第一篇：尼克松總統(tǒng)英文演講稿

晚上好!親愛的同胞們：

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.今晚，我想與各位探討一個問題，這是所有美國人和全球無數(shù)人所深切關(guān)注的一個問題——越南戰(zhàn)爭。

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy.The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.我認為，在關(guān)于越南戰(zhàn)爭一事上，大家的觀點出現(xiàn)了嚴重分歧的一個重要原因在于：很多美國民眾對我們的政府所宣揚的政策已失去了信心。當前情況下，除非美國人民真正認清政策本質(zhì)，否則不能也不應該被要求去支持涉及戰(zhàn)爭與和平等重大問題的政策。

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.所以，今晚，我想借此機會回答一些問題，一些縈繞在你們許多人腦海中的問題。

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years.Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action.The training program for the South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule.Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow.After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him--and come out as the peacemaker.Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election.I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace.The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war.The great question is: How can we win America’s peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a

supporting a revolution.In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers.Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.Now many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong.And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.They then murdered more

camps.We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year.During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.For the United States this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said，“We want to see a stable Government there,” carrying on the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence.“ We believe strongly in

to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia.So we’re going to stay there.”

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude.A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest.This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace--in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.Ultimately, this would cost more lives.It would not bring peace.It would bring more war.For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces.I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts.I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.We have proposed a cease fire under international supervision.We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force.And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.We have indicated that we’re willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side.We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals.They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements.I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum.That is why in addition to the

private avenue that might lead to a settlement.Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr.Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.None of these initiatives have to date produced results.In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break

’m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years.Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.Let me read from that letter to you now:

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war.But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace.I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam.The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war.You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam.Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death.It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken

being released to the press.In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.Well, now, who’s at fault? It’s become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States.It is not the South Vietnamese Government.The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi ’s deciding to negotiate--to negotiate seriously.I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth--the bad news as well as the good news--where the lives of our young men are involved.Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations.I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace--a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.It is in line with the major shift in U.S.foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine--a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.We Americans are a do-it-yourself people--we’re an impatient people.Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves.And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the

those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S.policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.”

Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia.First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments.But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.The defense of freedom is everybody’s business--not just America’s business.And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam.In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March.Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’s orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies.Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home.By

Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength.As a result, they've been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office.Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.Let me now turn to our program for the future.We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S.combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness.As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I’m sure you will understand.As I’ve indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.One of these is

announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement.They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal.As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution.If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that

shelling of cities in South Vietnam.I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.This is not a threat.This is a statement of policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated

for Vietnamization, if necessary--a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.I have chosen this second course.It is not the easy way.It is the right way.It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves.Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home.But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges.Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right.I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen.Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.In San

“Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people.If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.And now, I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.I respect your idealism.I share your concern for peace.I want peace as much as you do.There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war.This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam.It's very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in

not have to write any of those letters.那么，現(xiàn)在，我想說幾句話，如果可以的話，請允許我對生活在這個國家，并且對這次戰(zhàn)爭尤為關(guān)注的年輕人說幾句，我也能夠理解他們?yōu)槭裁磿绱岁P(guān)注這場戰(zhàn)爭。我尊重你們的理想主義，我和你們一樣關(guān)心和平，我和你們一樣盼望和平。不僅如此，還有一些強烈的個人原因促使我想結(jié)束這場戰(zhàn)爭。這周我將簽署83封信件。這些信件將寄給為了祖國在越南失去生命的戰(zhàn)士們的母親、父親、妻子和他們所愛的人。讓我感到稍微滿意的是，這些信件僅僅只占我執(zhí)政第一周所要簽署信件的三分之一。

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.And I want to end the war for another reason.I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.I have chosen a plan for peace.I believe it will succeed.If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter.Or if it does succeed，’t matter.If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter.I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor.But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world.Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace.I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be

enemy is to negotiate at Paris.Let us be united for peace.Let us also be united against defeat.Because let us understand--North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.Only Americans can do that.Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world.He said: “This is the war to end wars.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics.And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which--to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated--the goal of a just and lasting peace.As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.Thank you and good night.

第二篇：尼克松總統(tǒng)1972年訪華祝酒辭（精選）

總理閣下和今晚所有您尊貴的客人們：

我代表您所有的美國客人，感謝你們無比的熱情，中國人民以這種熱情聞名于世。我不僅要特別感謝那些準備了這場盛大晚宴的人，還要特別感謝那些演奏優(yōu)美音樂的人。我從未在異鄉(xiāng)聽到美國音樂演奏得這么棒。

總理閣下，感謝您熱情并有說服力的演講。在這個特有的時刻，通過遠程通信的奇跡，看到和聽到我們講話的人比整個世界歷史上任何一個場合的人都要多。但是，我們所說的將不會被長久記住。我們所做的卻能改變世界。

正如您在您的祝酒詞中所說的，中華民族是一個偉大的民族，美利堅民族也是一個偉大的民族。如果著兩個民族成為敵人，我們所共享的這個世界的未來一定是黑暗的。然而如果我們可以找到共同點一起合作，實現(xiàn)世界和平的機會就會無限地增加。

我希望在這周的會談中，能本著坦誠的精神，讓我們首先認識以下幾點：在過去一段時間里我們曾是敵人?，F(xiàn)在我們也存在巨大的分歧。促使我們一起合作的是超越分歧的共同利益。當我們討論我們的分歧時，我們都不會在原則上妥協(xié)。雖然我們無法減少我們之間的分歧，但是我們可以盡力在分歧上搭建橋梁，這樣我們就有可能越過分歧進行會談。

讓我們在接下來的五天一起開始一次長征，不是步伐一致，而是在不同道路上朝著同一個目標，這個目標是構(gòu)建和平公正的世界。在這個世界中，所有人以同等的尊嚴站在一起；在這個世界中，每個國家，無論大小，都有權(quán)利決定他們自己的政體，不受外界干擾和控制。世界在看。世界在聽。世界等著看我們將要做什么。世界是什么呢？個人角度而言，我想到我的大女兒，她的生日在今天。當我想到她，我想到了世界上所有的孩子，在亞洲的，在非洲的，在歐洲的，在美洲的，他們很多都出生在中華人民共和國成立之后。

我們將給我們的孩子留下什么遺產(chǎn)呢？因為仇恨在舊世界作怪，他們就注定要為之犧牲么？或者因為我們有遠見去構(gòu)建新世界，他們就注定要活下去么？

我們沒有理由成為敵人。我們都不會搶占對方的領(lǐng)土；我們都不會企圖統(tǒng)治對方；我們都不會企圖伸手統(tǒng)治世界。

毛主席寫過：“多少事，從來急；天地轉(zhuǎn)，光陰追。一萬年太久，只爭朝夕！”

現(xiàn)在就是只爭朝夕的時候?，F(xiàn)在就是我們兩個民族攀登那種可以建造嶄新美好世界的壯舉的高峰的時候。

本著這種精神，我請在座各位和我一起為毛主席，為周總理，為可以導致全世界人民友誼和和平的中美之間的友誼，舉杯。

第三篇：美國第37任總統(tǒng)尼克松告別演說(全文)

美國第37任總統(tǒng)尼克松告別演說(全文)

時間：1974年8月9日 地點：白宮

各位內(nèi)閣成員，各位白宮的職員，所有在場的朋友：

我想記錄會表明，這只是一次自發(fā)的聚會。每當總統(tǒng)要發(fā)表演說時，都會有這樣的場面。新聞媒體也會這樣報道。我們不必擔心這個問題，他們只要看到這個現(xiàn)場，自然就會這樣報道。但是我們自己一定要很清楚，這確實是自發(fā)的聚會，相信我。

你們來到這里，同我們說再見。這種儀式在英語里沒有特別好的名稱，最好的說法是法語的au revoir（歡送會）。我們還會再相見的。我剛才已經(jīng)接見過白宮的職員了，你們知道，他們天天都在白宮里提供服務，已經(jīng)很多年了。我對他們的要求，同對你們的要求是一樣的。我要求你們大家盡力，當然這本來就是你們的職責，為下一任總統(tǒng)服務，就像你們?yōu)槲液蜑闅v任總統(tǒng)服務一樣。你們中的很多人已經(jīng)在這里工作多年，無比忠誠和具有奉獻精神。你們要知道，這座樓之所以是一座偉大的樓，完全是因為那些和總統(tǒng)一起工作或者為總統(tǒng)工作的男男女女本身就同這幢樓一樣偉大。

比如說，當我走過大廳的時候，我會想到這座樓，我會將它同另一些世界上我到過的偉大的樓做比較。它不是最大的樓，很多小國里有比它大得多的樓。它也不是最漂亮的樓。歐洲的許多樓，中國的許多樓，里面有價值連城的繪畫，有許多我們這里沒有的東西，再過1000年，我們這里也未必會有。

但是，它是世界上最好的樓。因為它里面有一些東西，有一些比人員的數(shù)量、比房間的數(shù)目、比空間的大小、比藝術(shù)品的多寡更重要的東西。

這座樓有一顆偉大的心。這顆心來自于那些為這座樓工作的人們。我相當遺憾，他們沒有下來。我們在樓上同他們道別了。但是，他們的偉大是的的確確的?；叵肫饋恚以?jīng)做過很多次演講，有些還是難度很高的演講，當演講結(jié)束以后，經(jīng)過勞累的一天，我回到這座樓里，通常我的工作時間是很長的，我也許有些疲憊不堪，但是我總是能從他們身上感到鼓勵，他們總是對我微笑著。

現(xiàn)在，輪到在場的各位了，我看看周圍，我看到那么多的工作人員。我本應該來到你們的辦公室，同你們一一握手。我非常喜歡同你們交談，同你們討論如何讓世界正常運作。每個人都喜歡告訴總統(tǒng)該做什么，總統(tǒng)就像一個小男孩，要聽好多次人們的指點。但是，現(xiàn)在我沒有這么多時間了。不過，我要你們知道，你們中的每一個人，對這個政府來說，都是不可缺少的。我為這一屆的內(nèi)閣感到自豪。我為所有在這一屆內(nèi)閣中工作過的人們感到自豪。我為我們的顧問委員會感到自豪。我為白宮的工作人員感到自豪。正如我昨天晚上所說的，在政府運作中，我們毫無疑問做錯了一些事情。在這種情況下，負責人必須承擔責任，我絕對不會推卸掉我的責任。但是，我要說一件事，一件足以讓我們感到自豪的事情：五年半了，在這一屆政府中工作的所有人中，沒有一個人離開的時候比他來的時候多帶走了任何東西。沒有一個人從公共開支中獲得私利或者貪污。這充分表明了你們的品質(zhì)。

對，我們確實犯了錯誤，但是沒有個人利益在里面。你們實踐了自己的信仰。有時候，結(jié)果是對的，有時候結(jié)果是錯的。此時此刻，我僅僅希望我要是一個富有的人該多好——可惜我不是，我還必須找到一些辦法去付清我的稅款（聽眾的笑聲）——如果我有錢，我會補償你們，為了你們在這一屆政府里工作時所做出的奉獻。

但是，你們也從政府得到了另一些東西。我要你們?nèi)ジ嬖V你們的孩子，我希望這個國家的其他孩子也能聽到——在政府中工作，有一些東西是比金錢遠遠更重要的。那是一個比個人的生命更宏大的事業(yè)。這個事業(yè)就是創(chuàng)造一個世界上最偉大的國家，一個世界的領(lǐng)袖，因為如果我們沒有在世界上的領(lǐng)導地位，這個世界就會發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭，可能還有饑荒，或者未來的更糟糕的事情。只有在我們的領(lǐng)導下，世界才會有和平，才會有富裕。

我們一直是慷慨的，在未來我們還將盡我們所能更加慷慨。但是最重要的事情是，我們必須是強大的，我們的心靈必須是強大的，我們的靈魂必須是強大的，我們的信念必須是強大的，我們奉獻的意愿必須是強大的。你們一直以一種特別的方式，在做出犧牲，那就是在政府工作。

還有另一件事，我也要你們?nèi)ジ嬖V我們的孩子。你們知道，有些人會過來說：“我能跟自己的孩子說什么？”他們看著這一屆政府，說這一屆政府真是有點多災多難。他們只看到了我們犯的錯誤。他們得到了一種印象，好像每個在這里的人都是為了私利而來政府工作的。這就是我為什么會說前面那段說話，我們這一屆政府中沒有這樣的人，一個都沒有。

我要這些人說，“世界上有很多好的職業(yè)。這個國家需要好的農(nóng)民，好的商人，好的管子工，好的木匠。”我想起了我父親。人們總是管他叫小老百姓。他自己并不這么想。你們知道他干過什么？一開始，他是一個電車司機，后來他是個農(nóng)民，然后他自己有了一個種檸檬的大農(nóng)場。那個農(nóng)場是加州最差的種檸檬的農(nóng)場。我向你們保證，他賣掉農(nóng)場的時候，里面還沒有被發(fā)現(xiàn)藏有石油。（聽眾的笑聲）在那以后，他又開了一個雜貨店。但是，他是一個偉大的人，因為他做好了自己的工作，不管發(fā)生什么，他干過的每一項職業(yè)無不精益求精。

關(guān)于我母親，可能將來也不會有人為她寫本書。不錯，我想你們所有人都會用同樣一句話，形容你們的母親）——我的媽媽是個神圣的人。我回想她的一生，她有兩個兒子死于肺結(jié)核，養(yǎng)大了其他四個。她在亞利桑那州照顧我的兩個哥哥三年，看著他們接連死去。當他們死的時候，就像她自己死了一次一樣。就是這樣，沒有一本書會寫到她。但是，她是一個神圣的人。

好了，現(xiàn)在我們要看看未來了。昨天晚上的演講中，我引用了西奧多羅斯福的一句話。正如你們所知的，我還是很喜歡讀書的。我沒有受過良好的教育，但我確實讀了不少書。（聽眾的笑聲）西奧多?羅斯福的那句話說得很不錯。下面是另外一句話，是我昨天晚上在白宮里讀書的時候發(fā)現(xiàn)的，那句話說的是一個年輕人。他是一個紐約的年輕的律師。他娶了一個漂亮的姑娘，他們有一個可愛的女兒。突然之間，妻子死了。下面就是他寫的一段話。他寫在日記里。

他寫道：“她的臉和身體是那么美麗，她的靈魂更加美麗。她像一朵花那樣來到人間，又像一朵花那樣死去。她的生活總是處在陽光之中。她從來不會遇到巨大的悲傷。認識她的每一個人，沒有不愛她的。她聰明，天性快樂，樂于助人，人人都喜歡她。作為少女，她端莊、純潔又快樂；作為妻子，她深情、溫和又幸福。當她剛成為母親的時候，她的生活看上去才剛剛開始，未來還有無數(shù)美好的日子等待著她。但是突如其來，可怕的死亡就降臨在她身上。我最親愛的人死了，我生命中的光永久地熄滅了?！?/p>

這個年輕人就是西奧多?羅斯福。在他二十多歲的時候，他認為他的生活將永遠地黑暗無光。但是，他沒有消沉，繼續(xù)向前走，后來成為了美國的總統(tǒng)。作為一個總統(tǒng)，他為他的國家服務，永遠就像在競技場上戰(zhàn)斗，風云變幻，對手強大，有時他做了正確的事，有時他做了錯誤的事，但是他是一個真正的人。

現(xiàn)在，我即將離開，我想這是一個很好的例子，我們所有人都應該記住。有時，我們會覺得事情糟透了，比如你第一次的時候沒有通過律師資格考試。我就是這樣，但是我很幸運，我的意思是我的寫作差極了，但是考官說：“我們讓這個家伙通過算了?！保牨姷男β暎┊斘覀冇H愛的人死去，我們會這樣想，當我們輸?shù)粢淮芜x舉的時候，我們會這樣想，當我們被擊敗的時候，我們會這樣想。我們會想所有一切都完了。這正如西奧多?羅斯福所說的：“生命中的光永遠地熄滅了?！?/p>

但是，這不是真的。它永遠只是一個開始。年輕人一定要知道這一點，老年人也一定要知道這一點。我們必須永遠都記得這一點，生命中的偉大時刻并不僅僅是那些成功的時刻，也包括那些考驗你的時刻，打擊你的時刻，你感到失望的時刻，你悲傷的時刻。因為只有當你身處最深的山谷，你才會知道在最高的山峰之上將是何等壯美。

所以，我要對你們這些在場的人說，我們就要走了，我們是帶著驕傲離開的。我們?yōu)槟切┡c我們站在一起的人們感到驕傲，他們?yōu)槲覀児ぷ?，為這個國家服務。我們要你們?yōu)樽约核鲞^的事情感到驕傲。我們要你們繼續(xù)在政府中服務，如果你們愿意的話。永遠竭盡全力，永遠不要失去勇氣，永遠不要成為心胸狹窄的人，永遠要記得，可能有人會恨你，但是那些恨你的人不會贏，除非你也恨他們，那樣的話，你就將毀了你自己。

我們走了，帶著巨大的希望，我們的精神是高昂的，我們的態(tài)度是非常謙卑的，我們的心中是滿懷感激的。我對你們每一個人所能說的就是，我們也許有不同的信仰，我們也許向不同的神靈祈禱，但是在某種意義上，我們的神是一樣的。我要對你們每一個人說，我們不僅會永遠地記得你們，永遠地感激你們，我們還會將你們放到我們的心上，每一次祈禱的時候，我們都將想到你們。

第四篇：演講稿之尼克松

演講題目：理查德·尼克松

理查德·尼克松，出生于1913年9月。1946年，尼克松當選美國眾議員，其政治觀點保守，素有反共斗士之稱，與參議員約瑟夫·雷芒德·麥卡錫齊名，是麥卡錫主義的擁護者和極力倡導者。他在1952年與1956年兩度與德懷特·D·艾森豪威爾搭檔參選并獲得勝利，在1953年到1961年間，擔任了兩屆副總統(tǒng)職務。1960年尼克松競選總統(tǒng)，以微弱票差被約翰·肯尼迪擊敗，又在1962年競選加利福尼亞州州長時落敗而暫時離開國家權(quán)力中樞。1968年尼克松重返政壇，在當年的美國大選中順利當選為美國總統(tǒng)。1971年，發(fā)起了舉世聞名，影響美國刑事司法制度深遠至今的“向毒品宣戰(zhàn)（英語：War on Drugs）”。

尼克松生性多疑，在美國政壇有“難以捉摸的迪克”（Tricky Dick）綽號。尼克松在1959年7月莫斯科舉行的美國國家展覽會（American National Exhibition）開幕式上，與時任蘇聯(lián)部長會議主席的赫魯曉夫之間展開過一場關(guān)于東西方意識形態(tài)和核戰(zhàn)爭的論戰(zhàn)，史稱“廚房辯論”。在任期內(nèi)，將美國軍隊撤出了越南，逐漸結(jié)束了那場使國家陷入危機的戰(zhàn)爭。透過乒乓球活動嘗試與中華人民共和國建立外交關(guān)系，并支持其進入聯(lián)合國，史稱“乒乓外交”，改善了中國大陸與美國的關(guān)系。尼克松于1972年2月訪問中國大陸，是美國總統(tǒng)第一次訪問一個與美國沒有正式外交關(guān)系的國家，對中國大陸的7天訪問被稱為“改變世界的一周”。當時，尼克松率團訪問了北京、杭州、上海三個城市，在北京與中共中央主席毛澤東會面，并在杭州西湖邊的園林中與中國國務院總理周恩來草簽了轟動世界的《中美聯(lián)合公報》。中華人民共和國與美國兩國關(guān)系正常化，美中蘇三角外交的態(tài)勢開始形成，在很長一段時間里成為決定國際形勢發(fā)展的重要因素之一。

他平生有兩大事跡而聞名全球。第一，尼克松訪華，這是當時轟動世界的舉動，他這個人確實有遠見卓識的本領(lǐng)。在冷戰(zhàn)時期的人們會認為美蘇的對立是意識形態(tài)的對立，而尼克松卻圖謀與社會主義中國建立正常的外交關(guān)系，這一舉動石破天驚。一波驚起萬層浪，也為我國改革開放補充了一個重要的外部條件。這一點，我們在感謝鄧小平的同時，也要稱贊尼克松的聰明之舉。所以我們的歷史老師會一針見血的說，國際關(guān)系的決定關(guān)系是國家利益。

另外我還想說的是，尼克松訪華肯定有國家領(lǐng)導人的接待？那么接待尼克松是誰呢？毛澤東。對于毛澤東的晚年問題，有諸多的非議。什么發(fā)動大躍進，人民公社化運動啊，還有最恨的是發(fā)動了文化大革命，這個老家伙是晚節(jié)不保啊，恐怕是得了老年癡呆，但這只是我中學時的想法，如果大家還這樣想，說明大家的思想還很年輕。事實上，毛澤東文革時期得罪了最不應該得罪的群體：知識分子。我覺得要不是鄧小平的正確看待毛澤東同志的功與過這句話，恐怕毛澤東的袁世凱形象就要寫在歷史教科書上了。大家應該相信教科書的力量，它能把黑變白，也能把白變黑。所以我希望大家對待某一事件，能有自己的意見和想法，千萬不要隨波逐流。

那么話題重新回到尼克松，他的另一著名事件就是水門事件，相信大家都對水門事件有所了解，在這里就不多說了。不過我是挺佩服那位把總統(tǒng)拉下馬的女性。這里可以看出美國的太多，比如美國人的性格，不屈的精神。但是大家反過來想，尼克松第二任總統(tǒng)新上任沒多久就被拉下來，他有那個勇氣下來，這是中國領(lǐng)導人所不能及的。在中國，好像有為他人遮羞的義務，所以中國不會出現(xiàn)斯諾登，但這正是中國的價值觀，沒有對錯。謝謝

第五篇：尼克松總統(tǒng)在訪華答謝宴上的祝酒詞

The Great Wall Is No Longer a Dividing Wall--Toast of President Nixon at a Banquet Honoring the Premier in Peking Great Hall of the People Feb.25, 1972

長城不再是一道隔離墻

——美國總統(tǒng)尼克松在訪華答謝宴會上的祝酒詞 北京 人民大會堂 1972年2月25日

It is a great privilege that while we are guests in your country to be able to welcome you and the Chinese who are present here as our guests this evening.能有機會在貴國做客期間歡迎閣下和今晚在座的諸位中國客人，我們感到十分榮幸。

On behalf of Mrs.Nixon and all of the members of our official party, I want to express my deep appreciation for the boundless and gracious hospitality which you have extended to us.請允許我代表我的夫人以及同行的全體成員，對你們給予我們無限盛情的款待，表示衷心的感謝。

As you know, it is the custom in our country that the members of the press have the right to speak for themselves and that no one in government can speak for them.But I am sure that all those from the American press who are here tonight will grant me the rare privilege of speaking for the press in extending their appreciation to you and your government for the many courtesies you have extended to them.大家知道，按照我國的習慣，我們的新聞界人士有權(quán)代表他們自己講話，而政府官員是沒有代表他們講話的權(quán)利的。但我相信，今晚在座的全體美國新聞界人士都會授予我這一罕有的特權(quán)，代表他們感謝閣下和貴國政府給予他們的種種禮遇。

You have made it possible for the story of this historic visit to be read, seen, and heard by more people all over the world than on any previous occasion in history.你們已使全世界空前之多的人們得以讀到、看到、聽到這一歷史性訪問的情景。

Yesterday, along with hundreds of millions of viewers on television, we saw what is truly one of the wonders of the world, the Great Wall.As I walked along the Wall, I thought of the sacrifices that went into building it;I thought of what it showed about the determination of the Chinese people to retain their independence throughout their long history;I thought about the fact that the Wall tells us that China has a great history and that the people who built this wonder of the world also have a great future.昨天，我們同幾億電視觀眾一起參觀了名副其實的世界奇跡之———中國長城。當我在城墻上漫步時，我感受到了在建筑這座城墻時所付出的巨大犧牲；我認為它顯示了在悠久的人類歷史上始終保持獨立的中國人民的決心；我想到這樣一個事實，那就是，長城告訴我們，中國有偉大的歷史，建造這個世界奇跡的人民也會有偉大的未來。

The Great Wall is no longer a wall dividing China from the rest of the world, but it is a reminder of the fact that there are many walls still existing in the world which divide nations and peoples.長城已不再是一道把中國和世界其他地區(qū)隔開的城墻。但是，它使人們想起，世界上仍然存在許多把各個國家和人民隔開的城墻。

The Great Wall is also a reminder that for almost a generation there has been a wall between the People?s Republic of China and the United States of America.長城還使人們想起，在幾乎一代人的歲月里，中華人民共和國和美國之間存在著一道城墻。

In these past 4 days we have begun the long process of removing that wall between us.We began our talks recognizing that we have great differences, but we are determined that those differences not prevent us from living together in peace.四天以來，我們已經(jīng)開始著手拆除橫亙在我們之間的這座城墻。在開始會談時我們就承認彼此之間存在著巨大的分歧，但是我們決心不讓這些分歧阻礙我們和平相處。

You believe deeply in your system, and we believe just as deeply in our system.It is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hopes, the interest that each of us has to maintain our independence and the security of our peoples and the hope that each of us has to build a new world order in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another while disagreeing with one another, letting history rather than the battlefield be the judge of their different ideas.你們深信你們的制度，我們也同樣深信我們的制度。我們在這里聚會，并不是由于我們有共同的信仰，而是由于我們有共同的利益和共同的希望，我們每一方都有這樣的希望，就是建立一種新的世界秩序，具有不同制度和不同價值標準的國家和人民可以在其中和平相處，互有分歧但互相尊重，讓歷史而不是讓戰(zhàn)場對他們的不同思想做出判斷。

Mr.Prime Minister, you have noted that the plane which brought us here, is named the Spirit of ?76?.Just this week, we have celebrated in America the birth of George Washington, the Father of our Country, who led America to independence in our Revolution and served as our first President.總理先生，你已注意到送我們到這里來的飛機名為“76年精神號”。就在這個星期，我們美國慶祝了國父喬治·華盛頓的誕辰，是他領(lǐng)導美國人民在革命中取得了獨立，并擔任了我們的第一屆總統(tǒng)。

He bade farewell at the close of his term with these words to his countrymen: “Observe good faith and justice toward all nations.Cultivate peace and harmony with all.”

在他任期屆滿時，他用下面的話向他的同胞告別：“對一切國家恪守信用和正義。同所有人和平、和睦地相處。”

It is in that spirit, the spirit of ?76?, that I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to Chairman Mao, to Premier Chou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs.就是本著這種精神——76精神，我請大家站起來同我一起舉杯，為毛主席，為周總理，為兩國人民，為我們子孫后代的希望，即我們這一代能給他們留下和平與和睦的遺產(chǎn)。干杯！