experiential aspect.The experiential aspect consists of the sum of all points of contact with the brand and is known as the brand experience.The psychological aspect, sometimes referred to as the brand image, is a symbolic construct created within the minds of people and consists of all the information and expectations associated with a product or service.People engaged in branding seek to develop or align the expectations behind the brand experience(see also brand promise), creating the impression that a brand associated with a product or service has certain qualities or characteristics that make it special or unique.A brand is therefore one of the most valuable elements in an advertising theme, as it demonstrates what the brand owner is able to offer in the marketplace.The art of creating and maintaining a brand is called brand management.Careful brand management, supported by a cleverly crafted advertising campaign, can be highly successful in convincing consumers to pay remarkably high prices for products which are inherently extremely cheap to make.This concept, known as creating value, essentially consists of manipulating the projected image of the product so that that the consumer sees the product as being worth the amount that the advertiser wants him/her to see, rather than a more logical valuation that comprises an aggregate of the cost of raw materials, plus the cost of manufacture, plus the cost of distribution.Modern value-creation branding-and-advertising campaigns are highly successful at inducing consumers to pay, for example, 50 dollars for a T-shirt that cost a mere 50 cents to make, or 5 dollars for a box of breakfast cereal that contains a few cents' worth of wheat.A brand which is widely known in the marketplace acquires brand recognition.When brand recognition builds up to a point where a brand enjoys a critical mass of positive sentiment in the marketplace, it is said to have achieved brand franchise.One goal in brand recognition is the identification of a brand without the name of the company present.For example, Disney has been successful at branding with their particular script font(originally created for Walt Disney's “signature” logo), which it used in the logo for go.com.Consumers may look on branding as an important value added aspect of products or services, as it often serves to denote a certain attractive quality or characteristic(see also brand promise).From the perspective of brand owners, branded products or services also command higher prices.Where two products resemble each other, but one of the products has no associated branding(such as a generic, store-branded product), people may often select the more expensive branded product on the basis of the quality of the brand or the reputation of the brand owner.Brand name The brand name is often used interchangeably within “brand”, although it is more correctly used to specifically denote written or spoken linguistic elements of any product.In this context a “brand name” constitutes a type of trademark, if the brand name exclusively identifies the brand owner as the commercial source of products or services.A brand owner may seek to protect proprietary rights in relation to a brand name through trademark registration.Advertising spokespersons have also become part of some brands, for example: Mr.Whipple of Charmin toilet tissue and Tony the Tiger of Kellogg's.The act of associating a product or service with a brand has become part of pop culture.Most products have some kind of brand identity, from common table salt to designer jeans.A brandnomer is a brand name that has colloquially become a generic term for a product or service, such as Band-Aid or Kleenex, which are often used to describe any kind of adhesive bandage or any kind of facial tissue respectively.Brand identity How the brand owner wants the consumer to perceive the brandHoward Schultz(president, ceo and chairman of Starbucks “No-brand” branding Recently a number of companies have successfully pursued “No-Brand” strategies, examples include the Japanese company Muji, which means “No label, quality goods” in English.Although there is a distinct Muji brand, Muji products are not branded.This no-brand strategy means that little is spent on advertisement or classical marketing and Muji's success is attributed to the word-of-mouth, a simple shopping experience and the anti-brand movement.Another brand which is thought to follow a no-brand strategy is American Apparel, which like Muji, does not brand its products.[3] [4] [5]

Derived brands In this case the supplier of a key component, used by a number of suppliers of the end-product, may wish to guarantee its own position by promoting that component as a brand in its own right.The most frequently quoted example is Intel, which secures its position in the PC market with the slogan “Intel Inside”.Brand extension The existing strong brand name can be used as a vehicle for new or modified products;for example, many fashion and designer companies extended brands into fragrances, shoes and accessories, home textile, home decor, luggage,(sun-)glasses, furniture, hotels, etc.Mars extended its brand to ice cream, Caterpillar to shoes and watches, Michelin to a restaurant guide, Adidas and Puma to personal hygiene.Dunlop extended its brand from tires to other rubber products such as shoes, golf balls, tennis racquets and adhesives.There is a difference between brand extension and line extension.When Coca-Cola launched “Diet Coke” and “Cherry Coke” they stayed within the originating product category: non-alcoholic carbonated beverages.Procter & Gamble(P&G)did likewise extending its strong lines(such as Fairy Soap)into neighboring products(Fairy Liquid and Fairy Automatic)within the same category, dish washing detergents.Multi-brands Alternatively, in a market that is fragmented amongst a number of brands a supplier can choose deliberately to launch totally new brands in apparent competition with its own existing strong brand(and often with identical product characteristics);simply to soak up some of the share of the market which will in any case go to minor brands.The rationale is that having 3 out of 12 brands in such a market will give a greater overall share than having 1 out of 10(even if much of the share of these new brands is taken from the existing one).In its most extreme manifestation, a supplier pioneering a new market which it believes will be particularly attractive may choose immediately to launch a second brand in competition with its first, in order to pre-empt others entering the market.Individual brand names naturally allow greater flexibility by permitting a variety of different products, of differing quality, to be sold without confusing the consumer's perception of what business the company is in or diluting higher quality products.Once again, Procter & Gamble is a leading exponent of this philosophy, running as many as ten detergent brands in the US market.This also increases the total number of “facings” it receives on supermarket shelves.Sara Lee, on the other hand, uses it to keep the very different parts of the business separate — from Sara Lee cakes through Kiwi polishes to L'Eggs pantyhose.In the hotel business, Marriott uses the name Fairfield Inns for its budget chain(and Ramada uses Rodeway for its own cheaper hotels).Cannibalization is a particular problem of a “multibrand” approach, in which the new brand takes business away from an established one which the organization also owns.This may be acceptable(indeed to be expected)if there is a net gain overall.Alternatively, it may be the price the organization is willing to pay for shifting its position in the market;the new product being one stage in this process

畢業(yè)論文英文翻譯

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一、概念

（一）、概念

一些人區(qū)別一種品牌的心理是來自經(jīng)驗方面。經(jīng)驗方面包括來自其它本身已知的各種品牌經(jīng)驗的總和。在心理方面，一些如涉及到商標圖像，就是一種在人的頭腦內(nèi)被創(chuàng)造和形成的包括所有由符號、信息、期望以及產(chǎn)品服務(wù)等的關(guān)于一種符號的修建。

人們參與品牌化目的是為尋求開發(fā)或者排列在品牌經(jīng)驗之后的期望（參見品牌諾言）。創(chuàng)造這樣一種印象，一個品牌的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)以及相關(guān)的某些質(zhì)量或特征可以使品牌具有特別或獨特的印象。因此品牌是其中一個在一個廣告的題材中最可貴的元素，同時它又是一個品牌擁有者在市場中所要展示的重要元素。創(chuàng)造和維護品牌的藝術(shù)稱為“單項產(chǎn)品管理”。

詳細的“單項產(chǎn)品管理”是由非常聰明并且成功的廣告戰(zhàn)略所支持。而這種廣告戰(zhàn)略就是在產(chǎn)品極其高的價格和極端低廉的產(chǎn)品成本中使消費者信服產(chǎn)品的本質(zhì)。這個概念，叫做“創(chuàng)造價值”，本質(zhì)上包括操作產(chǎn)品的投影圖象以便消費者所看見的商品是廣告商希望他或者她所期望的購買價格。而不是包括各種材料的費用，加上制造的費用，再加上推銷成本等更加邏輯的估價?，F(xiàn)代價值創(chuàng)作，品牌化和廣告化的競爭是非常成功在誘導(dǎo)消費者消費，例如，市場價值是50美元的T恤杉，而它的制作成本僅僅只有50美分；由麥子制成的谷物早餐，它的售價在5美元左右，而它的制作成本僅僅只有幾美分而已。

一種品牌成功是通過市場的廣泛熟知來獲得市場的公認的。當品牌公認加強了這個品牌在市場上享受正面情緒臨界質(zhì)量的這一點時，這時就可以說達到了“品牌特權(quán)”。品牌公認的一個目標是目前在即使沒有公司名字的情況下也可以使品牌得到證明。例如，迪斯尼就曾成功的品牌化了他們的特殊劇本字體(最初創(chuàng)造為華特.迪斯尼的“署名”商標)，它在商標上使用為“go.com”。

消費者也許把品牌化看作為產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的一個重要增值方面，因為它經(jīng)常表示代表某一種具有吸引力的質(zhì)量或特征的服務(wù)(也參見品牌諾言)。從品牌所有者的角度上說，被品牌化的產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)也控制在更高的價格上。這就相當于倆個可替代產(chǎn)品，但其中一個產(chǎn)品沒有伴生品牌化（例如普通，年代久遠的商品）。人們也許經(jīng)常會根據(jù)品牌的質(zhì)量或品牌所有者的信譽選擇高價品種的產(chǎn)品。

（二）、品牌的名稱

品牌的名稱經(jīng)常被用在可交換的“品牌”中，雖然它恰當?shù)乇挥糜诿鞔_地表示所有產(chǎn)品的書面或講話的語言元素中。在上下文中，如果品牌的名稱可以用來完全辨認品牌所有者作為產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的商業(yè)來源的話，那么 “品牌的名稱”也就構(gòu)成了商標的類型。品牌的所有者可以通過商標注冊來尋求保護關(guān)于品牌名稱的所有權(quán)。為某些品牌做廣告代言的人也可以成為品牌名稱的一部分，例如：“Charmin衛(wèi)生紙”的Whipple先生、“凱洛格的老虎”的托尼先生。

同一種產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的組合銷售可以使一個品牌變成流行文化的一部分。大多數(shù)產(chǎn)品都有某種品牌的身份。例如普通的食用鹽到服裝設(shè)計師設(shè)計的牛仔褲?？谡Z化的品牌的名稱成為了一般的術(shù)語從而代表了某一項產(chǎn)品或者服務(wù)。例如：“護創(chuàng)膠布”(商標名)或者“克里內(nèi)克斯”紙巾(商標名)，分別常用來描述任何黏著性繃帶或任何面巾紙。

（三）、品牌身份

品牌的所有者必須要知道怎么引領(lǐng)消費者察覺該品牌和該品牌化的公司、組織、產(chǎn)品或者服務(wù)。品牌所有者將尋求縮小商標圖象和品牌身份之間的差距。品牌的身份對于消費者的公認和區(qū)別競爭者的不同的商標是根本的也是必須的。

二、品牌化的方法

（一）、公司的名稱

通常，尤其是在工業(yè)部門，這樣的公司名稱是需要被宣傳的（舉一個最具說明力的例子說明，當IBM公司走下坡路時，它們的宣傳標語就是“沒人會因為買IBM的產(chǎn)品而被解雇”）。

在這種情況下一個非常強勢的品牌名稱（或者公司名字）被用做一定范圍內(nèi)產(chǎn)品的宣傳工具（例如，“梅塞德斯-奔馳”或者美國最大的電工工具大廠“Black & Decker”）或者是一系列品牌的輔助工具（比如美國的“吉百利牛奶”、“吉百利玉米片”、“吉百利手套”）。

（二）、單一品牌策略

每一品牌有一個單獨的名字（比如，美國百事公司的“七喜”、德國拜爾斯道夫公司的“妮維雅防曬霜”），對于同一個公司甚至還會有相互競爭的不同品牌的同類產(chǎn)品（比如，聯(lián)合利華的“寶絲”洗衣粉、“奧妙”、“Surf”和“Lynx”）。

（三）、品牌化的態(tài)度

消費者對品牌化的態(tài)度是代表了對一種更好感覺的選擇，尤其是當產(chǎn)品或者產(chǎn)品用量之間沒有必然聯(lián)系的時候。品牌化的態(tài)度營銷包括：美國的“耐克”、“星巴克”、英國的“美體小鋪”、澳大利亞的“safeway”超市、美國的“蘋果電腦”。在2000本關(guān)于營銷的書籍中沒有商標品牌的品牌化態(tài)度營銷被描述為“迷信戰(zhàn)略”。

“一個偉大品牌的延伸，使它變的更加巨大、更具有目的性、吸收著更多的經(jīng)驗，它是否在挑戰(zhàn)你的健康，又或者在影響你對一杯咖啡的態(tài)度呢？”霍華德·舒爾茨（美國星巴克創(chuàng)始人）。

（四）、沒有品牌的品牌化策略

最近很多家公司成功地使用了“無品牌”戰(zhàn)略，其中的例子包括日本的“無印良品”集團，它們的產(chǎn)品就沒有標簽甚至是關(guān)于產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量保證。雖然在產(chǎn)品上有一個標有“無印良品”集團的標簽，但是“無印良品”集團的產(chǎn)品仍然是沒有任何品牌宣傳的。這種“無品牌戰(zhàn)略”意味著在廣告方面或者傳統(tǒng)營銷方面的花費幾乎為零并且“無印良品”集團的成功僅僅歸因于口頭表達，簡單的說就是通過消費者的一種簡單的購物經(jīng)驗和反品牌運動來實現(xiàn)成功的。另一個也同樣采用“無品牌”戰(zhàn)略的公司是美國的“American Apparel”服裝公司，它同日本的“無印良品”集團一樣，同樣在自己產(chǎn)品上不加任何商標和品牌化宣傳。

（五）、品牌的獲得

在這種情形下，一個關(guān)鍵部件的供應(yīng)商為了制造完整商品使用了多個其它供應(yīng)商的部件，供應(yīng)商可能希望產(chǎn)品因為使用了自己的核心部件而確保自己作為品牌的位置。最常見的例子就要屬英特爾公司了，在個人電腦的市場上“英特爾”電腦常常被稱為“電腦里面的英特爾”。品牌延伸

現(xiàn)有強勢的品牌名稱可以被用來作為一件新產(chǎn)品或者改進后產(chǎn)品的宣傳工具，例如，許多追隨流行時尚的服裝設(shè)計公司將自己的品牌擴展到香水、鞋、女士用品、家用紡織品、家用裝飾品、行李包、太陽眼鏡、家具、賓館用具、帽子等等。英國的“火星”公司也擴大了它對冰淇凌的品牌，還有美國“卡特彼勒”集團的手表和鞋子、“米其林”集團的飯店旅游指南、“阿迪達斯”公司和“標馬”公司的個人保健學(xué)等等。英國的“鄧祿普”體育用品公司對它旗下的產(chǎn)品的品牌也同樣擴大到了其他橡膠產(chǎn)品上，比如鞋、高爾夫球、網(wǎng)球球拍和球拍膠粘劑等。

品牌的延伸也存在橫向和縱向的延伸。當可口可樂公司推出了“特殊飲食碳酸”飲料和“櫻桃碳酸”飲料時，在橫向同類產(chǎn)品上又推出了“非酒精碳酸化合”飲料?！皩殱崱惫咀隽送瑯油瞥隽藱M向品牌延伸的產(chǎn)品（比如“花仙子”香皂），還有其他同類產(chǎn)品（“花仙子”洗滌液、“花 仙子”洗衣粉）。

（六）、多品牌策略

在二者選一情況下，在被分割的市場的一定數(shù)量的品牌之中，生產(chǎn)商為了讓自己的產(chǎn)品品牌在市場上更有利銷售，故意推出多種同類產(chǎn)品品牌在市場上相互競爭（并且經(jīng)常與自己旗下?lián)碛泄餐卣髌渌放频漠a(chǎn)品進行競爭），目的是為了占有更多的市場份額。這種多品牌策略的基礎(chǔ)可以解釋為在某個市場上12個品牌商品的競爭中生產(chǎn)商占有3個品牌比生產(chǎn)商在某個市場上10個品牌商品的競爭中生產(chǎn)商占有1個品牌商品更能多的占有市場份額（即使采用的多品牌在市場中僅僅只有一個能被市場接納）。在最極端的說明下，一個生產(chǎn)商可能為了能在新產(chǎn)品市場下占有更多的市場份額而推出第一種新產(chǎn)品后馬上就會推出第二種同類新產(chǎn)品進入市場。

各自品牌的名稱可以更靈活使用在不同種類、不同質(zhì)量的商品上?？梢凿N售給對產(chǎn)品需求有針對性的消費者。

再次，“寶潔”公司就是這種多品牌策略的典型代表，在美國“寶潔”公司有多達十幾種品牌的洗滌用品活躍在市場上。這也增加“寶潔”公司在超級市場的售貨架上接受“飾面的”的總數(shù)。美國的“莎莉”集團，在其他方面，運用多品牌策略在自己旗下的各種產(chǎn)品上，如在賓館住宿業(yè)的“莎莉”集團的蛋糕，到L'Eggs的褲襪。“萬豪”國際集團命名了“Fairfield”這樣一個連鎖賓館（“萬豪”國際集團并且還擁有對消費者消費更加便宜的“Ramada”連鎖旅店）。

“自損”是“大型多品牌通路”方法中一個特殊問題。一個新品牌的確立需要遠離已經(jīng)確定品牌市場規(guī)則和企業(yè)運作模式的品牌方式從而重新建立一套屬于自己的新規(guī)則和新運作模式。這是可接受的（而且也是可期望的），如果對整體有利，二者擇一的，“自損”也可以是企業(yè)愿意支付轉(zhuǎn)移它在市場上的位置所需的費用。這是一種新產(chǎn)品推出時所必須經(jīng)歷的階段。

第四篇：9.畢業(yè)論文英文文獻翻譯

Audit Office Size, Audit Quality, and AuditPricing Jong-Hag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, Jeong-Bon Kim, and YoonseokZang SUMMARY: Using a large sample of U.S.audit client firms over the period 2000–2005,this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within anaudit firmhereafter, office size is a significant, engagement-specific factor determiningaudit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level andauditor industry leadership at the city or office level.For our empirical tests, audit qualityis measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in twodifferent ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the otherbased on a total of audit fees earned by each office.Our results show that the officesize has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even aftercontrolling for national-level audit firm size and office-level industry expertise.Thesepositive relations support the view that large local offices provide higher-quality auditscompared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in themarket for audit services.Keywords:audit office;office size;audit quality;audit pricing.Data Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identified in the paper.The way we think about an accounting firm changes dramatically when we shift the unit of analysisaway from the firm as a whole, to the analysis of specific city-based offices within a firm.In termsof DeAngelo’s1981b argument, a Big 4 accounting firm is not so big when we shift to theofficelevel of analysis.For example, while Enron represented less than 2 percent of Arthur Ander-sen’s national revenues from publicly listed clients, it was more than 35 percent of such revenues in the Houston office.INTRODUCTION

As alluded to in the above quote, the size of a city-based audit engagement office could bea more crucial determinant of audit quality and thus audit feesthan the size of anational-level audit firm because the city-based office is a semi-autonomous unit withinan audit firm with its own client base.It is an office-based engagement partner or audit team, notnational headquarters, who actually administers and implements individual audit engagement con-tracts, including the delivery of audit services and the issuance of an audit opinion.In this regard,Wallman(1996)and Francis(2004)argue that the assessment of auditor independence needs tofocus more on the individual office level rather than the entire firm level because most of the auditdecisions with respect to a particular client are made within each individual office.The anecdotalevidence on the collapse of Enron, which was audited by the Houston office of Arthur Andersen,is a good example that demonstrates the importance of office-level audit quality.However, much of extant audit research has focused its attention on two national-level audit firm characteristics asfundamental determinants of audit quality, namely: audit firm size(e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987;Becker et al.1998;Francis and Krishnan 1999;Kim et al.2003;Choi and Doogar 2005), andauditor industry leadership(e.g., DeFond et al.2000;Balsam et al.2003;Krishnan 2005).These studies find, in general, that large audit firms with international brand names(i.e., Big4 auditors)or industry expertise provide higher-quality audit services than small audit firms which lack such brand names or industry expertise.Implicit in this line of research is the assumptionthat audit quality is homogeneous across offices of various sizes located in different cities withinthe same audit firm.As a result, we have little evidence on cross-office differences in audit quality,and in particular, whether and how the size of a local engagement office has an impact on auditquality and/or audit pricing.A natural question

to

ask

is:

Is

the

office

size

an additionalengagement-specific factor determining audit quality and thus audit pricing over and beyond auditfirm size and industry leadership? We aim to provide direct evidence on this unexplored question.Several recent studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that audit quality may differacross different engagement offices within an audit firm.For example, in the first U.S.study thatuses each engagement office as the unit of analysis, Reynolds and Francis(2000, 375)find thatwhen client size is measured at the office level using office-specific clienteles, “Big 5 auditorsreport

more

conservatively

for

larger clients.”Further,Ferguson et al.(2003)and Francis et al.(2005)find that city-specific, office-level industry leadership, when combined with the national-level leadership, generates the highest audit fee premiums and thus, by inference, higher auditquality in the Australian and U.S.audit markets, respectively, while national-level industry lead-ership alone has no effect.Subsequently, Francis et al.(2006)document that client earningsquality proxied by abnormal accruals is higher when auditors are city-level industry leaders alone,or they are both city-level and national-level industry leaders.Put differently, their results indicatethat national-level industry leadership alone has no significant impact on audit quality.Morerecently, Choi et al.(2007)show that the geographical proximity of the city-based engagementoffice to clients’ headquarters is positively associated with the accrual quality of clients, suggest-ing that the geographical location of the auditor’s office is an important engagement-specificdeterminant of audit quality.The above findings, taken together, suggest that city-based, office-level characteristics may play an important role in determining audit quality and thus audit pricing.It should be pointed out, however, that none of these studies has paid attention to the question ofwhether the size of a local engagement office is systematically associated with audit quality andfees paid to auditors.To bridge this gap in our knowledge, we investigate a hitherto under-researched question ofwhether, and how, the size of a local engagement office hereafter, office sizeis associated withaudit quality and audit pricing.We first hypothesize that office size is systematically associatedwith audit quality even after controlling for audit firm size at the national level and auditorindustry expertise at the office level.As will be further elaborated in the next section, one would observe a positive association if the audits by large offices are of higher quality than the audits bysmall offices.Second, we also examine the association between the office size and audit fees.Previous research shows that audit quality is priced in the market(Choi et al.2008;Craswell et al.1995;Ferguson et al.2003;Francis et al.2005).To the extent that the office size is positivelyassociated with audit quality, one can predict that the larger is the office size, the higher is theaudit quality, and thus the greater is the audit fee.Therefore, a positive association between theoffice size and audit fees could be viewed as evidence corroborating the positive associationbetween the office size and audit quality.In testing our hypotheses, we assert that biased earnings reporting can be used to drawinferences about audit quality, and we use the magnitude of abnormal accruals as a proxy for auditquality.To measure abnormal accruals, we rely on two alternative models developed by Ball andShivakumar(2006)and Kothari et al.(2005).In addition, we estimate the size of a local engage-ment office using the Audit Analytics database, which provides the identity of audit engagementoffices for all SEC registrant clients.We measure office size in two different ways: one based onthe number of audit clients in each office, and the other based on a total of audit fees earned byeach office.Briefly, our results reveal that in the U.S.audit market, both audit quality and audit fees arepositively associated with office size after controlling for audit firm size at the national levelproxied by a Big 4 dummy variable , industry leadership at the local office level proxied by anindustry specialist dummy variable), and other relevant factors.These results are robust to abattery of sensitivity checks we perform.Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.First, our paper is one of fewstudies which document that audit quality is not homogeneous across local offices within an auditfirm.To our knowledge, our paper is one of the first studies that provide direct evidence that thesize of an

audit

engagement

office

is

an

important engagement-specific determinant of auditquality in the U.S.The results of our study suggest that future research on audit quality differentiation needs to pay more attention to office-level auditor behavior as the unit of analysis and tothe size of a local engagement office.Second, this paper is the first to consider office size as acritical factor in audit pricing.Given that no previous research has examined whether audit feesare influenced by the size of a local office, our evidence helps us better understand the nature ofauditor-client relationships in the context of audit pricing.Finally, the findings in this study provide both regulators and practitioners with useful insightsinto what determines audit quality and thus audit fees.Our results suggest that regulators wouldhave a better assessment of audit quality if they shift the level of quality comparison to smallversus large auditors at the office level, and away from Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors at thenational level.Economic theory on quality premiums claims that producing goods and services ofa uniform quality for various markets and consumers over time is crucial for maintaining qualitypremiums(e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981;Kreps and Wilson 1982;Shapiro 1983).Similarly, ourevidence suggests that large, Big 4 auditors should take care to maintain a similar level of auditquality across offices of different sizes because a systematically poor-quality audit service per-formed by a local office could potentially cause damage to the reputation for the entire audit firm.HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Office Size and Audit Quality A growing body of audit research emphasizes the importance of analyzing the behavior ofauditors in city-based, local engagement offices.However, none of these studies has paid atten-tion to the size of a local office in the context of audit quality.Why does the office size matter inaudit quality over and beyond two well-known audit firm characteristics, i.e., audit firm size orbrand name(Big 4 versus non-Big 4)and industry expertise? In DeAngelo’s(1981b)framework, an auditor’s incentive to compromise audit quality withrespect to a particular client depends on the economic importance of the client relative to theauditor’s client portfolio.Her analysis indicates that large auditors are likely to provide higher-quality audit services to a particular client than small auditors because an auditor’s economicdependence on that client is negligible for large auditors, and large auditors have more to lose(i.e.,bear higher reputation loss)in case of audit failures, compared with small auditors.DeAngelo’s(1981b)theory can also be applied to the analysis of audit quality differentiationbetween large versus small offices, because a local engagement office can be viewed as a semi-autonomous unit in terms of its audit decisions, client base, revenue sources, and other factors(Francis 2004;Francis et al.2006;Wallman 1996).Large local offices are less likely to depend ona particular client than small local offices because the former have deeper office-level clientelesand thus are less economically dependent on a particular client.In other words, large offices areless likely to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard reporting than small offices.Further, local offices, whether small or large, may not bear the full amount of reputationlosses associated with an audit failure because a substantial portion of the reputation losses arelikely borne by the national-level audit firm itself.While the reputation losses in the event of auditfailures are likely to be greater for large audit firms(DeAngelo1981b), the losses are not necessarily greater for large local offices than for small local offices, because these costs are morefirm-wide in nature rather than office-specific.This means that local offices may be more concerned with the economic importance of a particular client than a potential litigation risk fromaudit failures, in particular, when the offices are small in size.The above arguments lead us topredict that large local offices with relatively deep local clienteles are less likely to compromise audit quality with respect to a particular client, and thus that they are likely to provide higher-quality audit services, ceteris paribus, compared with small local offices with relatively thin localclienteles.In such a case, one would observe a positive association between office size and auditquality.We call this prediction the economic dependence perspective.SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS While previous auditing research has examined whether and how audit fees and audit qualityare influenced by audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at both thenational level and the city level, this line of research has paid little attention to the effect of thesize of a local engagement office within an audit firm(i.e., office size)in the context of auditquality and audit pricing.Unlike previous research, the focus of this paper is on whether the officesize is an additional, engagement-specific factor determining audit quality and audit pricing overand beyond national-level audit firm size and office-level industry leadership.Our results can besummarized as follows.First, we find that the office size is positively associated with audit quality proxied by un-signed abnormal accruals.Our finding is consistent with what we call the economic dependenceperspective: large(small)local offices with deep office-level clienteles are less(more)likely to depend on a particular client, and thus are better(less)able to resist client pressure on substandardor biased reporting.Second, we find that large local offices are able to charge higher audit fees totheir clients than small ones, which is consistent with the view that large offices provide higher-quality audits than small offices, and this quality differential is priced as a fee premium in themarket for audit services.However, the above finding is at odds with the view that large officeshave a cost advantage in producing audit services of similar quality and thus are able to chargelower billing rates compared with small offices.Taken together, our results highlight that officesize is one of the most important engagement-specific determinants of audit quality and auditpricing.Last, while we use two alternative, advanced accrual models to alleviate a concern overthe limitations inherent in the Jones(1991)model estimates of abnormal accruals, our measures ofaudit quality, namely unsigned abnormal accruals, may suffer from nontrivial measurement errors.We therefore cannot completely rule out the possibility that the estimated coefficients on our testvariables are biased.However, given that a contemporaneous study of Francis and Yu(2009)documents the same positive association between audit quality and audit office size using twoadditional proxies for audit quality, i.e., auditors’ tendency to issue going-concern opinion andclient firms’ likelihood to meet earnings benchmarks, we believe that our results are unlikelydriven by possible measurement errors.Overall, our results suggest that both regulators and audit firms should pay more attention tothe behavior of small offices because they are more likely to be economically dependent on aparticular client, and thus to compromise audit quality.In particular, Big 4 audit firms may need toimplement strategies for providing a more homogenous level of audit services across offices ofdifferent sizes because a poor-quality audit by a small office could significantly damage thereputation of the entire firm.In today’s global business environment, the issue of maintaining“uniform quality” should be an even more important concern to reputable auditors because theirbusiness becomes increasingly internationalized in terms of locations and client profiles.Forexample, it may be more difficult for Big 4 audit firms to maintain uniform quality of service atthe office level across different jurisdictions around the world.Further, local offices in differentjurisdictions(e.g., European Union and China)have their own client bases and are likely to bemore autonomous in making audit-related decisions than those within the U.S.It is thereforepossible that the size of a local practicing office plays a more significant role in determining thequality of audit services in other non-U.S.jurisdictions than in the U.S.Given the scarcity ofinternational evidence regarding the effect of audit office size on audit quality and audit pricing,we recommend further research on the issue using international samples from different jurisdic-tions.審計辦事處規(guī)模，審計質(zhì)量與審計定價

Jong-Hag Choi, Chansog(Francis)Kim, Jeong-Bon Kim, and YoonseokZang 摘要：此論文使用2000-2005年間對美國審計事務(wù)所大量取樣的所得數(shù)據(jù)，以此調(diào)查審計事務(wù)所中當?shù)剞k事處規(guī)模大小對審計質(zhì)量和審計價格。實證檢驗中，審計質(zhì)量是由異常應(yīng)計來衡量的，辦事處規(guī)模則有兩種衡量方法：一個是基于每個辦事處的審計客戶數(shù)量，另一個是基于每個辦事處掙得的審計費用總額。調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，辦事處規(guī)模大小對審計質(zhì)量與審計費用都有著明顯的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，即使控制了國家級審計公司的規(guī)模以及辦公水平行業(yè)，結(jié)果也是如此。這正相關(guān)關(guān)系印證了規(guī)模大的本土辦事處相對規(guī)模小的辦事處來說，能過提供更高質(zhì)量的審計。質(zhì)量上的差異在審計市場中有價碼的差別。關(guān)鍵字：審計事務(wù)所，辦事處規(guī)模，審計質(zhì)量，審計定價 數(shù)據(jù)可用性：數(shù)據(jù)皆為公開可用，論文中有指明數(shù)據(jù)來源。

當我們把對事務(wù)所整體的分析轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閷μ囟ǖ某鞘兄械霓k事處的分析時，我們對審計事務(wù)所的看法同時也有了劇烈的變化。根據(jù)迪安哥羅在1981年的論證，當分析辦事處規(guī)模時，四大會計師事務(wù)時也就沒有那么大了。舉例來說，如果安然公司代表安達信會計事務(wù)所上市客戶小于2%的收入，那他代表的就是休斯敦辦事處大于35%的利潤。

簡介

正如前文所說，相對于國家級辦事處來說，市級審計辦事處的規(guī)模對審計質(zhì)量有著更為重要的決定作用。因為市級辦事處是半自治的單位，在審計公司中有他專屬的客戶群。真正管理和執(zhí)行審計委托合同（包括審計服務(wù)的交付和審核意見的發(fā)表）的并不是全國總部，而是辦事處合作伙伴。就這點而言，威廉與弗蘭西斯提出觀點，審計獨立性的評估需要更多地關(guān)注辦事處的程度而不是整體公司的程度。因為特定客戶的大多數(shù)的審計決定都是由單獨的辦事處制定的。由安達信會計師事務(wù)所休斯敦辦事處所審計的安然集團的倒閉便是一個很好的例子，證明辦事處級別的審計質(zhì)量的重要性之高。然而，現(xiàn)在許多審計研究都把焦點集中于國家級審計公司的特點，認為兩個審計質(zhì)量基本的決定性因素是審計公司規(guī)模和審計行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。

研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，一般而言，擁有國際知名商標的大審計公司（比如四大）或是有行業(yè)專長的公司比非有名及缺乏行業(yè)專長的小公司擁有更高質(zhì)量的審計服務(wù)。這個研究隱含的假設(shè)是同一公司在不同城市的不同規(guī)模的辦事處的審計質(zhì)量是平均的。因此，我們幾乎沒有收集到不同辦事處的審計質(zhì)量的差別，特別是本土辦事處的規(guī)模是否影響到審計質(zhì)量或是審計定價。所以有一個問題：辦事處規(guī)模是不是決定審計質(zhì)量的另一個因素因此審計定價比審計公司規(guī)模和行業(yè)領(lǐng)先地位的高。我們只在為這個還沒解決的問題提供直接的證據(jù)。最近有幾項研究都提供直接證據(jù)證明同一公司的不同辦事處的審計質(zhì)量有所不同。例如，最初美國的雷諾和弗朗西斯使用單獨的辦事處作為研究的單位，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)當用具體辦事處的客戶來衡量客戶規(guī)模時，“五大審計師對大客戶更為謹慎?！贝送猓ジ裆透ダ饰魉沟劝l(fā)現(xiàn)，在澳大利亞和美國審計市場中，當市級行業(yè)領(lǐng)先水平與國家級領(lǐng)先水平聯(lián)合時，審計收費是最高的。而單獨國家級行業(yè)領(lǐng)先水平則沒有這樣的效果。隨后，弗朗西斯等證實如果審計師是市級行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者或同時為國家級與市級領(lǐng)導(dǎo)水平時，非正常應(yīng)計所代理的客戶收益相對較高。換句話說，研究結(jié)果表明單獨的國家級領(lǐng)先水平對審計質(zhì)量沒有特別顯著的影響。最近，崔等人指出辦事處與總部的地理集中程度和客戶的應(yīng)計質(zhì)量成正相關(guān)，說明審計辦事處的地理位置對審計質(zhì)量是有決定性影響的。整合以上的發(fā)現(xiàn)，說明本地辦事處規(guī)模對審計質(zhì)量以及審計定價的決定起很重要的作用。這里需要指出的是，盡管如此，卻沒有研究者關(guān)注過本地辦事處的規(guī)模是否與審計質(zhì)量以及審計收費有系統(tǒng)性聯(lián)系這個問題。

為了填補這一知識空缺，我們決定調(diào)查這個迄今還未被研究過的問題，即辦事處規(guī)模是否與審計質(zhì)量和定價有關(guān)系以及如何聯(lián)系。首先我們假設(shè)辦事處規(guī)模與審計質(zhì)量有系統(tǒng)性關(guān)聯(lián)，即使控制了國家標準的審計公司規(guī)模和行業(yè)專長這兩個變量。如果大公司的審計質(zhì)量比小公司高，則說明是正相關(guān)關(guān)聯(lián)，這我們在下文會做進一步闡述。接著，我們還檢驗了辦事處規(guī)模與審計定價之間的關(guān)系。之前有研究指出審計質(zhì)量在市場上被標價。辦事處規(guī)模與審計質(zhì)量正相關(guān)，以此來看，我們可以推測，辦事處規(guī)模越大，審計質(zhì)量越高，因此審計費用也會越多。所以，我們可以由辦事處規(guī)模和審計定價的正相關(guān)關(guān)系推出辦事處規(guī)模和審計質(zhì)量的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。

為了檢驗之前的假設(shè)，我們用有偏向性的收益報告來作關(guān)于審計質(zhì)量的推論，另外我們用非正常應(yīng)計的級數(shù)來代表審計質(zhì)量。衡量非正常應(yīng)計時，我們使用由保爾和庫瑪和科薩里等人開發(fā)的兩個備擇模型。此外，我們用審計分析數(shù)據(jù)庫來估量本地辦事處的規(guī)模，此數(shù)據(jù)庫為美國證券交易委員會注冊的客戶提供審計辦事處的身份認證。

衡量辦事處規(guī)模大小的方法有多種，一種是基于每個辦事處的審計客戶數(shù)量，另一種是基于每個辦事處所掙得的審計費用。

簡單來說，研究結(jié)果指出在美國的審計市場，（控制審計公司規(guī)模為國家標準，行業(yè)領(lǐng)先水準為國家標準以及其他相關(guān)因素）審計質(zhì)量和審計費用都與辦事處規(guī)模呈正相關(guān)。這樣的結(jié)果與我們所做的一連串靈敏度測試一致。

我們的研究完善了現(xiàn)存的文獻，體現(xiàn)在幾方面。第一，該論文論證了同一審計公司的不同辦事處的審計質(zhì)量并不是相同的。就我們所知，在美國，我們的論文是最先有直接證據(jù)證明審計辦事處的規(guī)模是決定審計質(zhì)量的重要因素。研究結(jié)果指出，今后有關(guān)審計質(zhì)量差異的研究應(yīng)多關(guān)注辦事處審計師行為以及本地辦事處的規(guī)模。其次，本文最先提出辦事處規(guī)模是影響審計定價的關(guān)鍵因素。先前從未有研究驗證審計費用是否被本地辦事處規(guī)模所影響，我們的證據(jù)可以讓人們更好地了解在審計定價下審計師與客戶的關(guān)系。

最后，該研究結(jié)果為調(diào)查者和從業(yè)者提供了實用的關(guān)于審計質(zhì)量和審計定價的見解。我們的研究結(jié)果建議調(diào)查者如果把質(zhì)量等級比較改為大小公司審計員之分的比較，則該有一個更好的對于審計質(zhì)量的評估。質(zhì)量溢價的經(jīng)濟理論要求為不同的市場提供統(tǒng)一質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)，消費者始終是維持質(zhì)量溢價的關(guān)鍵。同樣的，我們的證據(jù)顯示，四大會計師行應(yīng)該在不同規(guī)模的辦事處維持相近水準的審計質(zhì)量，因為一個當?shù)剞k事處所犯的系統(tǒng)性低質(zhì)量的服務(wù)錯誤能導(dǎo)致整個審計公司的名譽損失。

假說發(fā)展

越來越多的審計調(diào)查強調(diào)在本地公司或當?shù)剞k事處工作的審計師的分析行為的重要性。但是，卻沒有一份調(diào)查是關(guān)注當?shù)剞k事處規(guī)模大小背景下的審計質(zhì)量。為什么公司規(guī)模對審計質(zhì)量的影響超過另外兩種著名審計公司的特征，也就是審計公司的品牌（四大和非四大）和工業(yè)的專門技能。

在迪安哥拉的體系中，一個審計師的動機對于審計質(zhì)量的妥協(xié)是關(guān)于個別客戶的經(jīng)濟意義決定并且和審計師的客戶的投資組合有關(guān)。他的分析指出高級審計師比低級審計師更傾向于提供更高質(zhì)量的審計服務(wù)給個別客戶。因為對于審計師來說，他的經(jīng)濟觀受客戶的影響是可以忽略不計的，還有相比于低級審計師來說，高級審計師有更多可以去輸（比方說，承受更高榮譽的損失）以防審計失誤。迪安哥拉的理論還可以應(yīng)用于造成大公司和小公司之間的審計質(zhì)量的不同。因為當?shù)氐膶徲嫻靖鶕?jù)它的審計決定，客戶群，收入來源還有其它事實可以看做是一個半自治的聯(lián)盟。大的審計公司相對于小的審計公司來說更沒可能依靠某些個別的客戶因為前者有更為廣泛的客戶源，因此在經(jīng)濟上依賴個別客戶的可能性更小。換言之，大公司更不可能像小公司一樣在個別客戶的施壓下默認一些不符合標準的報告。

更進一步的說，本地審計公司，不管是大的還是小的，都不想因為審計失誤而承受全部名譽的損失因為對于國家級別的公司來說它們只是更可能只是損失了一部分的名譽。萬一因為審計失誤發(fā)生榮譽損失，對于大公司來說更容易承受，這樣的損失對大公司來說更好承擔一些。因為這些代價對于特定的某些公司和一些大公司來說是不一樣的。特別來說，這就意味著當?shù)毓镜囊?guī)模比較小的時候會更多的考慮個別客戶的經(jīng)濟的重要性而不是潛在可能造成官司的審計失誤。上面的討論可以讓我們預(yù)測，在其它條件相同時，相對于客源小的公司，有一定的大范圍的客戶的大審計公司是更不可能對某些個別的客戶在審計質(zhì)量上由于尊重而妥協(xié)。因此他們更可能提供高水準的審計服務(wù)。在這種情況下，客戶會對公司規(guī)模大小和審計質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生樂觀的聯(lián)系。我們把這稱之為經(jīng)濟信賴觀點。

總結(jié)與評注

前面所述調(diào)研主要研究國家級審計辦事處規(guī)模和市級或國家級的審計行業(yè)趨勢是否對審計費用和審計質(zhì)量造成影響，以及如何影響。此處聲明，在審計質(zhì)量和審計費用一定的情況下，此研究不考慮審計公司內(nèi)部審計部門的影響。此論文主要探究辦事處規(guī)模是否是除國家級審計公司規(guī)模和公司級審計行業(yè)標準外，影響審計質(zhì)量和審計費用的一個額外的、有條件的因素。

首先，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)辦事處的規(guī)模大小是與審計質(zhì)量正相關(guān),表現(xiàn)為無符號的異常收益。這個結(jié)果于我們所說的經(jīng)濟意義相一致；擁有忠實的公司級客戶群的高級（或低級）辦事處很少依賴于個別幾個客戶，因此，這些辦事處就很少因為客戶施壓而虛假上報。其次，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當?shù)氐母呒夀k事處收費比小型的辦事處要高。這也是和我們發(fā)現(xiàn)的高級辦事處的審計質(zhì)量普遍要高于小型辦事處的結(jié)論，同時這種高質(zhì)量的服務(wù)在市場上是作為審計溢價計算的。但是，以上結(jié)論卻于另一種理論相矛盾。該理論認為大型辦事處的優(yōu)勢在于提供與小型辦事處相似的服務(wù)卻有更高的收費，因而計費費率也較低?？偠灾覀兊慕Y(jié)論強調(diào)辦事處規(guī)模是影響審計質(zhì)量和審計費用的其中一個重要因素。最后一點，當我們使用這兩種可互換的先進模型來減少在瓊斯模型中對不正常收益的估計缺陷時，我們可能犯了一些很重要的計算錯誤。因此，我們無法排除在測試中所估算出的系數(shù)有偏差的可能性。但是，在根據(jù)Francis 和Yu的論述：審計質(zhì)量和審計辦事處規(guī)模成正相關(guān)，也就是說，審計師將越來越關(guān)注這兩者的關(guān)系同時客戶公司也將從中獲取不少好處。我們自信這個結(jié)論沒有任何破綻。

總的來說，我們的結(jié)論是：鑒于個別客戶對小型審計辦事處來說，經(jīng)濟意義更大，通常這類公司會更加注重審計質(zhì)量。因此，審計監(jiān)察部門和審計公司應(yīng)該多加關(guān)注小型辦事處的相關(guān)做法，從而提高自身的審計質(zhì)量。特別是四大會計師事務(wù)所在處理相似的審計服務(wù)時，更應(yīng)該實施跨規(guī)模的措施，因為任何一個審計部門的審計失誤都將使公司名聲掃地。在全球化的今天，各大跨國公司遍布全球各地，擁有國際化的客戶，保障“始終如一的高質(zhì)服務(wù)”是所有跨國公司的高級審計師越來越關(guān)注的問題。例如，由于各會計事務(wù)所所在國家或地區(qū)的不同，所需遵循的司法體系也有很大不同，如何在這樣的環(huán)境中“保持始終如一的高質(zhì)服務(wù)”對四大會計師事務(wù)所來說無疑是一種挑戰(zhàn)。再者，處于不同司法體系下的事務(wù)所又擁有不同的客戶群，這些事務(wù)所在制定審計方法方面需要比在美國當?shù)氐姆止居懈蟮淖灾鳈?quán)。因此，當?shù)厥聞?wù)所對審計質(zhì)量的影響可能要比在美國相同規(guī)模的事務(wù)所大。鑒于，國際上很少有人論證審計辦事處規(guī)模對審計質(zhì)量和審計費用的影響，我們希望大家能從這個角度共同來探究不同體系下的國際案例。

第五篇：英文文獻

民營企業(yè)文化建設(shè)研究

本文轉(zhuǎn)自淺論天下

民營企業(yè)是我國經(jīng)濟建設(shè)中的重要力量。但許多民營企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理上存在一個共同的問題，即忽視企業(yè)文化建設(shè)，缺乏優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)文化。21世紀的企業(yè)競爭將突出地體現(xiàn)在企業(yè)文化力的競爭上，企業(yè)文化管理將是繼經(jīng)驗管理和科學(xué)管理之后的一種新的管理方式。在文化管理日益受到重視的今天，民營企業(yè)必須加強企業(yè)文化建設(shè)，以此改善經(jīng)營管理，為企業(yè)的發(fā)展提供持久的內(nèi)在動力。民營企業(yè)文化的發(fā)展有一個歷史的過程，形成了民營企業(yè)文化多樣的特征。本文總結(jié)了民營企業(yè)文化建設(shè)的現(xiàn)狀，對目前民營企業(yè)文化建設(shè)存在的誤區(qū)進行了詳細分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文提出了民營企業(yè)文化建設(shè)的指導(dǎo)原則、方向、方法和相應(yīng)措施，并對如何培育有特色的民營企業(yè)文化提出了相應(yīng)的對策。最后，以正泰集團為例，進行了民營企業(yè)文化建設(shè)的案例分析。

Private-owned enterprises are very important force in our country“s economic construction.However, there is a common issue existing in many private-owned enterprises in their business administration that is they neglect the enterprise culture construction and lack of excellent enterprise culture.The competitions of enterprise in 21st century will highlight in competition of culture strength.The enterprise culture management will become a new management way after the management way of experience and science.The private-owned enterprises must strengthen culture construction so as to improve business administration and provide permanent internal impetus for the development of enterprises.The development of the private-owned enterprise”s culture has a historical process and forms a diversiform character.The article sums up the actuality of the Private-owned enterprise“s culture construction and provides detailed analysis for mistakes in the private-owned enterprise”s culture construction at present.On the basis of it, the article put forwards the instructional principia, direction, method and corresponding measure for the private-owned enterprise“s culture construction and provides the corresponding suggestion for how to develop the private-owned enterprise”s culture that has distinguished features.According to the case of Zhengtai Company, this article also gives empirical analysis of the enterprise culture construction.本文轉(zhuǎn)自淺論天下