第一篇：哲學(xué)演講

王雷泉教授：

真正的引導(dǎo)需要大師。二千五百年前，在世界的東方和西方出現(xiàn)過(guò)偉大的老子、孔子、釋迦牟尼、蘇格拉底、柏拉圖等等。他們幾乎在同一個(gè)時(shí)代出現(xiàn)，哲學(xué)家雅斯貝爾斯稱(chēng)那個(gè)時(shí)代為軸心時(shí)代。那么兩千五百年以后，在世界走入了21世紀(jì)，這個(gè)世紀(jì)有很多變化，我們的物質(zhì)文明已經(jīng)發(fā)展到爛熟的地步，但是危機(jī)也隨之而現(xiàn)，所以這個(gè)時(shí)代更加注重心靈的探求，心靈的重建，所以我們這次請(qǐng)來(lái)了浙江大學(xué)的教授、博士生導(dǎo)師、浙江大學(xué)基督教與跨文化研究中心的副主任王志成博士給我們講解第二次軸心時(shí)代文明，講解我們中國(guó)將怎么來(lái)解決自身的問(wèn)題，同時(shí)考察我們中國(guó)能對(duì)整個(gè)人類(lèi)的未來(lái)提供什么樣的貢獻(xiàn)。王志成博士雖然年紀(jì)比較小，比我小很多，可是著作等身，光翻譯就有40本，涉及到東西方的宗教，自己的專(zhuān)著也有10部，是一位非常勤奮的學(xué)者?，F(xiàn)在，他的眼光也關(guān)注到宗教學(xué)核心的內(nèi)容，現(xiàn)在我們就以熱烈掌聲歡迎王志成教授為我們演講。

王志成教授：

謝謝王老師，謝謝各位老師和同學(xué)。王老師跟我十多年前就已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)，那時(shí)我準(zhǔn)備去耶魯大學(xué)訪(fǎng)學(xué)，我們一起吃飯討論過(guò)哲學(xué)。我于1986年進(jìn)入杭州大學(xué)（后并入浙江大學(xué)），90年畢業(yè)，同年讀研究生，我的導(dǎo)師是陳村富教授。1993年我跟隨夏基松教授研究外國(guó)哲學(xué)，攻讀博士學(xué)位。我的碩士論文研究古代希臘哲學(xué)中的懷疑主義神學(xué)，我的博士論文研究當(dāng)代宗教哲學(xué)家約翰?希克（John Hick）的宗教多元論。之后，我一直和約翰?希克以及相關(guān)的人士保持聯(lián)系，并持續(xù)地做一些翻譯工作。1996年出版了我的博士論文《解釋與拯救》。之后，我一直在大學(xué)教學(xué)和研究。

今天我很榮幸來(lái)到復(fù)旦大學(xué)來(lái)談?wù)勱P(guān)于我個(gè)人最近幾年思考的一些問(wèn)題以及對(duì)此的一些想法。從2004年開(kāi)始，我們開(kāi)始在北京宗教文化出版社主編一套叢書(shū)：《第二軸心時(shí)代文叢》。這些書(shū)里面有些觀點(diǎn)和我今天晚上講的有一些關(guān)系。

今天晚上我要講的主題是：全球化、第二軸心時(shí)代與中國(guó)宗教的未來(lái)。這個(gè)主題講三個(gè)內(nèi)容，第一是全球化問(wèn)題，第二是第二軸心時(shí)代問(wèn)題，第三是第二軸心時(shí)代與中國(guó)宗教的未來(lái)的關(guān)系。今天晚上的演講將是比較宏大的，并不是非常具體，并且說(shuō)的重點(diǎn)也不平衡，但希望給大家一個(gè)整體全面的印象。

一、全球化問(wèn)題

全球化是當(dāng)今我們?nèi)祟?lèi)的處境。有人說(shuō)人類(lèi)進(jìn)入全球化時(shí)間是在18世紀(jì)，有人說(shuō)在19世紀(jì)。但全球化真正給人帶來(lái)一種強(qiáng)烈沖擊感受的是20世紀(jì)，特別是二次世界大戰(zhàn)之后，對(duì)我們多數(shù)中國(guó)人來(lái)說(shuō)應(yīng)該是改革開(kāi)放之后。

這里，我要講二點(diǎn)：首先，全球化這個(gè)觀念發(fā)端于什么時(shí)候，一般來(lái)說(shuō)我們不會(huì)把這個(gè)觀念的起源推得很遠(yuǎn)，但是我在《中國(guó)宗教》上發(fā)表了一篇文章，談到了全球化觀念起源的問(wèn)題，并提出該觀念應(yīng)該發(fā)端于軸心時(shí)代，也就是說(shuō)在釋迦牟尼時(shí)代、在耶律米時(shí)代、在老子和孔子的時(shí)代。因此，我的一個(gè)基本觀念是：全球意識(shí)發(fā)端于軸心時(shí)代。之所以出現(xiàn)這種意識(shí)，這是一個(gè)很神秘的事情。在軸心時(shí)代之前，人們的觀念發(fā)展受到了地域的限制，但在軸心時(shí)代（公元前8—2世紀(jì)）不同地區(qū)都出現(xiàn)了一批偉大的思想家、哲學(xué)家、宗教家、圣人。為什么會(huì)在那個(gè)時(shí)代集中出現(xiàn)這么一批偉大的人物呢？這是人們到現(xiàn)在都不能解釋清楚的現(xiàn)象。因?yàn)椋瑥臅r(shí)間觀念來(lái)說(shuō)，之前是比較原始的，而這時(shí)出現(xiàn)了一大批思想家，他們之間幾乎都沒(méi)有什么來(lái)往，他們的觀念卻又都在這個(gè)時(shí)代出現(xiàn)了，所以對(duì)于很多人來(lái)說(shuō)這是一個(gè)神秘現(xiàn)象。

人類(lèi)的智慧在那時(shí)發(fā)生了突變。對(duì)此，至今我們難以有一個(gè)理性的解釋。雅斯貝爾斯最早提出了“軸心時(shí)代”一詞。他自己也無(wú)法解釋人類(lèi)這種智慧的神秘的集中性的爆發(fā)，其他思想家也難以解釋這個(gè)現(xiàn)象。但如果你是有信仰的，可能你說(shuō)這來(lái)自于神圣的天啟。

與全球化相關(guān)的全球意識(shí)，在它出現(xiàn)之后自身就會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)。當(dāng)今時(shí)代，人人都可以感受到全球意識(shí)，而且越來(lái)越多的人接受這種全球意識(shí)。例如，我們今天的一些學(xué)術(shù)研究或者我們各個(gè)領(lǐng)域的工作自然而然地都需要通過(guò)這種意識(shí)來(lái)思考、觀察和分析。

其次，我們不能說(shuō)軸心時(shí)代的那些思想就可以被稱(chēng)為宗教，只可以說(shuō)是宗教的源頭思想，佛陀本人不是要?jiǎng)?chuàng)宗教，他實(shí)際上是覺(jué)悟者，孔子、老子以及莊子他們本人都沒(méi)有創(chuàng)立宗教。而他們的思想?yún)s成了在此之后所創(chuàng)立的各種世界宗教思想的源頭。在中國(guó)，我們可以說(shuō)我們?cè)诮庾x先秦的思想家。先秦之后中國(guó)哲學(xué)幾乎沒(méi)有什么特別的原創(chuàng)思想。很多人因此說(shuō)要重返軸心時(shí)代。對(duì)于基督徒來(lái)說(shuō)，就是要回到圣經(jīng)；對(duì)于佛教徒，就是要回到原始佛教；對(duì)于道教徒，就是要回到老莊時(shí)代。但是各個(gè)宗教的創(chuàng)始人的頭銜是我們后人給予他們的，他們是被給予者，而他們本人并不很主動(dòng)地去創(chuàng)造一個(gè)宗教，后人沿著他們的思想道路發(fā)展出一個(gè)個(gè)不同的宗教體系。

比如在佛教中，首先是佛陀的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，而后沿著佛陀的經(jīng)驗(yàn)繼續(xù)踐行。我們的佛教不斷發(fā)展，我們不斷證悟佛陀的思想、體驗(yàn)佛陀的思想，然后我們的意識(shí)因此也不斷的擴(kuò)展。所以，它是以佛陀的經(jīng)驗(yàn)為根本，不斷地延伸，慢慢地形成佛教傳統(tǒng)。而這傳統(tǒng)由于我們對(duì)它的解讀上的差異以及在修行方法上的差異而產(chǎn)生了分化，細(xì)化為不同的宗派。慢慢地，它們共同構(gòu)成一個(gè)巨大的傳統(tǒng)，所以宗教就成了傳統(tǒng)而不是單單一個(gè)人創(chuàng)立的宗教，不是依靠佛陀一個(gè)人構(gòu)成的，它是一個(gè)包含了諸多亞傳統(tǒng)的巨大傳統(tǒng)。所以由一個(gè)原初的思想家變成一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)，這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)又有很多的亞傳統(tǒng)。這個(gè)過(guò)程不是短時(shí)間內(nèi)完成的，而是有一個(gè)歷史的發(fā)生、發(fā)展的過(guò)程。所以佛教不是一下子到中國(guó)，也不是一下子到西方的，西方的佛教主要是在上世紀(jì)發(fā)展起來(lái)的。十九世紀(jì)時(shí)候的西方，沒(méi)有多少西方人認(rèn)識(shí)佛教。可能尼采了解一點(diǎn)，可是尼采對(duì)佛陀的了解準(zhǔn)確嗎？很多地方尼采對(duì)佛陀的了解是不準(zhǔn)確的。叔本華對(duì)佛陀也了解一點(diǎn)，但叔本華對(duì)佛陀的理解很準(zhǔn)確嗎？到現(xiàn)在為止，據(jù)我所知，西方人一般對(duì)佛陀都難有正確的理解。

今天看來(lái)，佛教的力量在西方不斷擴(kuò)展，由一個(gè)人漸漸組成一個(gè)僧團(tuán)，然后逐漸變成一個(gè)有經(jīng)典文本、有自己特定組織的傳統(tǒng)，從小乘到大乘，再傳播到今天的西方，這是一個(gè)不斷物化、具體化的過(guò)程。實(shí)際上存在著這么一種說(shuō)法，《史記》里就有秦始皇要滅佛的記載。也就是說(shuō)在秦始皇的時(shí)代佛教就已經(jīng)傳進(jìn)了中國(guó)，但是我們對(duì)此并沒(méi)有多少證據(jù)。佛教的發(fā)展和傳播可以說(shuō)是一個(gè)全球化的過(guò)程，是一個(gè)慢慢展開(kāi)的過(guò)程。從歷史的角度看，我們要特別感謝阿育王，他是一個(gè)很特別的人。另外，大家可以讀一本佛經(jīng)——《彌蘭陀王問(wèn)經(jīng)》。在這部經(jīng)中，一個(gè)來(lái)自希臘的國(guó)王和龍軍菩薩展開(kāi)對(duì)話(huà)。這個(gè)希臘的國(guó)王接受龍軍的觀念，皈依了佛門(mén)。這是一個(gè)很有名的經(jīng)典。佛教的全球化過(guò)程，阿育王起到了非常大的作用。而且歷代的很多高僧對(duì)佛教的全球化起到了非常重要的作用。中國(guó)的佛教在解放后到文革這段時(shí)間遭到了根本性的打擊，但是在此之后佛教在中國(guó)開(kāi)始了緩慢的恢復(fù)。

而西方基督教的全球化就要從耶穌開(kāi)始說(shuō)起了。耶穌說(shuō)你們要把我的福音傳到地極。這個(gè)觀念給后來(lái)的門(mén)徒所指引的一個(gè)方向就是把他的福音傳播開(kāi)去?；浇痰呐d起是非常有意思的。理論上講，耶穌是一個(gè)猶太教徒，一個(gè)拉比。他不是基督徒，也沒(méi)有建立教會(huì)，但是他的思想、他的行動(dòng)、他的榜樣作用以及他的門(mén)徒沿著他的路線(xiàn)走下去，就形成了一個(gè)小的共同體，然后這個(gè)共同體逐漸地就變成了一個(gè)組織化了的但較為松散的群體。由于歷史的偶然性，經(jīng)過(guò)幾百年的掙扎和斗爭(zhēng)，這個(gè)宗教群體最后為羅馬當(dāng)局所接受，成為了國(guó)教?；浇淘诘匚簧系摹胺P(pán)”對(duì)于基督教來(lái)說(shuō)具有革命性的意義，基督教的優(yōu)點(diǎn)從此得以彰顯、相應(yīng)地，基督教的缺點(diǎn)也就被世人所知。這是一個(gè)國(guó)教化的過(guò)程。從今天來(lái)看，基督教的全球化是最為成功的。因?yàn)榛浇痰脑缙谛磐酱蠖紴槲幕讲桓叩拿癖?，他們只是憑著堅(jiān)定的信仰把基督教變成了一個(gè)巨大的傳統(tǒng)，并且形成了三大亞傳統(tǒng)——天主教、東正教、新教。相比于其他宗教，它的每個(gè)亞傳統(tǒng)都非常強(qiáng)大，光天主教信徒就有十多億人。在它的全球化過(guò)程中，基督教從西亞到歐洲、印度，乃至后來(lái)漂洋過(guò)海來(lái)到美洲，取代了美洲原有的文化根基，從此，美洲文化也就成為了一種基督教文化。

在當(dāng)時(shí)的美洲，本土的文化傳統(tǒng)和其信仰都是比較不牢固的，基督教進(jìn)入美洲是比較容易的，并把其本土文化給吞并了。但是基督教進(jìn)入亞洲如印度和中國(guó)情況卻是非常的復(fù)雜。在唐朝時(shí)，基督教就進(jìn)入中國(guó)（被稱(chēng)為景教），但是當(dāng)時(shí)景教是依附于佛教的，在滅佛過(guò)程中，景教（基督教一支）也被打壓下去了。在元朝，也里可溫教（當(dāng)時(shí)中國(guó)人對(duì)基督宗教的稱(chēng)呼）傳入中國(guó)，但是隨著元朝的滅亡而在中國(guó)消失。明末清初天主教進(jìn)入中國(guó)傳教。但是由于中國(guó)的文化自身的強(qiáng)大，直到清末，天主教在中國(guó)的傳教并不很成功。相比而言，佛教的本土化過(guò)程卻是非常成功的，因?yàn)樗軌蛟谥袊?guó)兩種文化傳統(tǒng)——儒道——之間達(dá)到一種和而不同的融合。

基督教和中國(guó)宗教（儒佛道）兩個(gè)異質(zhì)的文化傳統(tǒng)很難和平相處，這樣，基督教的本地化過(guò)程不是很成功。而今天，從基督教人數(shù)上看是比較成功的，但是從思想上來(lái)看，至今我們也不能說(shuō)基督教的中國(guó)化已經(jīng)成功了。目前，中國(guó)大陸還沒(méi)有中國(guó)神學(xué)。丁光訓(xùn)說(shuō)要建立中國(guó)神學(xué)，但是還沒(méi)有成功。香港道風(fēng)山為推進(jìn)漢語(yǔ)神學(xué)而不懈努力，但至今還不能說(shuō)已經(jīng)成功，還需要繼續(xù)努力。在社會(huì)科學(xué)院世宗所，卓新平教授一直要推進(jìn)學(xué)術(shù)神學(xué)，就是不依賴(lài)信仰進(jìn)行純學(xué)術(shù)的宗教研究。而這剛剛起步，其發(fā)展前景尚難預(yù)料。

在全球化的過(guò)程中，基督教得到了成功的發(fā)展。但在中國(guó)和印度，情況就比較復(fù)雜。因?yàn)橹袊?guó)和印度都具有悠久且博大的文明傳統(tǒng)，長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)，基督教的信徒人數(shù)在這兩個(gè)國(guó)家難以有大的增進(jìn)。基督教進(jìn)入美洲非常成功，進(jìn)入非洲我們也不能說(shuō)不成功。在進(jìn)入西方世界、希臘世界的過(guò)程中，是很成功的?？墒侨蚧慕裉?，人們發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)是塊唐僧肉，是非常有發(fā)展前途的地方。因?yàn)?，在英?guó)、德國(guó)、荷蘭等國(guó)家，基督教人數(shù)不斷下滑，而在中國(guó)大陸，信徒人數(shù)直線(xiàn)上升。而在印度不大可能有一個(gè)大的量的飛躍。這是因?yàn)橛《冉瘫旧砭头浅５膹?qiáng)大，因此，基督教在印度的發(fā)展空間是很有限的。在中國(guó)，基督教的發(fā)展空間則非常巨大。很多人會(huì)擔(dān)心中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)文化的迷失，以及中國(guó)自己的文化身份認(rèn)同感的喪失，而這樣的擔(dān)心也不是毫無(wú)理由的。

以上是我舉的兩個(gè)宗教全球化的例子，其實(shí)也可以舉伊斯蘭教的例子。伊斯蘭教的全球化也是很成功的。盡管伊斯蘭教出現(xiàn)在軸心時(shí)代之后，但也是沿著軸心時(shí)代的思想發(fā)展出來(lái)的一個(gè)世界性宗教。相比之下，中國(guó)的儒道的全球化不是很成功。并且現(xiàn)在我們多數(shù)人認(rèn)為道教是一個(gè)地方性宗教而不是一個(gè)世界性宗教。印度教的全球化也在展開(kāi)，在中國(guó)、在西方也會(huì)有所發(fā)展?，F(xiàn)在還有一個(gè)所謂的新時(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)，新時(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)不屬于傳統(tǒng)宗教，但是新時(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)在推動(dòng)宗教全球化的進(jìn)程中的作用是非常巨大的?？死锵＠绿峋褪切聲r(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)的一個(gè)代表人物。他在中國(guó)很受歡迎。甚至有人把南懷瑾也歸于新時(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)的人物。更有人說(shuō)從廣義上講，瑜伽也可以屬于新時(shí)代運(yùn)動(dòng)的一部分。瑜伽在全球化中非常成功，比“太極”成功多了。印度瑜伽在印度文明中是一個(gè)核心的東西，但是它在全球化的過(guò)程中發(fā)展沒(méi)有障礙，沒(méi)有受到意識(shí)形態(tài)的阻礙。瑜伽全球化的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)很值得我們?nèi)パ芯俊?/p>

第一點(diǎn)我所講的是世界的奧秘、神秘，在軸心時(shí)代出現(xiàn)了智慧爆發(fā)；第二點(diǎn)講的是世界宗教的擴(kuò)張，這是一個(gè)從神性到理性的過(guò)程。

二、第二軸心時(shí)代問(wèn)題

軸心時(shí)代的思想隨著時(shí)間的推移，在不斷發(fā)展之后，出現(xiàn)了很多有益的東西，但與此同時(shí)也出現(xiàn)了很多消極的東西。有關(guān)于這些積極方面和消極方面的東西在此我不多談。

軸心時(shí)代的思想發(fā)展到今天，或許由于現(xiàn)代人的自私以及自身存在的一些問(wèn)題而未能得以完全的繼承，于是我們會(huì)說(shuō)歷史墮落了、倒退了，比如現(xiàn)在經(jīng)常提到的基督教的末世觀，佛教所講的末法時(shí)代，以及印度教所講的卡利時(shí)代。為了變革這個(gè)并不讓人滿(mǎn)意的時(shí)代，一些人認(rèn)為我們要進(jìn)行人類(lèi)文明的轉(zhuǎn)化。最近，看了一個(gè)充滿(mǎn)個(gè)人魅力的科學(xué)家關(guān)于2012的演講，聽(tīng)似神秘莫測(cè)，令人覺(jué)得百惑不解。他的思考角度是基于對(duì)全球化的考察，通過(guò)考察當(dāng)代人類(lèi)的技術(shù)能力來(lái)思考人類(lèi)命運(yùn)的問(wèn)題。這樣的人在當(dāng)今世界可能不少市場(chǎng)。而我們作為學(xué)術(shù)的探討，也有很多關(guān)于源頭的探討。軸心時(shí)代發(fā)展至今，將進(jìn)入一個(gè)新的時(shí)代。雅思貝斯首先提出：我們可能正在醞釀一個(gè)新的文明時(shí)代，只是它還沒(méi)來(lái)到，我們正處在這個(gè)文明和軸心文明的間隙期。他說(shuō)這話(huà)的時(shí)候，我們還不能說(shuō)已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了新的軸心時(shí)代了。

但是，隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的發(fā)展，計(jì)算機(jī)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的興起，特別是上世紀(jì)九十年代全球化進(jìn)程突然加劇，發(fā)生了許多事件。有人把1993年作為一個(gè)關(guān)節(jié)點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為這是我們進(jìn)入新的軸心時(shí)代的標(biāo)識(shí)時(shí)間，這是因?yàn)?993年召開(kāi)了世界宗教會(huì)議。在會(huì)議上，通過(guò)了《全球倫理宣言》。它預(yù)示著：人們需要一套全球倫理，需要全球各個(gè)宗教的合作，形成一個(gè)巨大的宗教共同體。

早在1893年，在美國(guó)召開(kāi)了第一次世界宗教會(huì)議。印度教的辨喜參加了，并引起了很大的反響。過(guò)了100年又舉行了第二次的世界宗教會(huì)議，在這過(guò)去的100年中，全球化進(jìn)程加快了。在這種背景下，人們的時(shí)空觀念發(fā)生了改變，文化上發(fā)生了震蕩，人們之間的關(guān)系也有所變化。在這個(gè)過(guò)程中，我們有什么特別的改變？不同的思想家有不同的回答。迄今為止，研究新軸心文明的人中比較有影響的人是卡曾斯，但他已經(jīng)去世?？ㄔ乖?993年出版了一本叫做《21世紀(jì)的基督》的書(shū)，在這本書(shū)里他明確提出了“第二次軸心時(shí)代”這個(gè)觀念，可是他也說(shuō)，第二次軸心時(shí)代文明的源頭應(yīng)該回到圣方濟(jì)各，要延伸到哥白尼那個(gè)時(shí)候。他說(shuō)在二十世紀(jì)里有個(gè)在中國(guó)工作過(guò)的人—德日進(jìn)，他是一個(gè)古生物學(xué)家，他認(rèn)為人類(lèi)文明是從一個(gè)原點(diǎn)發(fā)展到歐米伽點(diǎn)的過(guò)程，這個(gè)點(diǎn)也就是基督。從這個(gè)角度看，德日進(jìn)也可以算是第二次軸心時(shí)代文明的一個(gè)先驅(qū)。

但是在學(xué)者看來(lái)，我們會(huì)提及若干人，剛才提到的卡曾斯就算是一個(gè)。凱倫?阿姆斯特朗也是其中的一個(gè)代表，她是一個(gè)英國(guó)暢銷(xiāo)書(shū)作家，出版過(guò)許多著作。此外還有一個(gè)非常激進(jìn)的哲學(xué)家叫庫(kù)比特，他自身也認(rèn)為自己是一個(gè)第二軸心時(shí)代的學(xué)者。還有一個(gè)叫推進(jìn)全球宗教對(duì)話(huà)的天主教思想家斯維德勒，稱(chēng)第二軸心時(shí)代為稱(chēng)全球?qū)υ?huà)時(shí)代。他在他的有關(guān)論文里討論了卡曾斯所說(shuō)的第二軸心時(shí)代。人大出版社出版了他的一本書(shū)叫《走向全球?qū)υ?huà)時(shí)代》。另外我們也把孔漢思納入為第二軸心時(shí)代學(xué)者的范疇之內(nèi)，但孔漢思本人沒(méi)有提第二軸心時(shí)代觀念。在我們的新儒家的代表中，杜維明是一個(gè)代表，他自己也在宣言第二軸心時(shí)代的觀念，想要對(duì)儒家文明進(jìn)行第二軸心時(shí)代的轉(zhuǎn)化。在北京論壇上，他曾經(jīng)公開(kāi)宣揚(yáng)第二軸心時(shí)代。在北京大學(xué)湯一介先生，也在宣揚(yáng)第二軸心時(shí)代，他出版過(guò)一本書(shū)叫《走向新軸心時(shí)代》。但這本書(shū)只有很少的篇幅談?wù)撔拢ǖ诙┹S心時(shí)代，但卻是結(jié)合中國(guó)儒家來(lái)談的。他認(rèn)為我們?nèi)寮覒?yīng)進(jìn)行一些變革、發(fā)展才好進(jìn)入第二軸心時(shí)代。在美國(guó)，耶穌研究會(huì)的一些人在宣揚(yáng)第二軸心時(shí)代的觀念，他們也在2003年召開(kāi)了一個(gè)會(huì)議，核心主題就是關(guān)于第二軸心時(shí)代的觀念。

關(guān)于第二軸心時(shí)代的特征，我們可以概括為三點(diǎn)：第一，全球意識(shí)。各個(gè)領(lǐng)域里的學(xué)術(shù)研究都出現(xiàn)了從個(gè)體性意識(shí)上升到全球性意識(shí)的現(xiàn)象。第二，生態(tài)意識(shí)，也叫大地意識(shí)。這也被認(rèn)為是第二軸心時(shí)代意識(shí)的一個(gè)基本觀念。第三，對(duì)話(huà)意識(shí)。它強(qiáng)調(diào)通過(guò)對(duì)話(huà)來(lái)處理不同信仰傳統(tǒng)之間的關(guān)系，不同文明之間的關(guān)系。我個(gè)人在做一個(gè)有關(guān)于宗教間以及信仰間靈性的探索。這方面研究比較少，但是在全球化時(shí)代這個(gè)問(wèn)題卻是非常的緊迫，是我們不得不面對(duì)的一個(gè)問(wèn)題，即探討儒教、佛教和基督教等宗教在相遇中我們應(yīng)該如何修證、證悟，也就是說(shuō)在一個(gè)人類(lèi)共同體中如何共享靈性的境界。在軸心時(shí)代，印度、中東、中國(guó)、希臘各自的文明都是獨(dú)立形成和發(fā)展的，而在今天這一全球化的時(shí)代開(kāi)始了越來(lái)越頻繁的互動(dòng)，是否會(huì)出現(xiàn)一個(gè)共同的地球靈性，這個(gè)問(wèn)題我個(gè)人在思考。很多時(shí)候我是從佛教的角度思考，很多時(shí)候我也很喜歡從印度教的角度去思考。而我翻譯得最多，寫(xiě)得最多的是基督教方面的內(nèi)容，所以我也不時(shí)地會(huì)從基督教的角度去思考。

有人會(huì)有疑問(wèn)，說(shuō)你這樣吃得消嗎。如果我們有了這種全球意識(shí)，我們的文明可能就要重新發(fā)展，很多問(wèn)題就要重新思考。從個(gè)人層面，如個(gè)人如何在當(dāng)今世界上活得有意義，有人說(shuō)我需要一個(gè)宗教，可是當(dāng)你面對(duì)很多宗教的時(shí)候，你能夠非常好的去相處，能夠從其他文明中去吸收營(yíng)養(yǎng)，去發(fā)展，這就有很多值得探討的問(wèn)題。所以我個(gè)人認(rèn)為對(duì)話(huà)是一種靈性的探索方式，也是一種靈性的實(shí)踐方式，也是宇宙本身的一個(gè)動(dòng)力結(jié)構(gòu)。

為什么是宇宙本身的一個(gè)動(dòng)力結(jié)構(gòu)？這是因?yàn)?，譬如從基督教?lái)說(shuō)，如果神是三位一體，父子靈是互動(dòng)的。三個(gè)位格之間是互動(dòng)的。在印度教里我們講三個(gè)主神是可以互動(dòng)的。在佛教里面我們講報(bào)身、法身、應(yīng)身是互動(dòng)。這些似乎有些玄奧，但是從靈修學(xué)的角度看，不同層面之間也是可以展開(kāi)對(duì)話(huà)的。作為一個(gè)佛教徒，在內(nèi)心深處，三個(gè)層面就可以展開(kāi)對(duì)話(huà)。印度教里面也是如此。這些我們不多談了，這就是說(shuō)，第二軸心時(shí)代文明將是一個(gè)全新的文明，而這個(gè)文明基于軸心文明精神的弘揚(yáng)。譬如說(shuō)當(dāng)時(shí)佛陀的慈悲以及實(shí)修證悟這些觀念一直以來(lái)可能沒(méi)有非常完整全面地展開(kāi)，可是在這個(gè)全球化時(shí)代我們似乎有可能更快地展開(kāi)，能夠體現(xiàn)出來(lái)。我們可能很少人能達(dá)到佛陀的那個(gè)層面，可是佛陀與你的最終層面是通的。在基督教中，按照神學(xué)家的研究，按照舊約里面的經(jīng)文，每個(gè)人都是神（god），也就是說(shuō)人人都是有神性的，也就是說(shuō)在終極層面你與上帝是一體的，從神話(huà)層面上看你就是上帝的生命之氣。

第二軸心時(shí)代有多種意識(shí)，我們這里只談了其中的部分。事實(shí)上，讀者可以結(jié)合全球化時(shí)代的特征去反省第二軸心時(shí)代的意識(shí)特征。

三、第二軸心時(shí)代和中國(guó)宗教的未來(lái)

我在2007年參加過(guò)一次儒耶對(duì)話(huà)的會(huì)議，當(dāng)時(shí)我就提出，儒家和基督教對(duì)話(huà)從明末清初就開(kāi)始了（或許應(yīng)該更早），到現(xiàn)在對(duì)話(huà)了幾百年，但是依然是不成功的。反之，佛教和中國(guó)文化的對(duì)話(huà)是非常成功，佛教已經(jīng)成為中國(guó)文化的一個(gè)有機(jī)部分。到現(xiàn)在為止，基督教在某種意義上還沒(méi)有成為中國(guó)文化的有機(jī)部分，所以耶儒對(duì)話(huà)還要繼續(xù)。在那次的香港儒耶對(duì)話(huà)會(huì)議上，一些基督教學(xué)者和儒教學(xué)者吵起來(lái)了，有的儒家學(xué)者從內(nèi)心說(shuō)，對(duì)基督教不屑一顧，批評(píng)得很兇，認(rèn)為基督教非常霸權(quán)。我那時(shí)是中間派。我的論文被評(píng)為很客觀，而基督教和儒教的學(xué)者基本上對(duì)對(duì)方多持有消極的態(tài)度。

但我們中國(guó)文明現(xiàn)在首先要面對(duì)的是基督教的進(jìn)入。北派的一些儒家學(xué)者搞儒家報(bào)紙《儒教郵報(bào)》，宣言儒教文化。有一次我和他們談，我說(shuō)儒家在對(duì)話(huà)這個(gè)方面的立場(chǎng)是開(kāi)放的，我完全可以成為一個(gè)儒士。儒家一直來(lái)是主張開(kāi)放的，如《論語(yǔ)》主張“和而不同”，并主張 “有朋自遠(yuǎn)方來(lái)，不亦說(shuō)乎”。2008年召開(kāi)的北京奧運(yùn)會(huì)上，我們就使用這個(gè)標(biāo)語(yǔ)。我認(rèn)為，儒家或者儒教從理論上說(shuō)它是開(kāi)放的，而且在走上全球化的道路上也沒(méi)有任何障礙。只是在儒教本身的發(fā)展中，有人把儒教的一些支流末節(jié)的東西凝固起來(lái)，作為寶貝，說(shuō)是國(guó)學(xué)里必須保留的東西，這就會(huì)出現(xiàn)很多批評(píng)。但儒家的精神本身是可以全球化的，而且在我看來(lái)是最容易被接受的觀念就是儒家觀念，因?yàn)槿寮液芏嘤^念在發(fā)展中沒(méi)有障礙。也就是說(shuō)，儒家很容易走向全球化，很容易為世界所接受，但是儒家現(xiàn)在很多都是很保守的，會(huì)出現(xiàn)很多張力。

我是主張儒家應(yīng)和基督教互動(dòng)的，這并不是說(shuō)徹底成為一個(gè)凝固不變的儒家，而應(yīng)該是作為一個(gè)開(kāi)放的、發(fā)展的儒家。所以說(shuō)，軸心時(shí)代的中國(guó)宗教思想先為我們中華民族帶來(lái)了福音，幫助了我們很多人，成為了我們中國(guó)的靈魂。道家其實(shí)也如儒家一樣也可以走上全球化，它在軸心時(shí)代以及軸心時(shí)代以后已經(jīng)滋養(yǎng)了無(wú)數(shù)人的精神生活。佛教傳入中國(guó)以后已經(jīng)成為了中國(guó)的佛教了，成為了中國(guó)文化的一部分，它也能并已經(jīng)為中華民族提供營(yíng)養(yǎng)。所以儒釋道三家是兄弟，它們都為中華民族服務(wù)。

宗教不是為教服務(wù)，而是為人服務(wù)，所以它們應(yīng)該造福于中國(guó)人民，也應(yīng)該面向于世界人民。如果宗教是服務(wù)人的，那么宗教很多信念層面的東西是可以變革的。在軸心時(shí)代發(fā)端的文明已經(jīng)發(fā)揮了很多作用，在它凝固的過(guò)程中，它有積極的也有消極的。而到今天真正的全球化時(shí)代，我認(rèn)為儒家的東西是可以改革的。道家有很多東西也是可以改革的。它們?cè)诜?wù)于中華民族的同時(shí)也可以服務(wù)世界，讓這些軸心時(shí)代已有的資源在全球化的過(guò)程中可以重新展開(kāi)，能夠哺育世界。這樣，這個(gè)世界就會(huì)更加和諧。

從靈修學(xué)的角度看，對(duì)個(gè)人靈性生活、個(gè)人靈性的成長(zhǎng)可以提供非常好的營(yíng)養(yǎng)。在中國(guó)，儒釋道以及一些較原始宗教，如少數(shù)民族中那種特別關(guān)注人與自然關(guān)系的宗教對(duì)于今天來(lái)說(shuō)也是十分重要的，對(duì)于今天現(xiàn)代人來(lái)說(shuō)具有借鑒作用?，F(xiàn)在，很多環(huán)境災(zāi)難都和我們?nèi)祟?lèi)自身的活動(dòng)息息相關(guān)，從佛教上說(shuō)，業(yè)很重，不僅中國(guó)的業(yè)很重，整個(gè)世界范圍內(nèi)的業(yè)都很重。人類(lèi)的很多問(wèn)題和人類(lèi)的共業(yè)有關(guān)。這就是說(shuō)在我們?nèi)蚧瘯r(shí)代，我們可以讓儒釋道和其他文明共同凝聚、創(chuàng)造一個(gè)新的人類(lèi)的靈性或者說(shuō)新時(shí)代的靈性，并可以服務(wù)于這個(gè)世界。在這個(gè)全球化的世界中不同的文化一定會(huì)相遇，一定會(huì)發(fā)生碰撞，融合。這個(gè)過(guò)程中出現(xiàn)了很多問(wèn)題，很值得我們的學(xué)者去探討去研究。從這個(gè)角度看，我們中國(guó)的儒釋道都可以為第二軸心時(shí)代做出貢獻(xiàn)！這不是為了迎合某個(gè)利益集團(tuán)或者意識(shí)形態(tài)，而是這個(gè)信仰本身在宇宙里發(fā)揮它的功能，應(yīng)該服務(wù)于這個(gè)世界的人，所以不是為了迎合某個(gè)利益集團(tuán)或者意識(shí)形態(tài)講的，而是它自身的生命、命運(yùn)運(yùn)動(dòng)本身所需要的。

在這個(gè)全球化過(guò)程中，不同的信仰、不同的宗教會(huì)共同形成一個(gè)非常巨大的松散的靈性共同體。我認(rèn)為這對(duì)我們的未來(lái)會(huì)更合理一些、更好一些。我們說(shuō)第二軸心時(shí)代來(lái)臨了，可是它不是說(shuō)今天來(lái)了，明天世界就變了，它是一個(gè)進(jìn)程。世界怎么走，未來(lái)是不確定的，因?yàn)樵谖覀冞@個(gè)世界中我們本身就有很多不確定的因素。這只能說(shuō)我們?cè)谂?chuàng)造一個(gè)未來(lái)，然后我們把這個(gè)軸心文明的精神或者靈魂在新的時(shí)代不斷弘揚(yáng)。結(jié)合這個(gè)時(shí)代的特征，我們進(jìn)一步去發(fā)揮它的功能，發(fā)展它的潛能，以及在這個(gè)互動(dòng)過(guò)程中去發(fā)揮、發(fā)現(xiàn)、發(fā)揚(yáng)更新的東西。

謝謝大家。

王志成：浙江大學(xué)教授，博士生導(dǎo)師。聯(lián)系地址：浙江大學(xué)西溪校區(qū)哲學(xué)系，310028；Email: dezxsd@126.com

第二篇：哲學(xué)與人生(演講)

按照我國(guó)著名哲學(xué)家馮友蘭先生的話(huà)說(shuō)：什么是哲學(xué)？哲學(xué)，就是對(duì)人生有系統(tǒng)的反思。所以，我把同學(xué)們對(duì)人生的關(guān)切和對(duì)哲學(xué)的興趣結(jié)合起來(lái)，和大家談一下哲學(xué)與人生。

哲學(xué)：“使人作為人而能夠成為人”

學(xué)科學(xué)，我不說(shuō)，你糊涂；我一說(shuō)，你明白。而學(xué)哲學(xué)，我不說(shuō)，你明白；我一說(shuō)，你糊涂。

哲學(xué)就是對(duì)于人生有系統(tǒng)的反思。在這個(gè)命題中，包含幾層意思。一層意思是說(shuō)，哲學(xué)是對(duì)于人生的一種反思。這種反思活動(dòng)，應(yīng)當(dāng)說(shuō)人人都會(huì)有。另一層意思是說(shuō)，作為哲學(xué)的這樣一種人類(lèi)活動(dòng)，它是對(duì)于人生的有系統(tǒng)的反思，也就是說(shuō)，能夠系統(tǒng)地反思人生的活動(dòng)叫哲學(xué)活動(dòng)；而進(jìn)行這種活動(dòng)的人呢，就是哲學(xué)家了。

系統(tǒng)地反思人生的哲學(xué)，它同其他科學(xué)的區(qū)別在什么地方？除了哲學(xué)之外的其他科學(xué)，使你成為“某種人”，也就是使你掌握某種具體的專(zhuān)業(yè)，掌握某種特殊的技能，扮演某種特定的角色，將來(lái)你可以從事某種特定的職業(yè)。我們把這稱(chēng)為科學(xué)，使你成為“某種人”。

與此不同，哲學(xué)使你“作為人而成為人”。這句話(huà)的含義是極為深刻的。雖然說(shuō)你是人，但是在真正人的意義上，缺少一種哲學(xué)的修養(yǎng)，還不是馮先生所指認(rèn)的那種真正意義上的人。所以，他作了這樣的一種區(qū)別，其他學(xué)科使你成為某種特殊的人，用我們現(xiàn)在的通俗說(shuō)法，就是成為一種“專(zhuān)門(mén)人才”；而學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)，使你作為人能夠成為人，做一個(gè)有教養(yǎng)的現(xiàn)代人。這是哲學(xué)與科學(xué)的區(qū)別，也就是哲學(xué)的特殊的意義與價(jià)值。

這種對(duì)于人生的有系統(tǒng)的反思哲學(xué)，怎樣才能夠獲得？ 馮先生說(shuō)是“覺(jué)解”。我曾經(jīng)寫(xiě)過(guò)《哲學(xué)修養(yǎng)十五講》一書(shū)，在國(guó)內(nèi)算一本暢銷(xiāo)書(shū)吧。前幾天這本書(shū)的編輯給我說(shuō)，最近在臺(tái)灣重新出版這本書(shū)，更名為《哲學(xué)修養(yǎng)的十五堂課》。

在書(shū)里，我說(shuō)學(xué)習(xí)科學(xué)和學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)是兩種完全不同的感覺(jué)。學(xué)科學(xué)是什么感覺(jué)呢？我不說(shuō)，你糊涂；我一說(shuō)，你明白。而學(xué)哲學(xué)則是，我不說(shuō)，你明白；我一說(shuō)，你糊涂。大家會(huì)覺(jué)得很怪，怎么會(huì)是這樣呢？大家想一想，科學(xué)是把一些個(gè)別的現(xiàn)象，單稱(chēng)命題和觀察名詞，經(jīng)過(guò)歸納推理，上升為理論名詞和全稱(chēng)命題，然后再通過(guò)演繹推理，做出解釋和預(yù)見(jiàn)。例如，我一說(shuō)，三角形三內(nèi)角之和等于180度，再一說(shuō)邊角關(guān)系，你就會(huì)作相關(guān)的幾何題了。這就叫作我不說(shuō)你糊涂，我一說(shuō)你明白了。

而哲學(xué)恰好相反，它是把人們當(dāng)作不言而喻的、毋庸置疑的東西作為批判反思的對(duì)象。我不說(shuō)的時(shí)候，你清清楚楚的；我一說(shuō)，你卻可能糊涂了。例如，這里有一張桌子，我不說(shuō)，它就是一張桌子，清清楚楚的；可是我一旦問(wèn)你，你如果沒(méi)有桌子的觀念，為什么會(huì)把如此這般的一個(gè)東西把握為桌子呢？糊涂沒(méi)？這就是哲學(xué)的“思維和存在的關(guān)系問(wèn)題”。

內(nèi)地的同學(xué)都知道，臺(tái)灣的同學(xué)不知聽(tīng)到過(guò)沒(méi)有？有一首歌叫《我心中的太陽(yáng)》，歌詞是：“天上的太陽(yáng)和水中的月亮誰(shuí)亮？山上的大樹(shù)和山下的小樹(shù)誰(shuí)大？心中的戀人和身外的世界誰(shuí)重要？”我不知道在座的同學(xué)怎么回答？歌曲中是：“我不知道，我不知道，我不知道！”

這個(gè)世界是極為復(fù)雜的！哲學(xué)就是要把這個(gè)世界的復(fù)雜性，特別是人生的復(fù)雜性揭示出來(lái)。我不說(shuō)的時(shí)候，你很清楚；我一說(shuō)的時(shí)候，你可能更糊涂了，這就需要馮先生所說(shuō)的那個(gè)“覺(jué)解”。如果沒(méi)有一種哲學(xué)的辯證智慧，你很容易走向極端，你今天是理想主義，明天可能是現(xiàn)實(shí)主義，最后可能是絕對(duì)主義，相對(duì)主義了，榮辱呀，禍福呀，你就不好把握了。所以，在這個(gè)意義上，哲學(xué)就是對(duì)于人生有系統(tǒng)的反思，使人作為人而能夠成為人，是一種“覺(jué)解”的活動(dòng)。

哲學(xué)的這種“覺(jué)解”活動(dòng)，要達(dá)到的目的是什么呢？馮先生說(shuō)是“境界”。他講人生四境界：使人超越自然的境界、功利的境界、道德的境界，最后達(dá)到一種天地的境界。所以，中國(guó)哲學(xué)最講究天人合一、知行合一、情景合一、養(yǎng)吾浩然之氣。這是一種馮先生所理解的哲學(xué)，也就是哲學(xué)與人生的關(guān)系。

上面是談了馮友蘭先生對(duì)哲學(xué)的理解。下面，我就想從哲學(xué)與人生出發(fā)，從哲學(xué)層面上對(duì)人生有一個(gè)大體的解說(shuō)，談一下自己的體會(huì)。我想分成三個(gè)問(wèn)題具體地來(lái)談，一是人的存在；二是人的人化；三是人的世界。

哲學(xué)家馮友蘭

人的存在，是一種超越性的存在 人無(wú)法忍受單一的顏色、無(wú)法忍受凝固的時(shí)空、無(wú)法忍受存在的空虛、無(wú)法忍受自我的失落和無(wú)法忍受徹底的空白。人的這五種無(wú)法忍受，意味著人是一種超越性的存在。

怎么樣來(lái)理解人的存在呢？我的說(shuō)法是，人是一種超越性的、理想性的、創(chuàng)造性的存在。我還有一本書(shū)《超越意識(shí)》。這本書(shū)開(kāi)篇的第一句話(huà)：人是世界上最奇異的存在――超越性的存在。怎么理解呢？我首先是使用反證法:人無(wú)法忍受什么？尤其是青年人，我概括為五個(gè)方面：無(wú)法忍受單一的顏色、無(wú)法忍受凝固的時(shí)空、無(wú)法忍受存在的空虛、無(wú)法忍受自我的失落和無(wú)法忍受徹底的空白。人的這五種無(wú)法忍受，意味著人是一種超越性的存在。

世界就是自然，它自然而然地存在。那么人生呢，它也是自然。人自然而然地生，自然而然地死。然而，從自然當(dāng)中生成的人，它恰好超越了這個(gè)自然！把自然而然的世界改造成了一個(gè)對(duì)于人來(lái)說(shuō)真善美相統(tǒng)一的世界！這才是人！

我問(wèn)在座的同學(xué)，你喜歡什么顏色？有的說(shuō)喜歡紅色，有的說(shuō)喜歡綠色，有的說(shuō)喜歡藍(lán)色。但是，我說(shuō)如果這個(gè)世界只是你所喜歡鮮艷的紅色、純潔的白色、嬌嫩的綠色，你還能不能在世界上生活了？！那就像馬克思所說(shuō)的一段話(huà)，他說(shuō)：“在太陽(yáng)的輝映下，每一顆露水珠都會(huì)閃現(xiàn)出五顏六色的顏色?！比说氖澜缡且粋€(gè)五彩繽紛的世界，豐富多彩的世界，人無(wú)法忍受單一的顏色。

生活的世界應(yīng)當(dāng)是豐富多彩的，這個(gè)豐富多彩的世界是人自己創(chuàng)造出來(lái)的，所以人無(wú)法忍受的第二個(gè)就是“凝固的時(shí)空”。用馬克思的話(huà)說(shuō)：“時(shí)間是人類(lèi)存在的空間?！?前些天看魯豫的一個(gè)訪(fǎng)談，被采訪(fǎng)的那個(gè)女士說(shuō)，回顧自己的一生，我沒(méi)有浪費(fèi)上帝給予我的時(shí)間。

時(shí)間構(gòu)成了人真正的存在，所以人無(wú)法忍受凝固的時(shí)空，而是在時(shí)間中實(shí)現(xiàn)了自己的存在。人的生活是創(chuàng)造的過(guò)程，也就是改天換地的過(guò)程。人類(lèi)世世代代的科學(xué)發(fā)現(xiàn)、技術(shù)發(fā)明、藝術(shù)創(chuàng)作、理論創(chuàng)新、政治變革，不都是在時(shí)間中構(gòu)成自己存在和發(fā)展的空間嗎？“凝固的時(shí)空”是人無(wú)法忍受的。

正因?yàn)槿私o自己創(chuàng)造了自己的時(shí)空世界，所以人又無(wú)法忍受“存在的空虛”。什么叫人？人是尋求意義的存在。人無(wú)法忍受無(wú)意義的生活。大家都知道，國(guó)內(nèi)近30年改革開(kāi)放，發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。國(guó)內(nèi)有一本暢銷(xiāo)的雜志叫《讀者》，這是一本有情趣的人都會(huì)喜歡的雜志。那里邊曾經(jīng)先后登過(guò)兩篇文章，一篇是《當(dāng)我沒(méi)有錢(qián)的時(shí)候》，另一篇是《當(dāng)我有錢(qián)的時(shí)候》。這兩篇文章表達(dá)了一個(gè)共同的思想，叫做人不是為了生存而生存，而是為了尋求意義而生活的。

所以，現(xiàn)在哲學(xué)有一個(gè)說(shuō)法，說(shuō)所謂現(xiàn)代病就是“形象大于存在”，就是“包裝”，方方面面的“包裝”?？墒巧鲜兰o(jì)80年代流行的一首歌里就有這樣的歌詞：“你不用涂紅又沫綠，只要你不斷充實(shí)自己，人人都會(huì)喜歡你?！背鋵?shí)自己，就是獲得存在的意義。人生的存在是大于它的形象的。它的存在的意義是最重要的。人無(wú)法忍受“存在的空虛”。

正因?yàn)槿绱?，人又無(wú)法忍受“自我的失落”。大家都知道人本主義心理學(xué)家馬斯洛的層次需要理論。生存的需要、安全的需要、歸屬的需要、審美的需要，最終升華為一種自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的需要。我想，對(duì)于每一個(gè)年青人來(lái)說(shuō)，最能夠使他激動(dòng)起來(lái)的，就是自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的感覺(jué)。在心理學(xué)上稱(chēng)之為高峰的體驗(yàn)。最美的體驗(yàn)就是一種自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的高峰體驗(yàn)。每個(gè)人的人生，作為一個(gè)長(zhǎng)卷，它是一部波瀾壯闊的小說(shuō)；作為每個(gè)瞬間，它是一首感動(dòng)自己的詩(shī)篇。人生的幸福，既是在目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)中所獲得的快樂(lè)的感覺(jué)，又是在快樂(lè)的感覺(jué)中實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的目標(biāo)。所以人無(wú)法忍受自我的失落。

人生是有限的。人是一種能夠自覺(jué)到死的存在。系統(tǒng)地反思人生的哲學(xué)，是“向死而思生”，所以有人把哲學(xué)叫作對(duì)死亡的練習(xí)。人能夠意識(shí)到自己是一個(gè)有限的存在，人就想超越這種有限的人生，因?yàn)槿藷o(wú)法忍受“徹底的空白”。哲人培根說(shuō)，人的“復(fù)仇之心勝過(guò)死亡，愛(ài)戀之心蔑視死亡，榮譽(yù)之心希冀死亡，憂(yōu)傷之心奔赴死亡，恐怖之心凝神于死亡”。這是心靈對(duì)死亡的超越。人的生命面對(duì)死亡，又以生命的追求超越死亡。古人講立功、立德、立言，用這三種方式來(lái)使自己有限的人生燃燒起熊熊的生命之火，使生命得到無(wú)限的延續(xù)。

這就是我所說(shuō)的人的超越性。有了尋求意義的人生，才能對(duì)人生進(jìn)行有系統(tǒng)的反思哲學(xué)。

那么，究竟怎樣理解人的存在？人既源于動(dòng)物，又同動(dòng)物具有根本性的區(qū)別。人和動(dòng)物都是一種生命活動(dòng)，兩者的區(qū)別就在于，動(dòng)物是一種生存的生命活動(dòng)，而人是一種生活的生命活動(dòng)。

生存是一種無(wú)意義的生命活動(dòng)，生活是一種尋求意義的生命活動(dòng)。在這一點(diǎn)上區(qū)分了人和動(dòng)物。人是一種尋求意義的生活活動(dòng)，動(dòng)物是一種本能性的生存活動(dòng)，動(dòng)物和人的區(qū)別就在于是兩種不同的生命活動(dòng)。為什么是兩種不同的生命活動(dòng)呢？馬克思說(shuō)，動(dòng)物只有一個(gè)生命的尺度，而人有兩種尺度。動(dòng)物只有自己所屬的物種的一個(gè)尺度，所以它只能是本能的生命活動(dòng)。人有兩個(gè)尺度，既是按照自己的目的活動(dòng)，又是按照所有物種的尺度活動(dòng)，這就是既“合目的”又“合規(guī)律”的活動(dòng)，是把世界變成對(duì)人來(lái)說(shuō)是真善美的世界的活動(dòng)。所以作為一個(gè)人的存在，是一個(gè)超越性的存在，一個(gè)理想性的存在，人是一個(gè)把自己的理想不斷地變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí)的活動(dòng)過(guò)程。這是一個(gè)創(chuàng)造的過(guò)程。

中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院的老院長(zhǎng)胡繩，在一篇文章中講到：人類(lèi)在20世紀(jì)的后五十年所創(chuàng)造的科學(xué)技術(shù)，超過(guò)了人類(lèi)在20世紀(jì)五十年代以前的幾千年所創(chuàng)造的總和！

什么叫現(xiàn)代化？現(xiàn)代化首先是日常生活科學(xué)化，接著是日常消遣文化化，接著是日常交往社交化，日常生活法治化，農(nóng)村生活城市化。人創(chuàng)造了自己的歷史，實(shí)現(xiàn)了生活的現(xiàn)代化。所以人的存在是超越性的、理想性的、創(chuàng)造性的存在。這才是人的存在。

大學(xué)生正處在一個(gè)人生的最有理想、最有創(chuàng)造性的時(shí)期，你們一定很喜歡哲學(xué)。這是對(duì)于人生的一種有系統(tǒng)的反思。通過(guò)這種反思，我們能夠覺(jué)解生活，更加自覺(jué)地去擁抱生活，更加自覺(jué)地去創(chuàng)造生活，從而把我們的世界建設(shè)成為更美好的世界，把我們的人生塑造成更美好的人生。

倫敦海格特公園的馬克思墓

人的人化，人使自己成為人

人是一個(gè)人化的產(chǎn)物，是一種人化的結(jié)果，是一種歷史性的存在。這是人和動(dòng)物的不同。動(dòng)物是一代又一代的復(fù)制自己，而人是一代又一代地發(fā)展自己。這是人和動(dòng)物的不同。

法國(guó)著名哲學(xué)家薩特，有一個(gè)著名的哲學(xué)命題：“存在先于本質(zhì)”。人以外的所有的存在都是本質(zhì)先于存在，而人這種存在是存在先于本質(zhì)。除了人之外，我們中國(guó)人有一句俗話(huà)，叫作種瓜得瓜，種豆得豆。本質(zhì)先于存在，本質(zhì)就規(guī)定了它的存在。

但是，人就不是這樣了。生下來(lái)的無(wú)論是男孩女孩，我們說(shuō)他是人，但是長(zhǎng)大了，未必就成為人。為什么？人是一個(gè)人化的產(chǎn)物，是一種人化的結(jié)果，是一種歷史性的存在。這是人和動(dòng)物的不同。動(dòng)物是一代又一代的復(fù)制自己，而人是一代又一代地發(fā)展自己。

用馬克思說(shuō)，什么叫歷史？“歷史不過(guò)是追求自己的目的人的活動(dòng)的過(guò)程而已”。人的這種活動(dòng)的過(guò)程，成了人的歷史。所以，馬克思說(shuō)，什么叫作社會(huì)存在？社會(huì)存在就是人們的實(shí)際的生活過(guò)程。我們的實(shí)際的生活過(guò)程，構(gòu)成我們?nèi)俗约旱纳畹臍v史。人的自己的生活歷史，就是我們每個(gè)人成為人的過(guò)程。我們每個(gè)人成為人的過(guò)程，既構(gòu)成了歷史的前提，又構(gòu)成了歷史的結(jié)果；而人只有首先作為歷史的結(jié)果，才能夠成為歷史的前提，因?yàn)槊看丝偸巧洗诉z留的文化的產(chǎn)物。我們正是在歷史文化的進(jìn)程中而成為今天的存在。正是在這個(gè)意義上，人是“存在先于本質(zhì)”，人是人化的過(guò)程。

關(guān)于人的人化，今天我要特殊地談一個(gè)我對(duì)教育的理解。

那么，什么是教育呢？教育是一種社會(huì)遺傳的機(jī)制，它以自身為中介而實(shí)現(xiàn)雙向的認(rèn)同：一方面，是個(gè)體向歷史社會(huì)文化的一種認(rèn)同；另一方面，它同時(shí)又是歷史社會(huì)文化對(duì)個(gè)體的認(rèn)可。教育就是這種“認(rèn)同”與“認(rèn)可”的雙向互動(dòng)過(guò)程。

在這個(gè)意義上，廣義的教育實(shí)際上是哲學(xué)教育；或者說(shuō)，哲學(xué)教育，就是使人作為人能夠成為人。教育首先不是使人成為某種人，而是使人作為人能夠成為人。人不僅僅是一種自然意義上的遺傳性的獲得，它還是一種文化意義上的獲得性的遺傳。所以，真實(shí)的教育，最根本的目的是提高人的素養(yǎng)。它是使人作為人能夠成為人。教育是使你首先能夠成為一個(gè)認(rèn)同這個(gè)社會(huì)、這個(gè)時(shí)代、這個(gè)歷史的現(xiàn)代公民。我們只有能夠成為人，才能夠成為某種人，才能夠去掌握某種專(zhuān)門(mén)的知識(shí)、技能，去從事某種專(zhuān)門(mén)的職業(yè)，去扮演某種特殊的角色，在社會(huì)生活中實(shí)現(xiàn)自我。

人作為一個(gè)歷史文化的存在，自身是一個(gè)人化的過(guò)程，使自己作為人能夠成為人的過(guò)程。這種成為人的過(guò)程，最重要的就是以教育為中介的社會(huì)遺傳和文化遺傳。從十九世紀(jì)中葉以來(lái)的現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)，所解決的一個(gè)根本的問(wèn)題就在于，它不是把人當(dāng)作一個(gè)抽象的存在，而是當(dāng)作一個(gè)歷史具體的文化存在。近代以來(lái)的哲學(xué)，它是一個(gè)上帝的人本化過(guò)程。上帝的自然化，上帝的物質(zhì)化，上帝的精神化到整個(gè)的上帝的人本化的過(guò)程。

所以，有的同學(xué)即使不是學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)的可能也知道，美國(guó)出版了一套叢書(shū)叫作“導(dǎo)師哲學(xué)家叢書(shū)”，我推薦給不是學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)專(zhuān)業(yè)的同學(xué)。它把中世紀(jì)叫作“信仰的時(shí)代”，把文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期叫作“冒險(xiǎn)的時(shí)代”，把十七世紀(jì)叫作“理性的時(shí)代”，把十八世紀(jì)叫作“啟蒙的時(shí)代”，把十九世紀(jì)叫作“思想體系的時(shí)代”，而把剛剛過(guò)去的二十世紀(jì)叫作“分析的時(shí)代”。

近一個(gè)時(shí)期以來(lái)，內(nèi)地的哲學(xué)家們也想用五個(gè)字概括當(dāng)今的時(shí)代，有的人叫它“物化的時(shí)代”，有的人叫它“體驗(yàn)的時(shí)代”，有的人叫它“信息的時(shí)代”，如此等等。

總而言之，哲學(xué)，恰如哲學(xué)家黑格爾所說(shuō)的，它是思想中所把握到的時(shí)代，就是思想中所把握到的人生。它是以一種理論的方式表征了人的特定的歷史的存在。

剛才說(shuō)到的“導(dǎo)師哲學(xué)家叢書(shū)”所概括的歷史時(shí)代，特別是在座的有學(xué)哲學(xué)的，有學(xué)歷史的，你們就會(huì)很清楚，這正是一個(gè)人的人化的過(guò)程。中世紀(jì)“信仰的時(shí)代”，先上帝而后自我，先信仰而后理解。那么，從文藝復(fù)興以來(lái)就發(fā)生了一個(gè)巨大的顛倒，笛卡爾說(shuō)“我思故我在”，意思是說(shuō)我先有思想然后才有我的存在嗎？不是！他是說(shuō)先自我而后上帝，先理解而后信仰，這才是從封建社會(huì)的自然經(jīng)濟(jì)到資本主義社會(huì)的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)化。

什么叫作從自然經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)向市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)呢？這是一種人的存在方式的轉(zhuǎn)化，是一個(gè)人化的過(guò)程。自然經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下，是一種經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的禁欲主義，精神生活的蒙昧主義，政治生活的專(zhuān)制主義。走向市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)以來(lái)，在經(jīng)濟(jì)生活當(dāng)中反對(duì)禁欲主義而要求現(xiàn)實(shí)幸福，精神生活反對(duì)蒙昧主義而要求理性自由，在政治生活當(dāng)中反對(duì)專(zhuān)制主義而要求民主法治。市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)際上蘊(yùn)含著三條基本原則：經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的功利主義的價(jià)值取向，精神生活的工具理性的思維取向，政治生活的民主法治的政治取向。三位一體構(gòu)成了馬克思所說(shuō)的，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)是以“物的依賴(lài)性為基礎(chǔ)的人的獨(dú)立性”的存在。這就是我們現(xiàn)代人的存在方式，這就是近代以來(lái)的人之為人的人化的過(guò)程。人是一種教養(yǎng)，而教養(yǎng)源于教育。這就是受教育的意義。所以無(wú)論是內(nèi)地的同學(xué)還是臺(tái)灣的同學(xué)，你最應(yīng)當(dāng)珍視的就是能夠接受到高等教育，這是你作為人能夠成為現(xiàn)代人的一個(gè)最基本的前提。這就是人的人化。人是一個(gè)人化的過(guò)程。這就是我要跟大家講的第二個(gè)問(wèn)題。

哲學(xué)家薩特

人的世界，有限世界的超越

哲學(xué)賦予人的生活以目的和意義的世界觀。哲學(xué)作為人類(lèi)心靈的最深層的偉大創(chuàng)造，其主旨即在于使人的精神境界不斷地升華，在精神境界的升華中崇高起來(lái)。哲學(xué)的修養(yǎng)與創(chuàng)造，是人們追求崇高的過(guò)程，也是使人們自己崇高起來(lái)的過(guò)程。它要求學(xué)習(xí)哲學(xué)的人永葆理想性的追求。祝愿大家終生與哲學(xué)為伴，讓哲學(xué)引導(dǎo)我們對(duì)真理、正義和更美好事物的追求！謝謝大家！

馬克思在1867年8月16日看完《資本論》序言的校樣后，寫(xiě)給恩格斯的信，感謝恩格斯所作的自我犧牲。

什么叫作神話(huà)的世界？神話(huà)的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作藝術(shù)的世界？藝術(shù)的世界是無(wú)情世界的超越。什么叫作倫理世界？倫理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科學(xué)的世界？科學(xué)的世界是經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界的超越。什么叫作哲學(xué)的世界？哲學(xué)的世界是有限世界的超越。

人的人化過(guò)程，是一個(gè)形成人的世界、屬于人的世界的過(guò)程。世界這個(gè)概念，可以在兩個(gè)意義上去使用它:一是在自然的意義上去使用，另一個(gè)真實(shí)的意義，是在人給自己創(chuàng)造的世界的意義上去使用。

我在1988年曾經(jīng)寫(xiě)過(guò)一篇文章，正標(biāo)題是“從兩極到中介”，副標(biāo)題是“現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)的革命”。其中，談到怎么理解人的存在方式，怎么理解語(yǔ)言？語(yǔ)言既然是人的世界的積極界限，也是人的世界的消極界限，世界在人的語(yǔ)言中生成為有。

語(yǔ)言之外的世界，對(duì)于人來(lái)說(shuō)，正如哲學(xué)家黑格爾所說(shuō)的，是“有之非有”，“存在著的無(wú)”。語(yǔ)言是人的存在方式，又是我們的世界的存在的方式。我們?cè)谡Z(yǔ)言當(dāng)中才構(gòu)成了屬于人的世界。語(yǔ)言不是僅僅作為能指和所指的統(tǒng)一，而是作為歷史文化的水庫(kù)而存在的。它表明人是一種歷史文化的存在。人是歷史文化的結(jié)果，歷史文化的產(chǎn)物。人是以人類(lèi)自己把握世界的方式而構(gòu)成了屬于人的豐富多彩的世界。

人都以什么方式把握世界？是以常識(shí)的方式，神話(huà)的方式，宗教的方式，藝術(shù)的方式，倫理的方式，科學(xué)的方式和哲學(xué)的方式把握世界，因此對(duì)于我們來(lái)說(shuō)有無(wú)限豐富的世界。

現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)和現(xiàn)代科學(xué)給了我們幾個(gè)最基本的命題，叫作觀察滲透理論，觀察負(fù)載理論，沒(méi)有中性的觀察，觀察總是被理論污染的。我們?cè)瓉?lái)總認(rèn)為科學(xué)始于觀察，甚至有人說(shuō)，正確的科學(xué)研究和科學(xué)試驗(yàn)，首先應(yīng)當(dāng)把我們自己的偏見(jiàn)像脫掉大衣一樣放到走廊里邊，用沒(méi)有偏見(jiàn)的頭腦進(jìn)到實(shí)驗(yàn)室。你只有有了相應(yīng)的理論，才能夠有相應(yīng)的世界。

馬克思說(shuō)，人只有有了欣賞音樂(lè)的耳朵，才能夠欣賞音樂(lè)。你有什么樣的音樂(lè)修養(yǎng)，才能夠欣賞什么樣的音樂(lè)。想一想，沒(méi)有看羅曼?羅蘭，沒(méi)有看莎士比亞，沒(méi)有看巴爾扎克，沒(méi)有看托爾斯泰，怎么能有相應(yīng)的修養(yǎng)去享受那樣一些相應(yīng)的作品呢？正如黑格爾說(shuō)的，有之非有，存在著的無(wú)！觀察負(fù)載理論，沒(méi)有中性的觀察，觀察總是被理論污染的。每個(gè)人所擁有的世界，同每個(gè)人所擁有的知識(shí)、理論、修養(yǎng)是密不可分的。

中國(guó)有一句古話(huà)叫作“君子坦蕩蕩，小人常戚戚”;西方人叫作“仆人眼中無(wú)英雄”。因?yàn)槭裁?？就是因?yàn)槟愕谋尘安灰粯用?！知識(shí)背景，理論背景不一樣，你對(duì)生活的感受和理解也就不一樣了。

為什么君子坦蕩蕩？就因?yàn)樗闹杏欣献印⒂锌鬃?、有莊子，有孟子，養(yǎng)我浩然之氣，萬(wàn)物皆備于我。

為什么小人常戚戚呢？因?yàn)樗恢缽埲钏模壌壴?，爾虞我詐，蠅蠅茍茍。

為什么仆人眼中無(wú)英雄呢？因?yàn)橛⑿塾杏⑿鄣氖聵I(yè)，英雄有英雄的情懷。不理解英雄的事業(yè)，不懂得英雄的情懷，當(dāng)然就“眼中無(wú)英雄”了。北國(guó)風(fēng)光，千里冰封，萬(wàn)里雪飄。這是毛澤東在《沁園春?雪》中對(duì)自然的禮贊。接著毛澤東寫(xiě)歷史人物:惜秦皇漢武，略輸文采，唐宗宋祖，稍遜風(fēng)騷，一代天驕，成吉思汗，只識(shí)彎弓射大雕。最后毛澤東說(shuō)什么？俱往矣，數(shù)風(fēng)流人物還看今朝！這就是政治家的一種博大而深邃的情懷!這也是藝術(shù)家的一種空靈而凝重的情懷！你如果不是作為政治家和藝術(shù)家的話(huà)，你就理解不了他的這種情懷。

我最強(qiáng)調(diào)一個(gè)年輕人必須得有兩個(gè)修養(yǎng)，一是文學(xué)修養(yǎng)，二是哲學(xué)修養(yǎng)。一個(gè)大學(xué)生沒(méi)有文學(xué)修養(yǎng)和哲學(xué)修養(yǎng)，肯定不會(huì)有一個(gè)完整的美好的人生，因?yàn)橹挥杏辛宋膶W(xué)修養(yǎng)和哲學(xué)修養(yǎng)，有一種真實(shí)的審美的境界，才有這樣一種最強(qiáng)烈的理性之美。有了這樣兩個(gè)修養(yǎng)，這個(gè)世界對(duì)于你來(lái)說(shuō)才是豐富多彩的。

這個(gè)屬于人的世界，它首先是一個(gè)常識(shí)的世界，同時(shí)它又是一個(gè)宗教的世界，一個(gè)藝術(shù)的世界，一個(gè)倫理的世界，一個(gè)科學(xué)的世界和一個(gè)哲學(xué)的世界。同學(xué)們需要學(xué)習(xí)，你有了哪種把握世界的方式，對(duì)你來(lái)說(shuō)就有了哪種世界。因此，一個(gè)人只有在適當(dāng)?shù)哪挲g，受到適當(dāng)?shù)慕逃攀侨恕?/p>

因?yàn)?，它使你獲得了那種把握世界的基本方式。什么叫作神話(huà)的世界？神話(huà)的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作藝術(shù)的世界？藝術(shù)的世界是無(wú)情世界的超越。什么叫作倫理世界？倫理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科學(xué)的世界？科學(xué)的世界是經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界的超越。什么叫作哲學(xué)的世界？哲學(xué)的世界是有限世界的超越。你擁有了人類(lèi)把握世界的基本方式，真正實(shí)現(xiàn)了人自身的超越性，才真正有了一個(gè)五彩繽紛的人的世界！

對(duì)于人來(lái)說(shuō)，首先就是一個(gè)常識(shí)的世界。常識(shí)是源于經(jīng)驗(yàn)、適用于經(jīng)驗(yàn)但卻不能超越經(jīng)驗(yàn)的知識(shí)。常識(shí)是每個(gè)正常的健全人都普遍認(rèn)同的，在經(jīng)驗(yàn)中所獲得的知識(shí)。人人都在生活經(jīng)驗(yàn)中分享常識(shí)、體驗(yàn)常識(shí)、重復(fù)常識(shí)和貢獻(xiàn)新的常識(shí)。在常識(shí)中，人們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界得到最廣泛的相互理解，人們的思想感情得到最普遍的相互溝通，人們的行為方式得到最直接的相互協(xié)調(diào)，人們的內(nèi)心世界得到最便捷的自我認(rèn)同。常識(shí)既為我們構(gòu)成經(jīng)驗(yàn)的世界圖景，又為我們構(gòu)成經(jīng)驗(yàn)的思維方式，還為我們構(gòu)成經(jīng)驗(yàn)的價(jià)值規(guī)范。常識(shí)是人類(lèi)把握世界的最具普遍性的基本方式。沒(méi)有常識(shí)的人是不正常的，正常的人就得有常識(shí)。

常識(shí)構(gòu)成經(jīng)驗(yàn)的世界，而人的情感、意志和思想?yún)s總是超越經(jīng)驗(yàn)的常識(shí)，總是以超越常識(shí)的各種方式去構(gòu)成豐富多彩的人的世界。神話(huà)就是對(duì)自然世界的超越。很多人看神話(huà)小說(shuō)。其實(shí)，神話(huà)并不只是一種文學(xué)樣式，它還是人類(lèi)把握世界的一種方式。人在神話(huà)世界當(dāng)中，既把人的世界宇宙化了，又把宇宙的世界擬人化了。在那個(gè)被擬人化的宇宙世界當(dāng)中，人找到了自身存在的意義和價(jià)值，所以人總是給自己構(gòu)成一個(gè)神話(huà)的世界。金庸、梁羽生，為什么大家愿意看他們的書(shū)呢？因?yàn)閺哪撤N意義上，它使人們獲得了一個(gè)神話(huà)的世界。在神話(huà)的世界中，人們把自己的向往和追求、煩惱和憂(yōu)傷對(duì)象化了。

宗教世界是世俗世界的超越。宗教使人們的生活獲得了一種神圣的意義。宗教里面，特別是西方上帝的觀念，是很值得思考的。

按照我自己的說(shuō)法，什么叫作上帝？上帝就是規(guī)范人的思想和行為的根據(jù)、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和尺度，哲學(xué)本體意義上的觀念構(gòu)成心中的上帝。上帝不是一種對(duì)象性的存在，是你心中的一種觀念。

用馬克思的話(huà)說(shuō)，宗教就是沒(méi)有獲得自我或者是再度喪失了自我的一種自我意識(shí)或自我感覺(jué)。因?yàn)槿艘阶约核畹氖浪椎氖澜?，從一種神圣的存在來(lái)獲得生活的意義和價(jià)值。所以哲學(xué)家尼采說(shuō)，上帝被殺死了，一切都是可能的。這句話(huà)是什么意思呢？它正好是說(shuō)了這樣的兩層意思。一層是說(shuō)，整個(gè)的哲學(xué)和科學(xué)，它的理性的求索殺死了上帝，上帝不再作為人的思想和行為的根據(jù)、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和尺度。上帝不存在了，上帝被人本化了。一旦這個(gè)神圣的意義不再存在了，人的一切就都是可能的了。

所以，我曾經(jīng)給我的學(xué)生講了一段很長(zhǎng)的話(huà)：“在自然經(jīng)濟(jì)的條件下，是在一種沒(méi)有選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的生命中不堪忍受之重的本質(zhì)主義的肆虐；而在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的條件下，是一種失去了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的選擇的生命中不能承受之輕的存在主義的焦慮?！?/p>

什么叫本質(zhì)主義的肆虐呢？沒(méi)有選擇的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，給你什么標(biāo)準(zhǔn)就是什么標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，你自己沒(méi)有選擇的余地。這就是生命中不堪忍受之重的本質(zhì)主義的肆虐。你們現(xiàn)在的生活，我把它叫作一種失去了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的選擇的、生命中不能承受之輕的存在主義的焦慮。

現(xiàn)在有的人穿的短衫上寫(xiě)，煩死了，別理我;或者干脆就寫(xiě)一個(gè)字：煩！這不就是存在主義的焦慮么！生命中不能承受之輕。這是今天向我們提出的問(wèn)題。為什么呢？馬克思曾經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)撕去了封建社會(huì)的田園詩(shī)般的溫情脈脈的面紗，抹去了一切職業(yè)的靈光，把一切都沉浸到金錢(qián)的冰水當(dāng)中去了。這就是存在方式的變化，上帝被殺死了，上帝被人本化了，我們用什么東西使我們的生活有真實(shí)的意義呢？我們需要藝術(shù)的世界，倫理的世界，科學(xué)的世界和哲學(xué)的世界。

什么是藝術(shù)的世界？藝術(shù)的世界是對(duì)無(wú)情世界的超越，藝術(shù)是一種生命的形式。美學(xué)家蘇珊?朗格說(shuō)，藝術(shù)叫作創(chuàng)造。為什么？舞蹈家是創(chuàng)造了胳膊還是創(chuàng)造了腿？畫(huà)家是創(chuàng)造了油彩還是創(chuàng)造了畫(huà)布？文學(xué)家是創(chuàng)造了語(yǔ)言還是創(chuàng)造了文字？沒(méi)有，但他們創(chuàng)造了意義！我非常欣賞魯迅先生在三十年代翻譯的一本書(shū)《苦悶的象征》，其中說(shuō)，憤怒出詩(shī)人。

在今天這個(gè)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的條件下，最難出的就是詩(shī)人。你看看在80年代的臺(tái)灣校園歌曲里邊，你還能夠深切地感受到外婆的澎湖灣呀這樣的一些詩(shī)情畫(huà)意當(dāng)中所蘊(yùn)含著的一種恬淡的生活的境界?，F(xiàn)在呢？在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的條件下，最難感受到的就是海德格爾最欣賞的荷爾德林的那句詩(shī)：人，詩(shī)意地棲居在大地上。哲學(xué)和文學(xué)呀，只不過(guò)是幫助我們大家詩(shī)意地棲居在這個(gè)大地上。藝術(shù)的真實(shí)是人生境界的升華。所以你看徐悲鴻畫(huà)的馬，它并不是草原奔馳的駿馬;齊白石畫(huà)的蝦，也不是水中游曳的蝦；但是，你看看徐悲鴻畫(huà)的馬、齊白石畫(huà)的蝦，你不感到是一種生命的躍動(dòng)嗎？這不就叫作藝術(shù)么！藝術(shù)使我們體驗(yàn)到了生活的深度，使我們的情感獲得了一種真實(shí)的深度。

再說(shuō)倫理的世界。我把今天的社會(huì)思潮概括為兩極對(duì)立模式的消解，英雄主義時(shí)代的隱退，高層精英文化的失落，理性主義權(quán)威的弱化和人類(lèi)精神家園的困惑。人類(lèi)面對(duì)著許多共同的問(wèn)題。前幾天聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織在我們這里舉辦的世界哲學(xué)節(jié)，在大會(huì)上我寫(xiě)了一句話(huà)：“趨利避害，這個(gè)不言而喻的生存邏輯卻成為當(dāng)代人類(lèi)的最為嚴(yán)峻的行為選擇”。

人就是趨利避害的么，趨利避害這個(gè)不言而喻的生存邏輯卻構(gòu)成了當(dāng)代人類(lèi)最為嚴(yán)峻的行為選擇了。為什么現(xiàn)在凸顯了環(huán)境問(wèn)題呢？大家都知道，現(xiàn)在內(nèi)地正在講科學(xué)發(fā)展觀，叫作全面、協(xié)調(diào)、可持續(xù)發(fā)展。為什么？這就是今天人類(lèi)面對(duì)著的共同的問(wèn)題。解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，決不僅僅是依賴(lài)技術(shù)手段，更重要的是解決社會(huì)問(wèn)題，解決人之間的關(guān)系問(wèn)題，解決發(fā)展的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與選擇問(wèn)題。倫理的世界呢，它是一種小我世界的超越，在我們今天的社會(huì)生活當(dāng)中就具有更加重要的作用了。

馬克思說(shuō)，人的本質(zhì)在其現(xiàn)實(shí)性上，是社會(huì)關(guān)系的總和。人不是一種純自然的存在，而是一種社會(huì)性的存在，而這種社會(huì)性的存在最重要的問(wèn)題就是，小我與大我的關(guān)系，離開(kāi)了大我沒(méi)有小我的存在。所以這種倫理的世界是一種小我世界的超越。

人類(lèi)面對(duì)著的一個(gè)共同的問(wèn)題，是發(fā)展的問(wèn)題。我們?cè)谧约旱男袨檫x擇當(dāng)中必須深切地思考發(fā)展的問(wèn)題。今天不是都講經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化么，在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的過(guò)程當(dāng)中，我們必須有一種深層的時(shí)代意識(shí)，關(guān)于人類(lèi)生存和發(fā)展的自我意識(shí)。

為什么20世紀(jì)80年代以來(lái)由羅爾斯的《正義論》為標(biāo)志的政治哲學(xué)會(huì)成為顯學(xué)？因?yàn)楣?、正義問(wèn)題成為當(dāng)代人類(lèi)面對(duì)的重大問(wèn)題。我們?cè)谧膶W(xué)文史哲的、政經(jīng)法的都有，無(wú)論你在文科的意義上學(xué)習(xí)哪門(mén)學(xué)科，一個(gè)共同的問(wèn)題都是為當(dāng)代人類(lèi)的發(fā)展提供一種理論的前提。用解釋學(xué)大師伽達(dá)默爾的話(huà)說(shuō)，理論是實(shí)踐的反義詞，理論就是對(duì)實(shí)踐的反駁，我們只有掌握了理論才能夠使我們作出一種比較好的選擇。

大家都在學(xué)習(xí)科學(xué)。科學(xué)同樣是人類(lèi)把握世界的一種基本方式，它是經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界的超越。什么叫科學(xué)？科學(xué)給予我們一種普遍必然性的認(rèn)識(shí)，從而對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界作出規(guī)律性的解釋和預(yù)見(jiàn)?？茖W(xué)的世界是一個(gè)超驗(yàn)的世界，超越了經(jīng)驗(yàn)的世界。

正因?yàn)槭沁@樣，所以卡西爾在《人論》里邊說(shuō)，科學(xué)在這個(gè)世界上具有無(wú)與倫比的作用，它使人類(lèi)的思維達(dá)到了一種極致?！霸谖覀儸F(xiàn)代世界中，再?zèng)]有第二種力量可以與科學(xué)思想的力量相匹敵”?？茖W(xué)改變了我們的世界圖景，改變了我們的思維方式，也改變了我們的價(jià)值觀念?？茖W(xué)改變了我們的生活。我們以科學(xué)的方式去把握這個(gè)世界，從而以科學(xué)的方式規(guī)范我們自己的思想和行為。這就是一種經(jīng)驗(yàn)世界的超越。

最后我們?cè)倩氐秸軐W(xué)。人類(lèi)面對(duì)千差萬(wàn)別、千變?nèi)f化、無(wú)邊無(wú)際、無(wú)始無(wú)終的茫茫宇宙，又面對(duì)有生有死、有愛(ài)有恨、有聚有散、有得有失的有限人生，總會(huì)馳騁自己的探索宇宙、人生奧秘的智慧，超越自己所理解的有限的世界。哲學(xué)是對(duì)有限世界的超越。人們俯仰古今而覺(jué)時(shí)間之無(wú)限，環(huán)顧天地而覺(jué)空間之永恒，回顧自身而覺(jué)人之立于兩者間的萬(wàn)千感慨！人總是試圖超越“哀吾生之須臾，羨長(zhǎng)江之無(wú)窮”的困惑與迷惘，以自己的超越性為人生尋求“安身立命之本”?！皭?ài)智”的哲學(xué)，就是一種超越有限對(duì)永恒的無(wú)奈、實(shí)現(xiàn)“天人合一”的渴望。人的超越性，以哲學(xué)的方式迸發(fā)出無(wú)比瑰麗的光彩。

文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期意大利畫(huà)家拉斐爾繪的《雅典學(xué)派》，圖中站立者為柏拉圖和

亞里士多德。

第三篇：維特根斯坦 哲學(xué)演講(英文)

維特根斯坦 哲學(xué)演講（英文）

2006年6月27日

來(lái)源:論壇主題I am going to exclude from our discussion questions which are answered by experience.Philosophical problems are not solved by experience, for what we talk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful.Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it.It is like advancing and retreating from a tree stump and seeing different things.We go nearer, remember the rules, and feel satisfied, then retreat and feel dissatisfied.2 Words and chess pieces are analogous;knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece.Now how do the rules enter into playing the game? What is the difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? I do not deny there is a difference, but I want to say that knowing how a piece is to be used is not a particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on.The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words.“How is the word used?” and “What is the grammar of the word?” I shall take as being the same question.The phrase, “bearer of the word”, standing for what one points to in giving an ostensive definition, and “meaning of the word” have entirely different grammars;the two are not synonymous.To explain a word such as “red” by pointing to something gives but one rule for its use, and in cases where one cannot point, rules of a different sort are given.All the rules together give the meaning, and these are not fixed by giving an ostensive definition.The rules of grammar are entirely independent of one another.Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use.Are the rules, for example, ~ ~ p = p for negation, responsible to the meaning of a word? No.The rules constitute the meaning, and are not responsible to it.The meaning changes when one of its rules changes.If, for example, the game of chess is defined in terms of its rules, one cannot say the game changes if a rule for moving a piece were changed.Only when we are speaking of the history of the game can we talk of change.Rules are arbitrary in the sense that they are not responsible to some sort of reality-they are not similar to natural laws;nor are they responsible to some meaning the word already has.If someone says the rules of negation are not arbitrary because negation could not be such that ~~p =~p, all that could be meant is that the latter rule would not correspond to the English word “negation”.The objection that the rules are not arbitrary comes from the feeling that they are responsible to the meaning.But how is the meaning of “negation” defined, if not by the rules? ~ ~p =p does not follow from the meaning of “not” but constitutes it.Similarly, p.p ?q.?.q does not depend on the meanings of “and” and “implies”;it constitutes their meaning.If it is said that the rules of negation are not arbitrary inasmuch as they must not contradict each other, the reply is that if there were a contradiction among them we should simply no longer call certain of them rules.“It is part of the grammar of the word 'rule' that if 'p' is a rule, 'p.~p' is not a rule.” 3 Logic proceeds from premises just as physics does.But the primitive propositions of physics are results of very general experience, while those of logic are not.To distinguish between the propositions of physics and those of logic, more must be done than to produce predicates such as experiential and self-evident.It must be shown that a grammatical rule holds for one and not for the other.4 In what sense are laws of inference laws of thought? Can a reason be given for thinking as we do? Will this require an answer outside the game of reasoning? There are two senses of “reason”: reason for, and cause.These are two different orders of things.One needs to decide on a criterion for something's being a reason before reason and cause can be distinguished.Reasoning is the calculation actually done, and a reason goes back one step in the calculus.A reason is a reason only inside the game.To give a reason is to go through a process of calculation, and to ask for a reason is to ask how one arrived at the result.The chain of reasons comes to an end, that is, one cannot always give a reason for a reason.But this does not make the reasoning less valid.The answer to the question, Why are you frightened?, involves a hypothesis if a cause is given.But there is no hypothetical element in a calculation.To do a thing for a certain reason may mean several things.When a person gives as his reason for entering a room that there is a lecture, how does one know that is his reason? The reason may be nothing more than just the one he gives when asked.Again, a reason may be the way one arrives at a conclusion, e.g., when one multiplies 13 x 25.It is a calculation, and is the justification for the result 325.The reason for fixing a date might consist in a man's going through a game of checking his diary and finding a free time.The reason here might be said to be included in the act he performs.A cause could not be included in this sense.We are talking here of the grammar of the words “reason” and “cause”: in what cases do we say we have given a reason for doing a certain thing, and in what cases, a cause? If one answers the question “Why did you move your arm?” by giving a behaviouristic explanation, one has specified a cause.Causes may be discovered by experiments, but experiments do not produce reasons.The word “reason” is not used in connection with experimentation.It is senseless to say a reason is found by experiment.The alternative, “mathematical argument or experiential evidence?” corresponds to “reason or cause?” 5 Where the class defined by f can be given by an enumeration, i.e., by a list,(x)fx is simply a logical product and(?x)fx a logical sum.E.g.,(x)fx.=.fa.fb.fc, and(?x)fx.=.fa v fb v fc.Examples are the class of primary colours and the class of tones of the octave.In such cases it is not necessary to add “and a, b, c,...are the only f's” The statement, “In this picture I see all the primary colours”, means “I see red and green and blue...”, and to add “and these are all the primary colours” says neither more nor less than “I see all...”;whereas to add to “a, b, c are people in the room” that a, b, c are all the people in the room says more than “(x)x is a person in the room”, and to omit it is to say less.If it is correct to say the general proposition is a shorthand for a logical product or sum, as it is in some cases, then the class of things named in the product or sum is defined in the grammar, not by properties.For example, being a tone of the octave is not a quality of a note.The tones of an octave are a list.Were the world composed of “individuals” which were given the names “a”, “b”, “c”, etc., then, as in the case of the tones, there would be no proposition “and these are all the individuals”.Where a general proposition is a shorthand for a product, deduction of the special proposition fa from(x)fx is straightforward.But where it is not, how does fa follow? “Following” is of a special sort, just as the logical product is of a special sort.And although(?x)fx.fa.=.fa is analogous to p v q.p.=.p, fa “follows” in a different way in the two cases where(?x)fx is a shorthand for a logical sum and where it is not.We have a different calculus where(?x)fx is not a logical sum fa is not deduced asp is deduced in the calculus of T's and F's from p v q.p.I once made a calculus in which following was the same in all cases.But this was a mistake.Note that the dots in the disjunctions v fb v fc v...have different grammars:(1)“and so on” indicates laziness when the disjunction is a shorthand for a logical sum, the class involved being given by an enumeration,(2)“and so on” is an entirely different sign with new rules when it does not correspond to any enumeration, e.g., “2 is even v 4 is even v 6 is even...”,(3)“and so on” refers to positions in visual space, as contrasted with positions correlated with the numbers of the mathematical continuum.As an example of(3)consider “There is a circle in the square”.Here it might appear that we have a logical sum whose terms could be determined by observation, that there is a number of positions a circle could occupy in visual space, and that their number could be determined by an experiment, say, by coordinating them with turns of a micrometer.But there is no number of positions in visual space, any more than there is a number of drops of rain which you see.The proper answer to the question, “How many drops did you see?”, is many, not that there was a number but you don't know how many.Although there are twenty circles in the square, and the micrometer would give the number of positions coordinated with them, visually you may not see twenty.6 I have pointed out two kinds of cases(I)those like “In this melody the composer used all the notes of the octave”, all the notes being enumerable,(2)those like “All circles in the square have crosses”.Russell's notation assumes that for every general proposition there are names which can be given in answer to the question “Which ones?”(in contrast to, “What sort?”).Consider(?x)fx, the notation for “There are men on the island” and for “There is a circle in the square”.Now in the case of human beings, where we use names, the question “Which men?” has meaning.But to say there is a circle in the square may not allow the question “Which?” since we have no names “a”, “b”, etc.for circles.In some cases it is senseless to ask “Which circle?”, though “What sort of circle is in the square-a red one?, a large one?” may make sense.The questions “which?” and “What sort?” are muddled together [so that we think both always make sense].Consider the reading Russell would give of his notation for “There is a circle in the square”: “There is a thing which is a circle in the square”.What is the thing? Some people might answer: the patch I am pointing to.But then how should we write “There are three patches”? What is the substrate for the property of being a patch? What does it mean to say “All things are circles in the square”, or “There is not a thing that is a circle in the square” or “All patches are on the wall”? What are the things? These sentences have no meaning.To the question whether a meaning mightn't be given to “There is a thing which is a circle in the square” I would reply that one might mean by it that one out of a lot of shapes in the square was a circle.And “All patches are on the wall” might mean something if a contrast was being made with the statement that some patches were elsewhere.7 What is it to look for a hidden contradiction, or for the proof that there is no contradiction? “To look for” has two different meanings in the phrases “to look for something at the North Pole”, “to look for a solution to a problem”.One difference between an expedition of discovery to the North Pole and an attempt to find a mathematical solution is that with the former it is possible to describe beforehand what is looked for, whereas in mathematics when you describe the solution you have made the expedition and have found what you looked for.The description of the proof is the proof itself, whereas to find the thing at the North Pole it is not enough to describe it.You must make the expedition.There is no meaning to saying you can describe beforehand what a solution will be like in mathematics except in the cases where there is a known method of solution.Equations, for example, belong to entirely different games according to the method of solving them.To ask whether there is a hidden contradiction is to ask an ambiguous question.Its meaning will vary according as there is, or is not, a method of answering it.If we have no way of looking for it, then “contradiction” is not defined.In what sense could we describe it? We might seem to have fixed it by giving the result, a not= a.But it is a result only if it is in organic connection with the construction.To find a contradiction is to construct it.If we have no means of hunting for a contradiction, then to say there might be one has no sense.We must not confuse what we can do with what the calculus can do.8 Suppose the problem is to find the construction of a pentagon.The teacher gives the pupil the general idea of a pentagon by laying off lengths with a compass, and also shows the construction of triangles, squares, and hexagons.These figures are coordinated with the cardinal numbers.The pupil has the cardinal number 5, the idea of construction by ruler and compasses, and examples of constructions of regular figures, but not the law.Compare this with being taught to multiply.Were we taught all the results, or weren't we? We may not have been taught to do 61 x 175, but we do it according to the rule which we have been taught.Once the rule is known, a new instance is worked out easily.We are not given all the multiplications in the enumerative sense, but we are given all in one sense: any multiplication can be carried out according to rule.Given the law for multiplying, any multiplication can be done.Now in telling the pupil what a pentagon is and showing what constructions with ruler and compasses are, the teacher gives the appearance of having defined the problem entirely.But he has not, for the series of regular figures is a law, but not a law within which one can find the construction of the pentagon.When one does not know how to construct a pentagon one usually feels that the result is clear but the method of getting to it is not.But the result is not clear.The constructed pentagon is a new idea.It is something we have not had before.What misleads us is the similarity of the pentagon constructed to a measured pentagon.We call our construction the construction of the pentagon because of its similarity to a perceptually regular five-sided figure.The pentagon is analogous to other regular figures;but to tell a person to find a construction analogous to the constructions given him is not to give him any idea of the construction of a pentagon.Before the actual construction he does not have the idea of the construction.When someone says there must be a law for the distribution of primes despite the fact that neither the law nor how to go about finding it is known, we feel that the person is right.It appeals to something in us.We take our idea of the distribution of primes from their distribution in a finite interval.Yet we have no clear idea of the distribution of primes.In the case of the distribution of even numbers we can show it thus: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,..., and also by mentioning a law which we could write out algebraically.In the case of the distribution of primes we can only show: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,...Finding a law would give a new idea of distribution just as a new idea about the trisection of an angle is given when it is proved that it is not possible by straight edge and compasses.Finding a new method in mathematics changes the game.If one is given an idea of proof by being given a series of proofs, then to be asked for a new proof is to be asked for a new idea of proof.Suppose someone laid off the points on a circle in order to show, as he imagined, the trisection of an angle.We would not be satisfied, which means that he did not have our idea of trisection.In order to lead him to admit that what he had was not trisection we should have to lead him to something new.Suppose we had a geometry allowing only the operation of bisection.The impossibility of trisection in this geometry is exactly like the impossibility of trisecting an angle in Euclidean geometry.And this geometry is not an incomplete Euclidean geometry.9 Problems in mathematics are not comparable in difficulty;they are entirely different problems.Suppose one was told to prove that a set of axioms is free from contradiction but was supplied with no method of doing it.Or suppose it was said that someone had done it, or that he had found seven 7's in the development of pi.Would this be understood? What would it mean to say that there is a proof that there are seven 7's but that there is no way of specifying where they are? Without a means of finding them the concept of pi is the concept of a construction which has no connection with the idea of seven 7's.Now it does make sense to say “There are seven 7's in the first 100 places”, and although “There are seven 7's in the development” does not mean the same as the italicised sentence, one might maintain that it nevertheless makes sense since it follows from something which does make sense.Even though you accepted this as a rule, it is only one rule.I want to say that if you have a proof of the existence of seven 7's which does not tell you where they are, the sentence for the existence theorem has an entirely different meaning than one for which a means for finding them is given.To say that a contradiction is hidden, where there is nevertheless a way of finding it, makes sense, but what is the sense in saying there is a hidden contradiction when there is no way? Again, compare a proof that an algebraic equation of nth degree has n roots, in connection with which there is a method of approximation, with a proof for which no such method exists.Why call the latter a proof of existence? Some existence proofs consist in exhibiting a particular mathematical structure, i.e., in “constructing an entity”.If a proof does not do this, “existence proof” and “existence theorem” are being used in another sense.Each new proof in mathematics widens the meaning of “proof”.With Fermat's theorem, for example, we do not know what it would be like for it to be proved.What “existence” means is determined by the proof.The end-result of a proof is not isolated from the proof but is like the end surface of a solid.It is organically connected with the proof which is its body.In a construction as in a proof we seem first to give the result and then find the construction or proof.But one cannot point out the result of a construction without giving the construction.The construction is the end of one's efforts rather than a means to the result.The result, say a regular pentagon, only matters insofar as it is an incitement to make certain manipulations.It would not be useless.For example, a teacher who told someone to find a colour beyond the rainbow would be expressing himself incorrectly, but what he said would have provided a useful incitement to the person who found ultra-violet.10 If an atomic proposition is one which does not contain and, or, or apparent variables, then it might be said that it is not possible to distinguish atomic from molecular propositions.For p may be written as p.p or ~ ~p, and fa as fa v fa or as(?x)fx.x = a.But “and”, “or”, and the apparent variables are so used that they can be eliminated from these expressions by the rules.So we can disregard these purportedly molecular expressions.The word “and”, for example, is differently used in cases where it can be eliminated from those in which it cannot.Whether a proposition is atomic, i.e., whether it is not a truth-function of other propositions, is to be decided by applying certain methods of analysis laid down strictly.But when we have no method, it makes no sense to say there may be a hidden logical constant.The question whether such a seemingly atomic proposition as “It rains” is molecular, that it is, say, a logical product, is like asking whether there is a hidden contradiction when there is no method of answering the question.Our method might consist in looking up definitions.We might find that “It's rotten weather”, for example, means “It is cold and damp”.Having a means of analysing a proposition is like having a method for finding out whether there is a 6 in the product 25 x 25, or like having a rule which allows one to see whether a proposition is tautologous.Russell and I both expected to find the first elements, or “individuals”, and thus the possible atomic propositions, by logical analysis.Russell thought that subject-predicate propositions, and 2-term relations, for example, would be the result of a final analysis.This exhibits a wrong idea of logical analysis: logical analysis is taken as being like chemical analysis.And we were at fault for giving no examples of atomic propositions or of individuals.We both in different ways pushed the question of examples aside.We should not have said “We can't give them because analysis has not gone far enough, but we'll get there in time”.Atomic propositions are not the result of an analysis which has yet to be made.We can talk of atomic propositions if we mean those which on their face do not contain “and”, “or”, etc., or those which in accordance with methods of analysis laid down do not contain these.There are no hidden atomic propositions.11 In teaching a child language by pointing to things and pronouncing the words for them, where does the use of a proposition start? If you teach him to touch certain colours when you say the word “red”, you have evidently not taught him sentences.There is an ambiguity in the use of the word “proposition” which can be removed by making certain distinctions.I suggest defining it arbitrarily rather than trying to portray usage.What is called understanding a sentence is not very different from what a child does when he points to colours on hearing colour words.Now there are all sorts of language-games suggested by the one in which colour words are taught: games of orders and commands, of question and answer, of questions and “Yes” and “No.” We might think that in teaching a child such language games we are not teaching him a language but are only preparing him for it.But these games are complete;nothing is lacking.It might be said that a child who brought me a book when I said “The book, please” would not understand this to mean “Bring me a book”, as would an adult.But this full sentence is no more complete than “book”.Of course “book” is not what we call a sentence.A sentence in a language has a particular sort of jingle.But it is misleading to suppose that “book” is a shorthand for something longer which might be in a person's mind when it is understood.The word “book” might not lack anything, except to a person who had never heard elliptic sentences, in which case he would need a table with the ellipses on one side and sentences on the other.Now what role do truth and falsity play in such language-games? In the game where the child responds by pointing to colours, truth and falsity do not come in.If the game consists in question and answer and the child responds, say, to the question “How many chairs?”, by giving the number, again truth and falsity may not come in, though it might if the child were taught to reply “Six chairs agrees with reality”.If he had been taught the use of “true” and “false” instead of “Yes” and “No”, they would of course come in.Compare how differently the word “false” comes into the game where the child is taught to shout “red” when red appears and the game where he is to guess the weather, supposing now that we use the word “false” in the following circumstances: when he shouts “green” when something red appears, and when he makes a wrong guess about the weather.In the first case the child has not got hold of the game, he has offended against the rules;in the second he has made a mistake.The two are like playing chess in violation of the rules, and playing it and losing.In a game where a child is taught to bring colours when you say “red”, etc., you might say that “Bring me red” and “I wish you to bring me red” are equivalent to “red”;in fact that until the child understands “red” as information about the state of mind of the person ordering the colour he does not understand it at all.But “I wish you to bring me red” adds nothing to this game.The order “red” cannot be said to describe a state of mind, e.g., a wish, unless it is part of a game containing descriptions of states of mind.“I wish...” is part of a larger game if there are two people who express wishes.The word “I” is then not replaceable by “John”.A new multiplicity means having another game.I have wanted to show by means of language-games the vague way in which we use “l(fā)anguage”, “proposition”, “sentence”.There are many things, such as orders, which we may or may not call propositions;and not only one game can be called language.Language-games are a clue to the understanding of logic.Since what we call a proposition is more or less arbitrary, what we call logic plays a different role from that which Russell and Frege supposed.We mean all sorts of things by “proposition”, and it is wrong to start with a definition of a proposition and build up logic from that.If “proposition” is defined by reference to the notion of a truth-function, then arithmetic equations are also propositions-which does not make them the same as such a proposition as “He ran out of the building”.When Frege tried to develop mathematics from logic he thought the calculus of logic was the calculus, so that what followed from it would be correct mathematics.Another idea on a par with this is that all mathematics could be derived from cardinal arithmetic.Mathematics and logic were one building, with logic the foundation.This I deny;Russell's calculus is one calculus among others.It is a bit of mathematics.12 It was Frege's notion that certain words are unique, on a different level from others, e.g., “word”, “proposition”, “world”.And I once thought that certain words could be distinguished according to their philosophical importance: “grammar”, “l(fā)ogic”, “mathematics”.I should like to destroy this appearance of importance.How is it then that in my investigations certain words come up again and again? It is because I am concerned with language, with troubles arising from a particular use of language.The characteristic trouble we are dealing with is due to our using language automatically, without thinking about the rules of grammar.In general the sentences we are tempted to utter occur in practical situations.But then there is a different way we are tempted to utter sentences.This is when we look at language, consciously direct our attention on it.And then we make up sentences of which we say that they also ought to make sense.A sentence of this sort might not have any particular use, but because it sounds English we consider it sensible.Thus, for example, we talk of the flow of time and consider it sensible to talk of its flow, after the analogy of rivers.13 If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, e.g., “When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner”.Suppose the log makes a bang on passing me.We can say these bangs are separated by equal, or unequal, intervals.We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as another set.But the equality or inequality of intervals so measured is entirely different from that measured by a clock.The phrase “l(fā)ength of interval” has its sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and differs according to the method of measurement.Hence the criteria for equality of intervals between passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different.We cannot say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree from those an hour apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is an hour long.And to say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is different from saying that the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly than the interval between another pair.Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart.We have an experience of what might be called the velocity of these(though not what is measured by a clock).Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense.But if we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy;really nothing has passed more quickly.To say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine something flowing.We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time.When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river is before them.Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed.The reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of the flow is embodied in our language.Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that someone said time was circular.Would this be right or wrong? Neither.It would only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular time.However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one that suggests itself very vigorously.Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning and will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end.It might be said that there is an experience which would verify these statements.Compare this with saying that time ceases.What is the criterion for its ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when “Time River” ceases.Suppose we had no substantive “time”, that we talked only of the passing of logs.Then we could have a measurement of time without any substantive “time”.Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the logs came to an end.We could in this sense talk of time coming to an end.Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved in “Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago”? Has time been created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the analogy of “Has this chair been made?”, and are like asking whether order has been created(a “before” and “after”).“Time” as a substantive is terribly misleading.We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it.Discussion of “the flow of time” shows how philosophical problems arise.Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending it on looking at it.We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean.Once conscious of “time” as a substantive, we ask then about the creation of time.14 If I asked for a description of yesterday's doings and you gave me an account, this account could be verified.Suppose what you gave as an account of yesterday happened tomorrow.This is a possible state of affairs.Would you say you remembered the future? Or would you say instead that you remembered the past? Or are both statements senseless? We have here two independent orders of events(1)the order of events in our memory.Call this memory time.(2)the order in which information is got by asking different people, 53 o'clock.Call this information time.In information time there will be past and future with respect to a particular day.And in memory time, with respect to an event, there will also be past and future.Now if you want to say that the order of information is memory time, you can.And if you are going to talk about both information and memory time, then you can say that you remember the past.If you remember that which in information time is future, you can say “I remember the future”.15 It is not a priori that the world becomes more and more disorganised with time.It is a matter of experience that disorganisation comes at a later rather than an earlier time.It is imaginable, for example, that by stirring nuts and raisins in a tank of chocolate they become unshuffled.But it is not a matter of experience that equal distributions of nuts and raisins must occur when they are swished about.There is no experience of something necessarily happening.To say that if equal distribution does not occur there must be a difference in weight of the nuts and raisins, even though these have not been weighed, is to assume some other force to explain the unshuffling.We tend to say that there must be some explanation if equal distribution does not occur.Similarly, we say of a planet's observed eccentric behaviour that there must be some planet attracting it.This is analogous to saying that if two apples were added to two apples and we found three, one must have vanished.Or like saying that a die must fall on one of six sides.When the possibility of a die's falling on edge is excluded, and not because it is a matter of experience that it falls only on its sides, we have a statement which no experience will refute-a statement of grammar.Whenever we say that something must be the case we are using a norm of expression.Hertz said that wherever something did not obey his laws there must be invisible masses to account for it.This statement is not right or wrong, but may be practical or impractical.Hypotheses such as “invisible masses”, “unconscious mental events” are norms of expression.They enter into language to enable us to say there must be causes.(They are like the hypothesis that the cause is proportional to the effect.If an explosion occurs when a ball is dropped, we say that some phenomenon must have occurred to make the cause proportional to the effect.On hunting for the phenomenon and not finding it, we say that it has merely not yet been found.)We believe we are dealing with a natural law a priori, whereas we are dealing with a norm of expression that we ourselves have fixed.Whenever we say that something must be the case we have given an indication of a rule for the regulation of our expression, as if one were to say “Everybody is really going to Paris.True, some don't get there, but all their movements are preliminary”.The statement that there must be a cause shows that we have got a rule of language.Whether all velocities can be accounted for by the assumption of invisible masses is a question of mathematics, or grammar, and is not to be settled by experience.It is settled beforehand.It is a question of the adopted norm of explanation.In a system of mechanics, for example, there is a system of causes, although there may be no causes in another system.A system could be made up in which we would use the expression “My breakdown had no causes”.If we weighed a body on a balance and took the different readings several times over, we could either say that there is no such thing as absolutely accurate weighing or that each weighing is accurate but that the weight changes in an unaccountable manner.If we say we are not going to account for the changes, then we would have a system in which there are no causes.We ought not say that there are no causes in nature, but only that we have a system in which there are no causes.Determinism and indeterminism are properties of a system which are fixed arbitrarily.16 We begin with the question whether the toothache someone else has is the same as the toothache I have.Is his toothache merely outward behaviour? Or is it that he has the same as I am having now but that I don't know it since I can only say of another person that he is manifesting certain behaviour? A series of questions arises about personal experience.Isn't it thinkable that I have a toothache in someone else's tooth? It might be argued that my having toothache requires my mouth.But the experience of my having toothache is the same wherever the tooth is that is aching, and whoever's mouth it is in.The locality of pain is not given by naming a possessor.Further, isn't it imaginable that I live all my life looking in a mirror, where I saw faces and did not know which was my face, nor how my mouth was distinguished from anyone else's? If this were in fact the case, would I say I had toothache in my mouth? In a mirror I could speak with someone else's mouth, in which case what would we call me? Isn't it thinkable that I change my body and that I would have a feeling correlated with someone's else's raising his arm? The grammar of “having toothache” is very different from that of “having a piece of chalk”, as is also the grammar of “I have toothache” from “Moore has toothache”.The sense of “Moore has toothache” is given by the criterion for its truth.For a statement gets its sense from its verification.The use of the word “toothache” when I have toothache and when someone else has it belongs to different games.(To find out with what meaning a word is used, make several investigations.For example, the words “before” and “after” mean something different according as one depends on memory or on documents to establish the time of an event.)Since the criteria for “He has toothache” and “I have toothache” are so different, that is, since their verifications are of different sorts, I might seem to be denying that he has toothache.But I am not saying he really hasn't got it.Of course he has it: it isn't that he behaves as if he had it but really doesn't.For we have criteria for his really having it as against his simulating it.Nevertheless, it is felt that I should say that I do not know he has it.Suppose I say that when he has toothache he has what I have, except that I know it indirectly in his case and directly in mine.This is wrong.Judging that he has toothache is not like judging that he has money but I just can't see his billfold.Suppose it is held that I must judge indirectly since I can't feel his ache.Now what sense is there to this? And what sense is there to “I can feel my ache”? It makes sense to say “His ache is worse than mine”, but not to say “I feel my toothache” and “Two people can't have the same pain”.Consider the statement that no two people can ever see the same sense datum.If being in the same position as another person were taken as the criterion for someone's seeing the same sense datum as he does, then one could imagine a person seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through someone's head.But if there is no criterion for seeing the same datum, then “I can't know that he sees what I see” does not make sense.We are likely to muddle statements of fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements.Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to be confused.The question whether someone else has what I have when I have toothache may be meaningless, though in an ordinary situation it might be a question of fact, and the answer, “He has not”, a statement of fact.But the philosopher who says of someone else, “He has not got what I have”, is not stating a fact.He is not saying that in fact someone else has not got toothache.It might be the case that someone else has it.And the statement that he has it has the meaning given it, that is, whatever sense is given by the criterion.The difficulty lies in the grammar of “having toothache”.Nonsense is produced by trying to express in a proposition something which belongs to the grammar of our language.By “I can't feel his toothache” is meant that I can't try.It is the character of the logical cannot that one can't try.Of course this doesn't get you far, as you can ask whether you can try to try.In the arguments of idealists and realists somewhere there always occur the words “can”, “cannot”, “must”.No attempt is made to prove their doctrines by experience.The words “possibility” and “necessity” express part of grammar, although patterned after their analogy to “physical possibility” and “physical necessity”.Another way in which the grammars of “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” differ is that it does not make sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, whereas it is sensible to say “He seems to have toothache”.The statements “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” have different verifications;but “verification” does not have the same meaning in the two cases.The verification of my having toothache is having it.It makes no sense for me to answer the question, “How do you know you have toothache?”, by “I know it because I feel it”.In fact there is something wrong with the question;and the answer is absurd.Likewise the answer, “I know it by inspection”.The process of inspection is looking, not seeing.The statement, “I know it by looking”, could be sensible, e.g., concentrating attention on one finger among several for a pain.But as we use the word “ache” it makes no sense to say that I look for it: I do not say I will find out whether I have toothache by tapping my teeth.Of “He has toothache” it is sensible to ask “How do you know?”, and criteria can be given which cannot be given in one's own case.In one's own case it makes no sense to ask “How do I know?” It might be thought that since my saying “He seems to have toothache” is sensible but not my saying a similar thing of myself, I could then go on to say “This is so for him but not for me”.Is there then a private language I am referring to, which he cannot understand, and thus that he cannot understand my statement that I have toothache? If this is so, it is not a matter of experience that he cannot.He is prevented from understanding, not because of a mental shortcoming but by a fact of grammar.If a thing is a priori impossible, it is excluded from language.Sometimes we introduce a sentence into our language without realising that we have to show rules for its use.(By introducing a third king into a chess game we have done nothing until we have given rules for it.)How am I to persuade someone that “I feel my pain” does not make sense? If he insists that it does he would probably say “I make it a rule that it makes sense”.This is like introducing a third king, and I then would raise many questions, for example, “Does it make sense to say I have toothache but don't feel it?” Suppose the reply was that it did.Then I could ask how one knows that one has it but does not feel it.Could one find this out by looking into a mirror and on finding a bad tooth know that one has a toothache? To show what sense a statement makes requires saying how it can be verified and what can be done with it.Just because a sentence is constructed after a model does not make it part of a game.We must provide a system of applications.The question, “What is its verification?”, is a good translation of “How can one know it?”.Some people say that the question, “How can one know such a thing?”, is irrelevant to the question, “What is the meaning?” But an answer gives the meaning by showing the relation of the proposition to other propositions.That is, it shows what it follows from and what follows from it.It gives the grammar of the proposition, which is what the question, “What would it be like for it to be true?”, asks for.In physics, for example, we ask for the meaning of a statement in terms of its verification.I have remarked that it makes no sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, which presupposes that it makes sense to say I can or cannot, doubt it.The use of the word “cannot” here is not at all like its use in “I cannot lift the scuttle”.This brings us to the question: What is the criterion for a sentence making sense? Consider the answer, “It makes sense if it is constructed according to the rules of grammar”.Then does this question mean anything: What must the rules be like to give it sense? If the rules of grammar are arbitrary, why not let the sentence make sense by altering the rules of grammar? Why not simply say “I make it a rule that this sentence makes sense”? 17 To say what rules of grammar make up a propositional game would require giving the characteristics of propositions, their grammar.We are thus led to the question, What is a proposition? I shall not try to give a general definition of “proposition”, as it is impossible to do so.This is no more possible than it is to give a definition of the word “game”.For any line we might draw would be arbitrary.Our way of talking about propositions is always in terms of specific examples, for we cannot talk about these more generally than about specific games.We could begin by giving examples such as the proposition “There is a circle on the blackboard 2 inches from the top and 5 inches from the side”.Let us represent this as “(2,5)”.Now let us construct something that would be said to make no sense: “(2,5,7)”.This would have to be explained(and you could give it sense), or else you could say it is a mistake or a joke.But if you say it makes no sense, you can explain why by explaining the game in which it has no use.Nonsense can look less and less like a sentence, less and less like a part of language.“Goodness is red” and “Mr.S came to today's redness” would be called nonsense, whereas we would never say a whistle was nonsense.An arrangement of chairs could be taken as a language, so that certain arrangements would be nonsense.Theoretically you could always say of a symbol that it makes sense, but if you did so you would be called upon to explain its sense, that is, to show the use you give it, how you operate with it.The words “nonsense' and ”sense“ get their meaning only in particular cases and may vary from case to case.We can still talk of sense without giving a clear meaning to ”sense“, just as we talk of winning or losing without the meaning of our terms being absolutely clear.In philosophy we give rules of grammar wherever we encounter a difficulty.To show what we do in philosophy I compare playing a game by rules and just playing about.We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word.But there is no such thing as a completed grammar.However, giving a rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not wish to follow.When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby complete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term, as if they did not know how.Logical analysis is an antidote.Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words.18 To return to the differing grammars of ”I have toothache“ and ”He has toothache“, which show up in the fact that the statements have different verifications and also in the fact that it is sensible to ask, in the latter case, ”How do I know this?“, but not in the former.The solipsist is right in implying that these two are on different levels.I have said that we confuse ”I have a piece of chalk“ and ”He has a piece of chalk“ with ”I have an ache“ and ”He has an ache“.In the case of the first pair the verifications are analogous, although not in the case of the second pair.The function ”x has toothache“ has various values, Smith, Jones, etc.But not I.I is in a class by itself.The word ”I“ does not refer to a possessor in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in ”I have a cigar“.We could have a language from which ”I“ is omitted from sentences describing a personal experience.{Instead of saying ”I think“ or ”I have an ache“ one might say ”It thinks“(like ”It rains“), and in place of ”I have an ache“, ”There is an ache here“.Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of ”I“.We constantly judge a language from the standpoint of the language we are accustomed to, and hence we think we describe phenomena incompletely if we leave out personal pronouns.It is as though we had omitted pointing to something, since the word ”I“ seems to point to a person.But we can leave out the word ”I“ and still describe the phenomenon formerly described.It is not the case that certain changes in our symbolism are really omissions.One symbolism is in fact as good as the next;no one symbolism is necessary.The solipsist who says ”O(jiān)nly my experiences are real“ is saying that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real.This is absurd if taken to be a statement of fact.Now if it is logically impossible for another person to have toothache, it is equally so for me to have toothache.To the person who says ”O(jiān)nly I have real toothache“ the reply should be: ”If only you can have real toothache, there is no sense in saying 'Only I have real toothache'.Either you don't need 'I' or you don't need 'real'...'I' is no longer opposed to anything.You had much better say 'There is toothache'.“ The statement, ”O(jiān)nly I have real toothache,“ either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is a grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule.The solipsist wishes to say, ”I should like to put, instead of the notation 'I have real toothache' 'There is toothache' “.What the solipsist wants is not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes.Were the solipsist to embody in his notation the restriction of the epithet ”real“ to what we should call his experiences and exclude ”A has real toothache“(where A is not he), this would come to using ”There is real toothache“ instead of ”Smith(the solipsist)has toothache“.Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word ”I “ in describing a personal experience.Acceptance of such a change is tempting] because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ.Ask yourself, How do I, the person, come in? How, for example, does a person enter into the description of a visual sensation? If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it.We can say the visual field has certain internal properties, but its being mine is not essential to its description.That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or a pain, to belong to someone.There will be no such thing as my image or someone else's.The locality of a pain has nothing to do with the person who has it: it is not given by naming a possessor.Nor is a body or an organ of sight necessary to the description of the visual field.The same applies to the description of an auditory sensation.The truth of the proposition, ”The noise is approaching my right ear“, does not require the existence of a physical ear;it is a description of an auditory experience, the experience being logically independent of the existence of my ears.The audible phenomenon is in an auditory space, and the subject who hears has nothing to do with the human body.Similarly, we can talk of a toothache without there being any teeth, or of thinking without there being a head involved.Pains have a space to move in, as do auditory experiences and visual data.The idea that a visual field belongs essentially to an organ of sight or to a human body having this organ is not based on what is seen.It is based on such facts of experience as that closing one's lids is accompanied by an event in one's visual field, or the experience of raising one's arm towards one's eye.It is an experiential proposition that an eye sees.We can establish connections between a human body and a visual field which are very different from those we are accustomed to.It is imaginable that I should see with my body rather than with my eyes, or that I could see with someone else's eyes and have toothache in his tooth.If we had a tube to our eyes and looked into a mirror, the idea of a perceiving organ could be dispensed with.Were all human bodies seen in a mirror, with a loudspeaker making the sounds when mouths moved, the idea of an ego speaking and seeing would become very different.20 The solipsist does not go through with a notation from which either ”I“ or ”real“ is deleted.He says ”O(jiān)nly my experiences are real“, or ”O(jiān)nly I have real toothache“, or ”The only pain that is real is what I feel“.This provokes someone to object that surely his pain is real.And this would not really refute the solipsist, any more than the realist refutes the idealist.The realist who kicks the stone is correct in saying it is real if he is using the word ”real“ as opposed to ”not real“.His rejoinder answers the question, ”Is it real or hallucinatory?“, but he does not refute the idealist who is not deterred by his objection.They still seem to disagree.Although the solipsist is right in treating ”I have toothache“ as being on a different level from ”He has toothache“, his statement that he has something that no one else has, and that of the person who denies it, are equally absurd.”O(jiān)nly my experiences are real“ and ”Everyone's experiences are real“ are equally nonsensical.21 Let us turn to a different task.What is the criterion for ”This is my body“? There is a criterion for ”This is my nose“: the nose would be possessed by the body to which it is attached.There is a temptation to say there is a soul to which the body belongs and that my body is the body that belongs to me.Suppose that all bodies were seen in a mirror, so that all were on the same level.I could talk of A's nose and Any nose in the same way.But if I singled out a body as mine, the grammar changes.Pointing to a mirror body and saying ”This is my body“ does not assert the same relation of possession between me and my body as is asserted by ”This is A's nose“ between A's body and A's nose.What is the criterion for one of the bodies being mine? It might be said that the body which moved when I had a certain feeling will be mine.(Recall that the ”I“ in ”I have a feeling“ does not denote a possessor.)Compare ”Which of these is my body?“ with ”Which of these is A's body?“, in which ”my“ is replaced by ”A's“.What is the criterion for the truth of the answer to the latter? There is a criterion for this, which in the case of the answer to ”Which is mine?“ there is not.If all bodies are seen in a mirror and the bodies themselves become transparent but the mirror images remain, my body will be where the mirror image is.And the criterion for something being my nose will be very different from its belonging to the body to which it is attached.In the mirror world, will deciding which body is mine be like deciding which body is A's? If the latter is decided by referring to a voice called ”A“ which is correlated to the body, then if I answer ”Which is my body?“ by referring to a voice called Wittgenstein, it will make no sense to ask which is my voice.There are two kinds of use of the word ”I“ when it occurs in answer to the question ”Who has toothache?“.For the most part the answer ”I“ is a sign coming from a certain body.If when people spoke, the sounds always came from a loudspeaker and the voices were alike, the word ”I“ would have no use at all: it would be absurd to say ”I have toothache“.The speakers could not be recognised by it.)Although there is a sense in which answering ”I“ to the question, ”Who has toothache?“, makes a reference to a body, even to this body of mine, my answer to the question whether I have toothache is not made by reference to any body.I have no need of a criterion.My body and the toothache are independent.Thus one answer to the question ”Who?“ is made by reference to a body, and another seems not to be, and to be of a different kind.22 Let us turn to the view, which is connected with ”All that is real is my experience“, namely, solipsism of the present moment: ”All that is real is the experience of the present moment“.(Cf.Wm.James' remark ”The present thought is the only thinker“, which makes the subject of thinking equivalent to the experience.)We may be inclined to make our language such that we will call only the present experience ”experience“.This will be a solipsistic language, but of course we must not make a solipsistic language without saying exactly what we mean by the word which in our old language meant ”present“.Russell said that remembering cannot prove that what is remembered actually occurred, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with acts of remembering intact.We could go on to say that it might have been created one minute ago, and finally, that it might have been created in the present moment.Were this latter the situation we should have the equivalent of ”All that is real is the present moment“.Now if it is possible to say the world was created five minutes ago, could it be said that the world perished five minutes ago? This would amount to saying that the only reality was five minutes ago.Why does one feel tempted to say ”The only reality is the present“? The temptation to say this is as strong as that of saying that only my experience is real.The person who says only the present is real because past and future are not here has before his mind the image of something moving.past < present < future.This image is mispast present future leading, just as the blurred image we would draw of our visual field is misleading inasmuch as the field has no boundary.That the statement ”O(jiān)nly the present experience is real“ seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing us in space.When in philosophy we talk of the present, we seem to be referring to a sort of Euclidean point.Yet when we talk of present experience it is impossible to identify the present with such a point.The difficulty is with the word ”present“.There is a grammatical confusion here.A person who says the present experience alone is real is not stating an empirical fact, comparable to the fact that Mr.S.always wears a brown suit.And the person who objects to the assertion that the present alone is real with ”Surely the past and future are just as real“ somehow does not meet the point.Both statements mean nothing.By examining Russell's hypothesis that the world was created five minutes ago I shall try to explain what I mean in saying that it is meaningless.Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it.Whatever our experience might be, it would be in agreement with it.The point of saying that something has happened derives from there being a criterion for its truth.To lay down the evidence for what happened five minutes ago is like laying down rules for making measurements.The question as to what evidence there can be is a grammatical one.It concerns the sorts of actions and propositions which would verify the statement.It is a simple matter to make up a statement which will agree with experience because it is such that no proposition can refute it, e.g., ”There is a white rabbit between two chairs whenever no observations or verifications are being carried out.“ Some people would say that this statement says more than ”There is no white rabbit between the chairs“, just as some would say it means something to say the world was created five minutes ago.When such statements are made they are somehow connected with a picture, say, a picture of creation.Hence it is that such sentences seem to mean something.But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have no function although they do not look to be useless.I shall try to explain further what I mean by these sentences being meaningless by describing figures on two planes, one on plane I, which is to be projected, and the other, on plane II, the projection: Now suppose the mode of projecting a circle on plane I was not orthogonal.In consequence, to say ”There is a circle in plane II“ would not be quite the same as saying that there is a circle in plane I.For a range of angles through which the circle is projected, the figures on plane II are all more or less circular.But now suppose the rays of light effecting the projection were allowed to vary through any range of angles.Then what meaning has it to say there are circles in plane II? When we give the method of projection such freedom, assertions about the projection become meaningless, though we still keep the picture of a circle in mind.Russell's assertion about the creation of the world is like this.The fact that there is a picture on plane I does not make a verifiable projection on plane II.We are accustomed to certain pictures being projected in a given way.But as soon as we leave this mode of projection, statements do not have their usual significance.When I say ”That means nothing“ I mean that you have altered your mode of projection.That it seems to mean something is due to an image of well-known things.23 The words ”thinkable“ and ”imaginable“ have been used in comparable ways, what is imaginable being a special case of what is thinkable, e.g., a proposition and a picture.Now we can replace a visual image by a painted picture, and the picture can be described in words.Pictures and words are intertranslatable, for example, as A(5,7), B(2,3).A proposition is like, or something like, a picture.Let us limit ourselves to propositions describing the distribution of objects in a room.The distribution could be pictured in a painting.It would be sensible to say that a certain system of propositions corresponds to those painted and that other propositions do not correspond to pictures, for example，that someone whistles.Suppose we call the imaginable what can be painted, and the thinkable only what is imaginable.This would limit the word ”thinkable“ to the paintable.Now of course one can extend the way of picturing, for example, to someone whistling:

This is a new way of picturing, for a ”rising“ note is different from a vertical rise in space.With this new way we can imagine more, i.e., think more.People who make metaphysical assertions such as ”O(jiān)nly the present is real“ pretend to make a picture, as opposed to some other picture.I deny that they have done this.But how can I prove it? I cannot say ”This is not a picture of anything, it is unthinkable“ unless I assume that they and I have the same limitations on picturing.If I indicate a picture which the words suggest and they agree, then I can tell them they are misled, that the imagery in which they move does not lead them to such expressions.It cannot be denied that they have made a picture, but we can say they have been misled.We can say ”It makes no sense in this system, and I believe this is the system you are using'?.If they reply by introducing a new system, then I have to acquiesce.My method throughout is to point out mistakes in language.I am going to use the word “philosophy” for the activity of pointing out such mistakes.Why do I wish to call our present activity philosophy, when we also call Plato's activity philosophy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the subject.Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental discomforts the old was supposed to.24 With regard to a proposition about the external world or to a proposition of mathematics it is frequently asked “How do you know it?” There is an ambiguity here between reasons and causes.The interpretation we do not want is “How, causally, did you reach the result?” It does not matter what caused you to get the result;this is irrelevant.The important thing is to determine what you know when you are knowing it.To illustrate the distinction between reason and cause, let us take the question, How does one know the molecules of a gas are in motion? The answer might be psychological, for example, that you will see them if you have had enough to eat.If the kinetic theory were wrong, then no experience at all need correspond to it;but at the same time there would be a criterion for movement of molecules in a gas.The inventor of the theory would say “I am going to take such-and-such as a criterion”.What is taken as a reason for belief in a theory is thus not a matter of experience but a matter of convention.If I believe the theory after taking clear soup, this is a cause of my belief, not a reason.When I am asked for a reason for the belief, what is expected, as part of the answer, is what I believe.The different ways of verifying “It rained yesterday” help to determine the meaning.Now a distinction should be made between “being the meaning of” and “determining the meaning of”.That I remember its raining yesterday helps determine the meaning of “It rained yesterday”, but it is not true that “It rained yesterday” means “I remember that...” We can distinguish between primary and secondary criteria of its raining.If someone asks “What is rain?”, you can point to rain falling, or pour some water from a watering can.These constitute primary criteria.Wet pavements constitute a secondary criterion and determine the meaning of “rain” in a less important way.Two questions have been raised, which need to be answered now.(I)How could the meaning of a sentence about the past be given by a sentence about the present?(2)The verification of a proposition about the past is a set of propositions involving present and future tenses.If the verification gives the meaning, is part of the meaning left out? My reply is to deny that the verification gives the meaning.It merely determines the meaning, i.e., determines its use, or grammar.25 When we understand a statement we often have certain characteristic experiences connected with it and with the words it contains.But the meaning of a symbol in our language is not the feelings it arouses nor the momentary impression it makes on us.The sense of a sentence is neither a succession of feelings nor one definite feeling.If you want to know the meaning of a sentence, ask for its verification.I stress the point that the meaning of a symbol is its place in the calculus, the way it is used.Of course if the symbol were used differently there might be a different feeling, but the feeling is not what concerns us.To know the meaning of a symbol is to know its use.We can regard understanding a symbol, when we take its meaning in at a glance, as intuitive.Or understanding it may be discursive: knowing its meaning by knowing its use.Knowing the use of a sign is not a certain state lasting a certain time.(If we say knowing how to play chess is a certain state of mind, we have to say it is a hypothetical state.)Attending to the way the meaning of a sentence is explained makes clear the connection between meaning and verification.Reading that Cambridge won the boat race, which verifies “Cambridge won”, is obviously not the meaning, but it is connected with it.“Cambridge won” is not a disjunction, “I saw the race or I read the result or...” It is more complicated.Yet if we ruled out any one of the means of verifying the statement we would alter its meaning.It would upset our grammar if we excluded as a verification something that always accompanied winning.And if we did away with all means of verifying it we would destroy the meaning.It is clear that not every sort of verification is actually used to verify “Cambridge won”, nor would just any verification give the meaning.The different verifications of the boat race being won have different places in the grammar of “boat race being won”.There is a mistaken conception of my view concerning the connection between meaning and verification which turns the view into idealism.This is that a boat race = the idea of a boat race.The mistake here is in trying to explain something in terms of something else.It lies back of Russell's definition of number, which we expect to tell us what a number is.The difficulty with these explanations in terms of something else is that the something else may have an entirely different grammar.Consider the word “chair”.If there could be no visual picture of a chair, the word would have a different meaning.That one can see a chair is essential to the meaning of the word.But a visual picture of a chair is not a chair.What would it mean to sit on the visual picture of a chair? Of course we can explain what a chair is by showing pictures of it.But that does not mean that a chair is a complex of views.The tendency is to ask “What is a chair?”;but I ask how the word “chair” is used.An intimately connected consideration concerns the words “time” and “l(fā)ength”.People have felt that time is independent of the way it is measured.This is to forget what one would have to do to explain the word.Time is what is measured by a clock.To verify “The concert lasted an hour” you must tell how you measured time.It is a misunderstanding about both time and length that they are independent of measurement.If we have many ways of measuring which do not contradict, we do not assume any one way of measuring in explaining these words.The measuring which is connected with the meaning of a term is not exact, though in physics we do sometimes specify the temperature of the measuring rod.If, for example, we try to make the notion of a “precise time” more exact, we do not push it back far, for the striking of a clock at “precisely 4:30” takes time.And “to be here at precisely 4:30” is also not precise: should one be opening the door or be inside? Likewise with “having the same colour”.The verification of “These have the same colour” may be that one can't see a colour transition when they are put side by side, or that one can't tell the difference when they are apart, or that one can't tell one from the other when one is substituted for the other.These ways of testing give different meanings for “having the same colour”.26 If the meaning of a word is determined by the rules for its use, does this mean that its meaning is the list of rules? No.Nor is the meaning, as is sometimes the case with the bearer, something one can point to.The use of money and the use of words are analogous.Money is not always used to buy things which can be pointed to, e.g., when it buys permission to sit in a theatre, or a title, or one's life.The ideas of meaning and sense are obsolete.Unless “sense” is used in such sentences as “This has no sense” or “This has the same sense as that”, we are not concerned with sense.In some cases it is not clear whether a statement is experiential or grammatical.How far is giving the verification of a proposition a grammatical statement about it? So far as it is, it can explain the meaning of its terms.Insofar as it is a matter of experience, as when one names a symptom, the meaning is not explained.27 There is a problem connected with our talk of meaning: Does such talk indicate that I think meaning to be the subject matter of philosophy? Are we talking about something of more general importance than chairs, etc., so that we can take it that questions of meaning are the central questions of philosophy? Is meaning a metalogical idea? No.For there are problems in philosophy that are not concerned with the meaning of “meaning”, though perhaps with the meaning of other words, e.g., “time”.The word “meaning” has no higher place than these.What gives it a different place is that our investigations are about language and about puzzles arising from the use of language.“Grammar”, “proposition”, “meaning” thus figure more often than other words, though investigation concerning the word “meaning” is on the same level as a grammatical investigation of the word “time”.Of course there isn't a philosophical grammar and ordinary English grammar, the former being more complete since it includes ostensive definitions such as the correlation of “white” with several of its applications, Russell's theory of descriptions, etc.These are not to be found in ordinary grammar books;but this is not the important difference.The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher.One obvious difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary qualities, neither of which is of concern to us.Moreover, we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression “Time flows”.We shall have to justify calling our comments on such a sentence grammar.If we say time flows in a different sense than water does, explaining this by an ostensive definition, we have indicated a way of explaining the word.And we have left the realm of what is generally called grammar.Our object is to get rid of certain puzzles.The grammarian has no interest in these;his aims and the philosopher's are different.We are pulling ordinary grammar to bits.28 Let us look at the grammar of ethical terms, and such terms as “God”, “soul”, “mind”, “concrete”, “abstract”.One of the chief troubles is that we take a substantive to correspond to a thing.Ordinary grammar does not forbid our using a substantive as though it stood for a physical body.The words “soul” and “mind” have been used as though they stood for a thing, a gaseous thing.'what is the soul?“ is a misleading question, as are questions about the words ”concrete“ and ”abstract“, which suggest an analogy with solid and gaseous instead of with a chair and the permission to sit on a chair.Another muddle consists in using the phrase ”another kind“ after the analogy of ”a different kind of chair“, e.g., that transfinite numbers are another kind of number than rationals, or unconscious thoughts a different kind of thought from conscious ones.The difference in the case of the latter pair is not analogous to that between a chair we see and a chair we don't see.The word ”thought“ is used differently when prefaced by these adjectives.What happens with the words ”God“ and ”soul“ is what happens with the word ”number“.Even though we give up explaining these words ostensively, by pointing, we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms.The reason people say that a number is a scratch on the blackboard is the desire to point to something.No sort of process of pointing is connected with explaining ”number“, any more than it is with explaining ”permission to sit in a seat at the theatre“.Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word ”God“.I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one.For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God.This would throw light on the use of the word.What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word.29 Changing the meaning of a word, e.g., ”Moses“, when one is forced to give a different explication, does not indicate that it had no meaning before.The similarity between new and old uses of a word is like that between an exact and a blurred boundary.Our use of language is like playing a game according to the rules.Sometimes it is used automatically, sometimes one looks up the rules.Now we get into difficulties when we believe ourselves to be following a rule.We must examine to see whether we are.Do we use the word ”game“ to mean what all games have in common? It does not follow that we do, even though we were to find something they have in common.Nor is it true that there are discrete groups of things called ”games“.What is the reason for using the word ”good“? Asking this is like asking why one calls a given proposition a solution to a problem.It can be the case that one trouble gives way to another trouble, and that the resolution of the second difficulty is only connected with the first.For example, a person who tries to trisect an angle is led to another difficulty, posed by the question ”Can it be done?“ Proof of the impossibility of a trisection takes the place of the first investigation;the investigation has changed.When there is an argument about whether a thing is good, the discussion shows what we are talking about.In the course of the argument the word may begin to get a new grammar.In view of the way we have learned the word ”good“ it would be astonishing if it had a general meaning covering all of its applications.I am not saying it has four or five different meanings.It is used in different contexts because there is a transition between similar things called ”good“, a transition which continues, it may be, to things which bear no similarity to earlier members of the series.We cannot say ”If we want to find out the meaning of 'good' let's find what all cases of good have in common“.They may not have anything in common.The reason for using the word ”good“ is that there is a continuous transition from one group of things called good to another.30 There is one type of explanation which I wish to criticise, arising from the tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause, and then to try to show the phenomenon to be ”really“ another.This tendency is enormously strong.It is what is responsible for people saying that punishment must be one of three things, revenge, a deterrent, or improvement.This way of looking at things comes out in such questions as, Why do people hunt?, Why do they build high buildings? Other examples of it are the explanation of striking a table in a rage as a remnant of a time when people struck to kill, or of the burning of an effigy because of its likeness to human beings, who were once burnt.Frazer concludes that since people at one time were burnt, dressing up an effigy for burning is what remains of that practice.This may be so;but it need not be, for this reason.The idea which underlies this sort of method is that every time what is sought is the motive.People at one time thought it useful to kill a man, sacrifice him to the god of fertility, in order to produce good crops.But it is not true that something is always done because it is useful.At least this is not the sole reason.Destruction of an effigy may have its own complex of feelings without being connected with an ancient practice, or with usefulness.Similarly, striking an object may merely be a natural reaction in rage.A tendency which has come into vogue with the modern sciences is to explain certain things by evolution.Darwin seemed to think that-an emotion got its importance from one thing only, utility.A baby bares its teeth when angry because its ancestors did so to bite.Your hair stands on end when you are frightened because hair standing on end served some purpose for animals.The charm of this outlook is that it reduces importance to utility.31 Let us change the topic to a discussion of good.One of the ways of looking at questions in ethics about good is to think that all things said to be good have something in common, just as there is a tendency to think that all things we call games have something in common.Plato's talk of looking for the essence of things was very like talk of looking for the ingredients in a mixture, as though qualities were ingredients of things.But to speak of a mixture, say of red and green colours, is not like speaking of a mixture of a paint which has red and green paints as ingredients.Suppose you say ”Good is a quality of human actions and events“.This is apparently an intelligible sentence.If I ask ”How does one know an action has this quality?“, you might tell me to examine it and I would find out.Now am I to investigate the movements making up the action, or are they only symptoms of goodness? If they are a symptom, then there must be some independent verification, otherwise the word ”symptom“ is meaningless.Now there is an important question which arises about goodness: Can one know an action in all its details and yet not know whether it is good? A similar question arises about beauty.Consider the beauty of a face.If all its shapes and colours are determined, is its beauty determined also? Or are these merely symptoms of beauty, which is to be determined otherwise? You may say that beauty is an indefinable quality, and that to say a particular face is beautiful comes to saying it has the indefinable quality.Is our scrutiny intended to find out whether a face has this indefinable quality, or merely to find out what the face is like? If the former, then the indefinable quality can be attributed to a particular arrangement of colours.But it need not be, and we must have some independent verification.If no separate investigation is required, then we only mean by a beautiful face a certain arrangement of colours and shapes.32 The attribute beauty has been analysed as what all beautiful things have in common.Consider one such property, agreeableness.I call attention to the fact that in studying the laws of harmony in a harmony text there is no mention of ”agreeableness“;psychology drops out.To say Lear is agreeable is to say something nondescriptive.And to many things this adjective is wholly inapplicable.Hence there is no basis for building up a calculus.The phrase ”beautiful colour“, for example, can have a hundred meanings, depending on the occasion on which we use it.Very often the adjectives we use are those applicable to the face of a person.This is the case with ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“.Consider how we learn such words.We do not as children discover the quality of beauty or ugliness in a face and find that these are qualities a tree has in common with it.The words ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“ are bound up with the words they modify, and when applied to a face are not the same as when applied to flowers and trees.We have in the latter a similar ”game“.For example, the adjective ”stupid“ is inapplicable to coals, except as you see a face in them.By a face being stupid we may mean it is the sort of face that really belongs to a stupid person;but usually not.Instead, it is a character of the particular expression of a face.This is not to say it is a character of the distribution of lines and colours.If it were, then one might ask how to find out whether the distribution is stupid.Is stupidity part of the distribution? The word ”stupid“ as applied to hands is still another game.The same is the case with ”beautiful“.It is bound up with a particular game.And similarly in ethics: the meaning of the word ”good“ is bound up with the act it modifies.How can one know whether an action or event has the quality of goodness? And can one know the action in all of its details and not know whether it is good? That is, is its being good something that is independently experienced? Or does its being good follow from the thing's properties? If I want to know whether a rod is elastic I can find out by looking through a microscope to see the arrangement of its particles, the nature of their arrangement being a symptom of its elasticity, or inelasticity.Or I can test the rod empirically, e.g., see how far it can be pulled out.The question in ethics, about the goodness of an action, and in aesthetics, about the beauty of a face, is whether the characteristics of the action, the lines and colours of the face, are like the arrangement of particles: a symptom of goodness, or of beauty.Or do they constitute them? a cannot be a symptom of b unless there is a possible independent investigation of b.If no separate investigation is possible, then we mean by ”beauty of face“ a certain arrangement of colours and spaces.Now no arrangement is beautiful in itself.The word ”beauty“ is used for a thousand different things.Beauty of face is different from that of flowers and animals.That one is playing utterly different games is evident from the difference that emerges in the discussion of each.We can only ascertain the meaning of the word ”beauty“ by seeing how we use it.33 What has been said of ”beautiful“ will apply to ”good“ in only a slightly different way.Questions which arise about the latter are analogous to those raised about beauty: whether beauty is inherent in an arrangement of colours and shapes, i.e., such that on describing the arrangement one would know it is beautiful, or not;or whether this arrangement is a symptom of beauty from which the thing's being beautiful is concluded.In an actual aesthetic controversy or inquiry several questions arise:(1)How do we use such words as ”beautiful“?(2)Are these inquiries psychological? Why are they so different, and what is their relation to psychology?(3)What features makes us say of a thing that it is the ideal, e.g., the ideal Greek profile? Note that in an aesthetic controversy the word ”beautiful“ is scarcely ever used.A different sort of word crops up: ”correct“, ”incorrect“, ”right“, ”wrong“.We never say ”This is beautiful enough“.We only use it to say, ”Look, how beautiful“, that is, to call attention to something.The same thing holds for the word ”good“.34 Why do we say certain changes bring a thing nearer to an ideal, e.g., making a door lower, or the bass in music quieter.It is not that we want in different cases to produce the same effect, namely, an agreeable feeling.What made the ideal Greek profile into an ideal, what quality? Actually what made us say it is the ideal is a certain very complicated role it played in the life of people.For example, the greatest sculptors used this form, people were taught it, Aristotle wrote on it.Suppose one said the ideal profile is the one occurring at the height of Greek art.What would this mean? The word ”height“ is ambiguous.To ask what ”ideal“ means is the same as asking what ”height“ and ”decadence“ mean.You would need to describe the instances of the ideal in a sort of serial grouping.And the word is always used in connection with one particular thing, for there is nothing in common between roast beef, Greek art, and German music.The word ”decadence“ cannot be explained without specific examples, and will have different meanings in the case of poetry, music, and sculpture.To explain what decadence in music means you would need to discuss music in detail.The various arts have some analogy to each other, and it might be said that the element common to them is the ideal.But this is not the meaning of ”the ideal“.The ideal is got from a specific game, and can only be explained in some specific connection, e.g., Greek sculpture.There is no way of saying what all have in common, though of course one may be able to say what is common to two sculptures by studying them.In the statement that their beauty is what approaches the ideal, the word ”ideal“ is not used as is the word ”water“, which stands for something that can be pointed to.And no aesthetic investigation will supply you with a meaning of the word ”ideal“ which you did not have before.When one describes changes made in a musical arrangement as being directed to bringing the arrangement of parts nearer to an ideal, the ideal is not before us like a straight line which is set before us when we try to draw it.(When questioned about what we are doing we might cite another tune which we thought not to be as near the ideal.)Some people say we have an ideal before our minds in the same way we have a memory image when we recognise a colour.It may happen that you have a picture in mind with which the colour recognised is compared, but this is rare.To see how the ideal comes in, say in making the bass quieter, look at what is being done and at one's being dissatisfied with the music as it is.Can one call this ”action“ of making the bass quieter an investigation? No, not in the sense of scientific investigation.No truth is found, except the psychological fact that I am satisfied with the result.In what sense is aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? The first thing we might say of a beautiful arrangement of colours-a flower, a meadow, or a face-is that it gives us pleasure.In saying these all give pleasure we speak as if the pleasure differed in degree rather than that the pleasures were of a different sort.Pain and pleasure do not belong on one scale, any more than the scale from boiling hot to ice cold is one of degree.They differ in kind.When a man jumps out of the window rather than meet the police he is not choosing the ”more agreeable“.Of course there are cases where we do weigh pleasures, as in choosing between cinemas.But this is not always the case.And it happens only sometimes that when we do not choose the lesser pain or the greater pleasure we choose what will produce these in the long run.One might think that it is entirely a matter of psychology whether something is good or beautiful, that in comparing musical arrangements, for example, one is making a psychological experiment to determine which produces the more pleasing effect.If this were true then the statement that beauty is what gives pleasure is an experiential one.But what people who say this wish to say is that it is not a matter of experience that beauty is what gives pleasure.Their statement is really a sort of tautology.In aesthetic investigation the thing we are not interested in is causal connections, whereas in psychology we are.This is the main point of difference.To the question ”Why is this beautiful?“ we are accustomed to being satisfied with answers which cite causes instead of reasons.To name causal connections is to give an hypothesis.Giving a cause does not remove the aesthetic puzzle one feels when asked what makes a thing beautiful.It is useful to remind yourself of the answers given to the opposite question, ”What is wrong with this poem or melody?“, for the answer to the first question is of the same kind.The answer to ”What is wrong with this melody?“ is like the statement, ”This is too loud“, not like the statement that it produces sulphur in the blood.The sort of experiment we carry on to discover people's likes and dislikes is not aesthetics.If it were, then you could say aesthetics is a matter of taste.In aesthetics the question is not ”Do you like it?“ but ”Why do you like it?“ Whenever we get to the point where the question is one of taste, it is no longer aesthetics.In aesthetic discussion what we are doing is more like solving a mathematical problem.It is not a psychological one.Aesthetic discussion is something that goes on inside the range of likes and dislikes.It goes on before any question of taste arises.A statement about a visual or auditory impression, as against what causes it, need not be psychological.That a sorrowful face becomes more sorrowful as the mouth turns downward is not a statement of psychology.In aesthetics we are not interested in causal connections but in description of a thing.35 What is the justification for a feature in a work of art? I disagree with the answer ”Something else would produce the wrong effect“.Is it that you are satisfied, once something is found which removes the difficulty? What reasons can one give for being satisfied? The reasons are further descriptions.Aesthetics is descriptive.What it does is to draw one's attention to certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these features.To tell a person ”This is the climax“ is like saying ”This is the man in the puzzle picture“.Our attention is drawn to a certain feature, and from that point forward we see that feature.The reasons one gives for feeling satisfied have nothing to do with psychology.These, the aesthetic reasons, are given by placing things side by side, as in a court of law.If one gave psychological reasons for choosing a simile, those would not be reasons in aesthetics.They would be causes, not reasons.Stating a cause would be offering a hypothesis.Insofar as the remedy for the disagreeable feeling of top-heaviness of a door is like a remedy for a headache, a question concerning what remedy to prescribe is not a question of aesthetics.The aesthetic reason for feeling dissatisfied, as opposed to its cause, is not a proposition of psychology.A good example of a cause for dissatisfaction which I might have, say, with the way someone is playing a waltz, is that I have seen the waltz danced and know how it should be played.This does not give a reason for my dissatisfaction.The person who plays it, and I, have a different ideal of the waltz, and to give the reason for my dissatisfaction demands a description.Similarly, if a composition is felt to have a wrong ending.36 I wish to remark on a certain sort of connection which Freud cites, between the foetal position and sleep, which looks to be a causal one but which is not, inasmuch as a psychological experiment cannot be made.His explanation does what aesthetics does: puts two factors together.Another matter which Freud treats psychologically but whose investigation has the character of an aesthetic one is the nature of jokes.The question, ”What is the nature of a joke?“, is like the question, ”What is the nature of a lyric poem?“ I wish to examine in what way Freud's theory is a hypothesis and in what way not.The hypothetical part of his theory, the subconscious, is the part which is not satisfactory.Freud thinks it is part of the essential mechanism of a joke to conceal something, say, a desire to slander someone, and thereby to make it possible for the subconscious to express itself.He says that people who deny the subconscious really cannot cope with post-hypnotic suggestion, or with waking up at an unusual hour of one's own accord.When we laugh without knowing why, Freud claims that by psychoanalysis we can find out.I see a muddle here between a cause and a reason.Being clear why you laugh is not being clear about a cause.If it were, then agreement to the analysis given of the joke as explaining why you laugh would not be a means of detecting it.The success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the person's agreement.There is nothing corresponding to this in physics.Of course we can give causes for our laughter, but whether those are in fact the causes is not shown by the person's agreeing that they are.A cause is found experimentally.The psychoanalytic way of finding why a person laughs is analogous to an aesthetic investigation.For the correctness of an aesthetic analysis must be agreement of the person to whom the analysis is given.The difference between a reason and a cause is brought out as follows: the investigation of a reason entails as an essential part one's agreement with it, whereas the investigation of a cause is carried out experimentally.”What the patient agrees to can't be a hypothesis as to the cause of his laughter, but only that so and-so was the reason why he laughed." Of course the person who agrees to the reason was not conscious at the time of its being his reason.But it is a way of speaking to say the reason was subconscious.It may be expedient to speak in this way, but the subconscious is a hypothetical entity which gets its meaning from the verifications these propositions have.What Freud says about the subconscious sounds like science, but in fact it is just a means of representation New regions of the soul have not been discovered, as his writings suggest.The display of elements of a dream, for example, a hat(which may mean practically anything)is a display of similes.As in aesthetics, things are placed side by side so as to exhibit certain features.These throw light on our way of looking at a dream;they are reasons for the dream.But his method of analysing dreams is not analogous to a method for finding the causes of stomach-ache.It is a confusion to say that a reason is a cause seen from the inside.A cause is not seen from within or from without.It is found by experiment.In enabling one to discover the reasons for laughter psychoanalysis provides merely a representation of processes.

第四篇：在哲學(xué)課上的一次演講

在哲學(xué)課上的一次演講

各位老師，各位同學(xué)下午好： 今天很高興也很榮幸能站在這個(gè)講臺(tái)上和大家一起共同探討對(duì)一些問(wèn)題的看法。我知道接下來(lái)我講的內(nèi)容可能并不是十分的精彩，甚至還有什么不妥的地方，還請(qǐng)各位老師和同學(xué)多多包涵。在這我只是起一個(gè)拋磚引玉的作用，因?yàn)槲蚁嘈沤酉聛?lái)會(huì)有很多更優(yōu)秀的同學(xué)帶來(lái)更精彩的發(fā)言。直奔主題，今天我想和大家一起探討的是關(guān)于“開(kāi)放民間信貸”的問(wèn)題。通俗點(diǎn)說(shuō)就是“高利貸”?？梢赃@么說(shuō)，自古以來(lái)，高利貸都是躲在陽(yáng)光背后的東西，它不被社會(huì)和政府認(rèn)可，原因是高利貸的確存在著某些負(fù)面影響?？晌ㄎ镛q證法也告訴我們，萬(wàn)事萬(wàn)物都是變化發(fā)展的，我們一定要用發(fā)展的眼光看問(wèn)題。絕不能以現(xiàn)在的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)去否定過(guò)去，當(dāng)然，也不能以過(guò)去的觀點(diǎn)評(píng)定現(xiàn)在。你不能因?yàn)槟硞€(gè)人在過(guò)去犯了錯(cuò)誤就將他一棍子打死。所有這些靜止的觀點(diǎn)都是形而上學(xué)，都應(yīng)該是我們所反對(duì)的。同樣，對(duì)于高利貸，對(duì)于民間信貸，我們也需要用發(fā)展的眼光重新審視。為什么這么說(shuō)呢？ 中國(guó)改革開(kāi)放30年來(lái)，經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展突飛猛進(jìn)，中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展也不可謂不迅速，他們?cè)诎l(fā)展中對(duì)資金的需求也越來(lái)越大?？蛇z憾的是，中國(guó)的銀行信貸卻跟不上時(shí)代的步伐，他們對(duì)中小企業(yè)和個(gè)體工商戶(hù)的金融服務(wù)少之又少，導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資困難重重，有的甚至因?yàn)槿狈Y金而不得不關(guān)門(mén)大吉，這不能不算是中國(guó)資本社會(huì)的一大悲哀。所以，在新形勢(shì)下，是政府該開(kāi)放民間信貸，讓高利貸，地下錢(qián)莊從黑暗走向光明，從地下走到地上的時(shí)候了。雖然高利貸一直都沒(méi)有實(shí)現(xiàn)合法化，可中國(guó)的地下金融交易卻一直非常之繁榮。有調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，以存貸款總額作為衡量指標(biāo)，2005年中國(guó)的民間金融，地下金融和非法金融總量約為2.9萬(wàn)億元左右。由此可見(jiàn)，民間信貸市場(chǎng)之大，前景之廣闊是不言而喻的。所以開(kāi)發(fā)民間信貸，不僅可以打破現(xiàn)在銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)的信貸壟斷地位，加快中國(guó)金融體制改革的步伐。還可以充分利用民間閑散資金，活躍產(chǎn)品和資本市場(chǎng)，拉動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。所以，政府開(kāi)放民間信貸將是順應(yīng)歷史潮流的偉大選擇，是大勢(shì)所趨，也是刻不容緩的。我們知道，美國(guó)從二戰(zhàn)以來(lái)就建立了以美元為中心的資本主義貨幣體系，成為當(dāng)今世界上唯一的超級(jí)大國(guó)，所以就時(shí)不時(shí)的喜歡干涉這個(gè)，指責(zé)那個(gè)，到處插手別國(guó)內(nèi)政，把別國(guó)都看作它的“小弟”。我們想想，美國(guó)為什么能夠這樣霸道呢？有人可能會(huì)說(shuō)因?yàn)樗袕?qiáng)大的軍事實(shí)力和先進(jìn)的科技，可我認(rèn)為這些都還不是主要的。主要的是什么？是因?yàn)樗鼡碛袕?qiáng)大的資本市場(chǎng)。你們知道嗎？美國(guó)以華爾街為中心編織了一張龐大的資本之網(wǎng)，這張網(wǎng)遍布了世界的各個(gè)角落，牽動(dòng)著全球的經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)向，2008年由美國(guó)的次貸危機(jī)而引起的全球金融危機(jī)就是最好的證明。所以說(shuō)，中國(guó)想要有一天超越美國(guó)，成為世界的主宰，就必須大力發(fā)展資本市場(chǎng)，加快金融體制創(chuàng)新，要讓中國(guó)的上海超越美國(guó)的紐約，要讓中國(guó)擁有自己的“華爾街”，也只有這樣中國(guó)才能實(shí)現(xiàn)彎道超越！現(xiàn)在流傳這樣一個(gè)說(shuō)法，未來(lái)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是貨幣的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，誰(shuí)掌握的貨幣誰(shuí)就統(tǒng)治世界！但這歸根到底還是要有完善和健全的資本市場(chǎng)。所以，加快中國(guó)的金融體制創(chuàng)新是中國(guó)領(lǐng)先世界的必經(jīng)之路。當(dāng)然，我們也都很清楚，中國(guó)要實(shí)現(xiàn)發(fā)展，實(shí)現(xiàn)超越并不是一兩句話(huà)那么簡(jiǎn)單的事情，他需要我們中國(guó)一代又一代人的共同努力和奮斗，需要我們?yōu)榱艘粋€(gè)信念而堅(jiān)持，所以我希望在中國(guó)復(fù)興的道路上也能夠留下在座的每一位同學(xué)的足跡和身影！我相信，有我們的共同努力，中國(guó)的復(fù)興之路不會(huì)遙遠(yuǎn)，中國(guó)的復(fù)興之夢(mèng)也將不再是夢(mèng)！謝謝！

2011-11-8

第五篇：哲學(xué)讀后感（共3篇）

篇1：哲學(xué)讀后感

哲學(xué)讀后感

對(duì)于中國(guó)哲學(xué)簡(jiǎn)史以及其他部分哲學(xué)書(shū)表面處理之后得到的讀后感：

全部--部分--相對(duì)立面

死亡----生存:相對(duì)的解釋.沒(méi)有死亡的感覺(jué)體會(huì)不到你還在生存.死亡可以給你存在的相對(duì)感覺(jué).如一切明天都沒(méi)有了,你會(huì)珍惜今天的所有一切.大多數(shù)時(shí)間死亡不在我們考慮范圍之內(nèi),或者是我們不可能清晰的體驗(yàn)到死亡的感覺(jué).所以我們一直認(rèn)為我們還有明天.實(shí)際上有太多的意外不在我們掌控中.grey里面的,t如果愛(ài)就說(shuō)吧,也許明天一切都沒(méi)有了.任何一個(gè)感覺(jué)和詞語(yǔ),都是要一個(gè)反襯才能體現(xiàn)出它的價(jià)值.如果世界尚沒(méi)有悲傷,那也不會(huì)有快樂(lè)了.如果某一種感覺(jué)全部的占據(jù)了你的內(nèi)心,那么你要留意去尋找相對(duì)的感覺(jué),因?yàn)槟莻€(gè)全部的感覺(jué)一定不是真實(shí)的也根本沒(méi)有價(jià)值.

日常--->慣性動(dòng)作可以讓人產(chǎn)生惰性.就是上面的全部感覺(jué),你必須要找到如何突破惰性,找到那種相對(duì)立的感覺(jué)去突破自己.

靈魂的電流--->應(yīng)該是部分感性的存在.回憶對(duì)人是重要的.是人最寶貴的財(cái)富,在一生中不停的做著計(jì)劃和回憶的互動(dòng)動(dòng)作.雖然很多理論讓你把握當(dāng)前,其實(shí),這很難.至少?gòu)囊陨系奈淖挚梢钥闯?多數(shù)是在幻想未來(lái),和回味過(guò)去.只是今天也會(huì)成為回憶,未來(lái)也會(huì)成為今天.把握當(dāng)前的心態(tài)就是要突破惰性,要在一種全部的感覺(jué)中找到那種相對(duì)立的感覺(jué).比如你有一個(gè)鉆石,你會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)擁有它.它放在你的倉(cāng)庫(kù)里面.永遠(yuǎn)不去提取.你偶爾會(huì)想想它的光芒,但實(shí)際生活中你不會(huì)天天帶著它.但是有一天你的倉(cāng)庫(kù)失竊,鉆石沒(méi)有了.你就會(huì)經(jīng)常想起那個(gè)鉆石,想如果天天帶著它的話(huà)也許倉(cāng)庫(kù)失竊的時(shí)候就不會(huì)丟了.但是你不知道哪天你的倉(cāng)庫(kù)會(huì)失竊.失竊前,你也會(huì)經(jīng)常忘記你擁有這個(gè)鉆石,這個(gè)就是計(jì)劃之內(nèi)的東西,也是在你回憶里面的東西,其實(shí)不屬于你的'現(xiàn)在.

我覺(jué)得,改變,或者是體驗(yàn)到存在感,或者價(jià)值等方法就是一定要知道相對(duì)立的體驗(yàn)感覺(jué).事物矛盾的對(duì)立面是促進(jìn)事物發(fā)展的原始動(dòng)力。靈魂的電流基本是一種情感發(fā)揮到一定程度所體現(xiàn)出來(lái)的物理現(xiàn)象.

存在主義哲學(xué)家卡爾.雅斯貝爾斯（karljaspers的觀點(diǎn):他把我們體驗(yàn)到存在邊緣的狀態(tài)定義為“邊緣狀態(tài)”。通常，我們?nèi)绱说貓?zhí)迷于和熟悉日常的生活，以至于我們不能夠看破世俗--我們用自己的觀點(diǎn)造了一個(gè)藩籬。只有當(dāng)我們處于邊緣狀態(tài)，如疾病、痛苦、煩惱或者破產(chǎn)使我們遠(yuǎn)離正常的生活，把我們放置在一個(gè)新的位置時(shí)，我們才會(huì)像一個(gè)旁觀者一樣去看待和重新審視我們的生活.我們可以說(shuō)生命和死亡就像在鏡子里互相觀望一樣，當(dāng)我們說(shuō)已經(jīng)為死亡做好了準(zhǔn)備的時(shí)候，也就意味著我們活得沒(méi)有任何遺憾；而當(dāng)我們說(shuō)自己生活得很幸福的時(shí)候，就意味著我們已經(jīng)為死亡做好了準(zhǔn)備。

其實(shí)內(nèi)心中,生活應(yīng)該正在朝著這么一個(gè)軌跡發(fā)展吧

篇2：哲學(xué)讀后感

哲學(xué)讀后感精選

當(dāng)真正用理性思考經(jīng)驗(yàn)之后，就能知道自己應(yīng)該如何做，知道哪一種人生更為理想，也更適合自己。理想代表針對(duì)未來(lái)，哲學(xué)的思考就是要讓人能夠在過(guò)去、現(xiàn)在、未來(lái)三個(gè)時(shí)間向度中連貫起來(lái)，讓自己的生命不再只是活在當(dāng)下那片片斷斷，剎那生滅的過(guò)程中而已?！?/p>

愛(ài)因斯坦曾說(shuō)過(guò)“專(zhuān)家只是訓(xùn)練有素的狗?！边@句話(huà)的用意并不在罵人，而是要提醒我們，不要只是做一個(gè)專(zhuān)家，還要設(shè)法透過(guò)自己的知識(shí)進(jìn)一步體驗(yàn)到智慧。智慧也有其自身的特點(diǎn)，總結(jié)為兩點(diǎn)：“完整”與“根本”。

因?yàn)槿梭w是物質(zhì)的，有重量、有惰性同時(shí)也是軟弱的。這種軟弱會(huì)妨礙人類(lèi)擁有智慧。比如，有時(shí)候我們希望自己能夠早起，卻怎么也爬不起來(lái)，這時(shí)候會(huì)覺(jué)得身體實(shí)在是自己最大的敵人。身體如此沉重，就是因?yàn)樗俏镔|(zhì)，所以有惰性。又有時(shí)候我們很愿意幫助別人，這代表心靈上的美好，卻可能因?yàn)樾枰〞r(shí)間、花力氣，所以懶得行動(dòng)。由此可知，人的身體是軟弱的。人應(yīng)該減少身體的控制程度，亦即要讓身體的惰性無(wú)法對(duì)個(gè)人產(chǎn)生影響力。如此，才能讓心靈自由地追求智慧。

“人生所有一切都不能帶走，故要與人分享。這種分享不單指財(cái)務(wù)，還應(yīng)包括關(guān)懷、信念、尊重等。”是啊，人本是赤條條地來(lái)又赤條條地去，何必一定要固守自己的東西，封閉自己的心靈呢？這樣或許守住了自己的財(cái)產(chǎn)，卻錯(cuò)失了許多機(jī)會(huì)，但與人分享后也許就不同了

煩惱不值得擔(dān)心，因?yàn)槟苣ゾ毘鲋腔?；死亡不值得害怕，害怕的是不知為何而死。”這很值得我們深思，現(xiàn)在人們多把擁有大量金錢(qián)和物質(zhì)的人當(dāng)作自己的偶像，以至于許多人接受教育的目的就是為了掙錢(qián)。其實(shí)擁有越多并不見(jiàn)得就越快樂(lè)，傅先生在介紹存在主義時(shí)就說(shuō)，“一個(gè)人‘有’的越多越不‘是’他自己。因?yàn)閾碛性蕉?，越?jīng)]有時(shí)間做自己?！痹诮榻B道家思想時(shí)又說(shuō)，“一個(gè)人若多思多欲就不可能快樂(lè)，因?yàn)橛麤](méi)有滿(mǎn)足會(huì)痛苦，一旦滿(mǎn)足之后，又生出更多欲望，更多痛苦?！?/p>

“一個(gè)人活在世界上，可以沒(méi)有豐富的物質(zhì)享受，可以沒(méi)有良好的制度，卻不能沒(méi)有正確的理念”。――

很多人不快樂(lè)，就是因?yàn)檎也坏饺松囊饬x。然而，人生的意義又是什么？一個(gè)人在念中學(xué)的時(shí)候，人生的'意義是要考大學(xué)；念大學(xué)的時(shí)候，人生的意義則是要順利畢業(yè)或繼續(xù)深造。這樣的意義一直往后推延，最后總是要碰到結(jié)束，而在這個(gè)關(guān)卡上，不能在以一個(gè)具體的東西作為意義了（如賺到多少錢(qián)、當(dāng)?shù)绞裁垂伲＿@個(gè)意義是一個(gè)人在生命過(guò)程中無(wú)法達(dá)成的，因此不能向外探求，只能內(nèi)向?qū)ふ遥簿褪且环N對(duì)自己的要求，要求自己達(dá)成一種最高的、圓滿(mǎn)的境界?！?/p>

篇3：哲學(xué)讀后感600字

人生就好象航海一樣，如果你沒(méi)有羅盤(pán)，就不知道自己往哪里走。羅盤(pán)就是哲學(xué)，哲學(xué)是對(duì)人生的經(jīng)驗(yàn)做全面的反省。人們可以向哲學(xué)家借這樣的一個(gè)羅盤(pán)或者指南針，參考他們思考后的見(jiàn)解，也可以在自己內(nèi)心里面啟發(fā)這樣的智慧，其實(shí)每個(gè)人的內(nèi)心都有他的羅盤(pán)，只不過(guò)他不一定經(jīng)過(guò)嚴(yán)格的訓(xùn)練或者是適當(dāng)?shù)厝シ词《业健?/p>

所以離開(kāi)人生，哲學(xué)是空洞的，它沒(méi)有內(nèi)容。如果離開(kāi)哲學(xué)的話(huà)，人生是盲目的，人生變成找不到方向，不知道該往哪里走。

很多時(shí)候教師不知不覺(jué)的在給學(xué)生們說(shuō)“你要懂人生的道理，要走好人生的每一步”，這里就有哲學(xué)的含義在里面。所以，人生的智慧，它歸結(jié)為生命歷程中不同的抉擇。

書(shū)的作者傅佩榮用三句話(huà)來(lái)描寫(xiě)哲學(xué)：第一句，培養(yǎng)智慧，這跟西方的傳統(tǒng)很接近。第二，發(fā)現(xiàn)真理。因?yàn)槿顺３０l(fā)現(xiàn)變化的事物，覺(jué)得非常迷惘，你就要發(fā)現(xiàn)變化背后有沒(méi)有不變真實(shí)的東西。比如道家，道就是最后的真實(shí)，讓你知道這些變化有來(lái)源，有歸宿。第三，驗(yàn)證價(jià)值。價(jià)值不能離開(kāi)主體，不能離開(kāi)你我他每一個(gè)人。

前面培養(yǎng)智慧，然后發(fā)現(xiàn)真理，然后去驗(yàn)證價(jià)值。這樣就會(huì)使生活產(chǎn)生具體的改變，懂得自己往哪里走，就像在航海的時(shí)候我有指南針，別人說(shuō)這個(gè)路線(xiàn)不好，但是自己知道自己為什么這樣選擇。人最怕不知道，這樣選擇是受風(fēng)氣的影響，受別人的影響，甚至是別人的操縱，結(jié)果走的路好像很多人都走，到最后不見(jiàn)得是自身愿意走的路。

由此看來(lái)哲學(xué)是人在早或者晚一定要碰到的題材。在生命的階段，尤其是遇到重大的轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)、重大的痛苦、罪惡或者是災(zāi)難，在這種情況下，人們特別需要能不能有一個(gè)方向讓我知道我這樣做是對(duì)的，或者給自身這樣一個(gè)選擇的機(jī)會(huì)，讓自身可以改變生命不同的路線(xiàn)。

哲學(xué)讀后感600字范文